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Prologue
This dissertation concerns three compositionality puzzles in the semantics of
modality and conditionals. In particular, we will discuss modal concord, anankas-
tic conditionals, and domain restricting if -clauses. Existing analyses of these
phenomena, if compositional at all, achieve compositionality by fiddling with
what the meaningful parts of the relevant constructions are. The present study
improves on these analyses by reconciling compositionality with the assumption
that all constituents involved are meaningful. I argue that for each puzzle the
trick is to find the right semantics for the constituents involved.
The dissertation consists of five chapters. Chapters 1 and 2 are introductory,
presenting standard possible world semantics for modality and conditionals re-
spectively. Readers familiar with this treatment may skip these chapters. The
subsequent chapters are each devoted to one of the puzzles mentioned above.
These chapters are pretty much self-contained. Of course, putting independent
chapters together leads to some redundancy. I have tried to eliminate this as
much as possible, but redundancies could not always be avoided. Let me now
introduce the puzzles on which these main chapters focus.
Chapter 3 concerns modal concord. Modal concord is the phenomenon that
although modality is marked twice at the linguistic surface, only one modal op-
erator is interpreted (Halliday 1970, Lyons 1977). The best examples consist of
a modal verb in combination with a modal adverb. For instance:
(1) He may perhaps have forgotten.
Crucially, this sentence does not express that it is possible that it is possible that
he has forgotten, but just that this is possible. This is surprising, for in isolation
both may and perhaps clearly suffice to introduce a modality:
(2) a. He may have forgotten.
b. Perhaps he has forgotten.
It is standard to assume thatmay and perhaps are quantifiers over possible worlds.
xi
However, together with the assumption that the meaning of (1) is determined
compositionally, this predicts a doubly modalized reading, not a concord inter-
pretation in which the two modal operators have somehow ‘merged’.
Modal concord has been analyzed in terms of syntactic agreement (Zeijlstra
2007b). The basic idea is that modal auxiliaries are semantically empty markers
of the presence of a modal operator (in (1) the adverb). For (2a) a covert operator
must be assumed. I argue that this analysis is too rigorous, for many modal verb
adverb combinations have a reading in which the verb is interpreted:
(3) Perhaps he may sleep late.
This sentence can be read as an estimation of the chance that he is allowed
sleep late: ‘It is possible that he is allowed to sleep late’. If modal auxiliaries
are meaningless, this is unexpected. Following Geurts & Huitink (2006), I argue
instead that, on one of their readings, modal adverbs perform a test on the verb
that they combine with. If the verb has the same meaning as the adverb on
its standard (non-testing) meaning, a concord reading ensues. If not, a doubly
modalized reading follows.
Chapter 4 deals with so-called anankastic conditionals. Such conditionals
state what is possible or necessary in order to achieve a certain goal. Going back
to Sæbø (2001), the classic example is:
(4) If you want to go to Harlem, you must take the A train.
This sentence expresses that the A train is the only way to get to Harlem (one
must probably accommodate some background assumptions, for instance that it
isn’t an option to walk there, etc.). While it is reasonably clear what (4) means, it
is far from clear how this meaning can be derived compositionally from the main
ingredients of the construction: if, want and must. Particularly problematic is
that want seems to make no semantic contribution: (4) says what you should do
to achieve your goal, but your goal is not to want to go to Harlem, but simply
to go there. In other words, it seems that (4) expresses a relation between the
consequent and the antecedent minus the expression of intention.
Analyses that are currently on the market, e.g. von Fintel & Iatridou (2005),
von Stechow et al. (2006), assume that anankastic conditionals are fundamen-
tally different from ‘normal’ conditionals. In order to derive the meaning of (4)
compositionally, it is assumed that (4) is ‘elliptical’ for:
(5) If you want to go to Harlem, you must take the A train (to go there).
The anankastic meaning is expressed by the modal in combination with the covert
to-clause. Since this clause doesn’t contain an expression of intention, we do not
have to worry about the contribution of want. However, on this analysis it is
surprising that one would ever utter an anankastic conditional. Why not just say
‘To go to Harlem, you must take the A train’?
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I argue that anankastic conditionals can be treated as mundane conditionals
if such conditionals are analyzed as doubly modalized structures, which involve
an implicit modal on top of the explicit one. It is the implicit modal that is
restricted by the if -clause. This modal takes us to worlds in which you want to
go to Harlem, and it is with respect to such worlds that ‘You must take the A
train’ is evaluated. This has the effect that must is sensitive to your hypothetical
goal, as what you want in such worlds is to go to Harlem.
Chapter 5 concerns domain-restricting uses of if, as exemplified in (6a) and
(6b):
(6) a. Harry always succeeds if he works hard.
b. Harry never succeeds if he works hard.
Intuitively, (6a) says that Harry succeeds in all cases in which he works hard, and
(6b) says that he does so in no cases in which he works hard. Thus, quantification
ranges over cases that satisfy the if -clause. But while the meaning of (6a) can
be derived under the assumption that always embeds a conditional, this is not
possible for (6b). In fact, it seems that if means as much as and in this sentence
‘there is no case such that Harry works hard in it and succeeds in it’. But if the
interpretation of if is sensitive to the nature of the embedding quantifier, this is
a clear violation of compositionality.
One popular solution to this puzzle is that if never corresponds to a con-
ditional connective. Instead, the if -clauses in (6a) and (6b) merely mark the
restrictor argument of always and never respectively. Through influential work
by Kratzer (1981, 1991), this has become the theory of conditionals: if -clauses
just are devices for restricting the domain of some operator or other. For ‘bare’
conditionals that do not occur in the scope of an overt quantifier, a covert operator
must be posited.
I argue that we can both assume that if corresponds to a conditional con-
nective and account for its domain restricting potential. Following Belnap (1970,
1973), I propose that two truth values aren’t enough: we need a partial semantics
for if which allows for truth value gaps whenever the antecedent is not true. I
will show that combined with the assumption that quantifiers are restricted to
cases in which their scope is defined, this gives us domain restriction. In ad-
dition, I will present three reasons for wanting to have conditional connectives
in the logical forms of natural language. This accounts for (i) the interpersonal
traffic of conditionals in dialogues, cf. von Fintel (2007), (ii) the restriction of
several quantifiers by the same if -clause, (iii) domain restriction by coordinated
if -clauses.
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Chapter 1
Semantics for modals
The present chapter introduces possible worlds semantics for modal expressions.
The basic idea is that modals quantify over possible worlds and that different
modal interpretations (epistemic modality, deontic modality, etc.) correspond
to different choices of sets of possible worlds as the domain of quantification.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.1 provides the motivation for the
kind of semantics we will be concerned with. Then, 1.2 introduces the standard
version of possible worlds semantics, concentrating on the artificial language of
modal sentential logic. After that, in section 1.3, we will modify the standard
framework to deal with more complex examples. In the modified framework, the
interpretation of modal expressions does not only depend on a set of accessible
worlds, but is also sensitive to an ordering on these worlds. Finally, in 1.4 we will
switch from formal language to natural language.
1.1 Possibility and necessity
Modality is a semantic category that comprises various notions of possibility and
necessity. For example, we can make claims concerning what is possible given the
laws of nature, but also concerning what is possible (permitted) given the rules
of my university. Both varieties of possibility can be expressed by the same word:
(1) a. It is possible that I will live to be 100 years old.
b. It is possible that my thesis committee will contain two professors
that are affiliated with the University of Nijmegen.
Characteristically, modal expressions enable us to talk about circumstances that
are not actually the case, and that may never become actual. I may not become a
centenarian, nevertheless (1a) is true. Similarly, in order for (1b) to be true, it is
not required that the number of professors from Nijmegen on my thesis committee
will actually be two.
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2 Chapter 1. Semantics for modals
Natural languages abound in ways to express modal meanings. The following
is just a selection from the English inventory of modals:1
(2) a. Auxiliaries:
Harry might/may/can/could/should/must be in the library.
b. Semi-auxiliaries:
Harry has to/ought to/needs to be in the library.
c. Full verbs:
Harry is able to/allowed to/required to be in the library.
d. Adverbs:
Perhaps/possibly/certainly, Harry is in the library.
e. Adjectival phrases:
It is possible/necessary/mandatory that Harry is in the library.
f. Conditionals:
If Harry wasn’t a wizard, he wouldn’t attend Hogwarts.
In formal semantics, these expressions are standardly treated as quantifiers over
(restricted) sets of non-actual circumstances (possible worlds). This treatment
is motivated by the fact that we may often use the same modal expression to
convey a variety of modal meanings, as the examples in (1) already demonstrated
for the adjectival phrase it is possible that. This is not only true of English, but
other languages display the same tendency. Let’s now examine the types of modal
meaning that are expressed in natural language.
1.1.1 Different modal flavors
While everyone agrees that one can distinguish among different types of modal
meanings, it seems that there are as many taxonomies of modal meanings as
there are scholars working on the subject, see de Haan (2005)2 for a comparison.
I follow von Fintel (2006) and assume that there are at least five different types of
modality expressed in natural language. First, epistemic modality concerns what
is possible and necessary relative to a certain body of knowledge. The following
1Note that I use the term ‘modal expression’ in a rather broad sense: any expression whose
meaning depends on alternative states of affairs is a modal. In contrast, descriptive studies on
modality, e.g. Coates (1983) and Palmer (2001), often reserve the term ‘modal’ for the class of
such expressions that can be syntactically defined i.e. for the modal auxiliaries (these are set
apart by the so-called NICE properties (Huddleston 1976)). Semi-auxiliaries like have to are
then called ‘semi-modals’. Arguably, my definition is too inclusive, whereas syntactic definitions
are not inclusive enough, see Kiefer (1987), Narrog (2005), Zaefferer (2005) for definitional issues
in the field of modality.
2I adopt Kai von Fintel’s strategy for alphabetizing last names like ‘de Haan’ that contain
particles. That is, the article cited here will be alphabetized as ‘de Haan, Ferdinand’, but it
will be listed under ‘H’. See http://kaivonfintel.org/von/.
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sentences, on their preferred interpretation, illustrate epistemic modality:3
(3) a. Neville can’t have mixed that potion.
b. Harry may be in the bathroom.
c. Ron must be crazy.
d. It is possible that Ron has already left.
Typically, epistemic modals4 are relative to the knowledge of the speaker, and
this is often seen as one of the defining characteristics of epistemic modality:
[Epistemic modality] is concerned with the speaker’s assumptions or
assessment of possibilities and, in most cases, it indicates the speaker’s
confidence (or lack of confidence) in the truth of the proposition ex-
pressed. (Coates 1983, 18)
In what follows, I will assume that it is the knowledge of the speaker that
is relevant, but it should be noted that this may be too weak for some cases
(e.g. eavesdropping, retraction, disagreements). It has been argued instead that
epistemic modals are relativized to an assessor or judge which need not be the
speaker (Egan et al. 2005, MacFarlane 2008, Stephenson 2007), or that epistemic
modality depends on group knowledge (Hacking 1967, Teller 1972, DeRose 1991,
von Fintel & Gillies 2008a). For our purposes, however, it will be good enough
to assume that this type of modality is relative to the information available to
the speaker.
Another modal meaning which is frequently expressed in natural language is
deontic modality. This category deals with what is possible and necessary given
a set of laws or moral principles or the like, and is illustrated by the sentences in
(4). Note in passing that we may use the same items to convey both epistemic
and deontic modal notions:
(4) a. You can leave your hat on.
b. Harry may have another piece of cake.
c. Ron must do his homework (according to professor Snape).
d. It is not possible to get a refund.
As is clear from the above examples, by using deontic modals we may issue
permissions and commands. In some cases, the speaker acts as the ‘deontic
3Actually, epistemic modals often seem to depend on beliefs besides known facts (see below
in 1.2.1 and 1.3.3). In light of this, it is more appropriate to call this type of modality doxastic.
However, I will continue to speak of epistemic modality, as this is more in line with current
usage.
4For convenience, I will often talk of ‘epistemic modals’ or ‘deontic modals’, etc., but as
many modal expressions can typically be used in various modal senses, the modals themselves
aren’t epistemic or deontic. This terminology is merely used because it is simpler than talking
about ‘modals on their epistemic/deontic/etc. use’.
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source’: by uttering (4a) a speaker can give the addressee permission to drive
her car. In other cases, such as (4c), someone other than the speaker is the
relevant authority.5 Importantly, deontic modality is not limited to the notions
of permission and command, cf. Nuyts et al. (2005). Consider:
(5) Harry should have treated Cho better.
It doesn’t make much sense to maintain that this sentence claims that Harry
was obligated to treat his girlfriend better. Rather, the necessity is relative to
certain criteria of moral acceptability, perhaps the speaker’s, or perhaps society’s
criteria of how to treat a loved one, assuming that there is agreement about these
matters.
The third category I distinguish is dynamic modality and concerns what is
possible and necessary for someone given the circumstances.6 This includes a
person’s abilities and needs:
(6) a. Harry can speak Parseltongue.
b. Harry must sneeze.
c. Do you have to be an insufferable know-it-all?
While (6a) makes a claim about what Harry can do, (6b) is about what he cannot
help himself but doing. The use of can in sentences like (7a) and (7b) is usually
also classified as dynamic modality (for instance by Palmer (2001, 10)):
(7) a. Harry can escape.
b. Harry can still buy tickets for the game.
These sentences talk about Harry’s possibilities in light of circumstances external
to him. In contrast, (6a), which makes a claim about Harry’s skills, is about what
is possible for him given his internal circumstances. Van der Auwera & Plungian
(1998) take opportunity and ability to be separate categories of modal meaning
(in their terminology, these express participant-external and participant-internal
modality respectively). Is there any way to decide between their proposal and
lumping ability and opportunity together? An argument in favor of teasing the
two meanings apart is perhaps that the two give rise to different entailments.
As pointed out by Pin˜o´n (2003), sentences containing the past tense form of the
5In Dutch, the deontic source can be made explicit by the preposition van ‘of’:
(i) Ik
I
moet
must
van
of
mijn
my
moeder
mother
de
the
afwas
dishes
doen.
do
‘I have to (given my mother’s demands) do the dishes.’
6The names ‘epistemic’, ‘deontic’ and ‘dynamic’ go back to the pioneering work by
von Wright (1951b, 1-2, 28), where he credits Peter Geach for coining the term ‘dynamic’.
In von Wright (1951a) he declares himself indebted to Professor C.D. Broad for suggesting the
term ‘deontic’. However, the name ‘Deontik’ was already used by Mally (1926).
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modal be able to imply that the situation described actually took place when the
modal receives an opportunity reading, but not when the modal is interpreted as
indicating ability. Here are some of his examples ((8) expresses opportunity and
(9) ability):
(8) By detecting subtle variations in the glow’s warmth, scientists were able
to discern the primordial structure of the universe a mere 380,000 years
after its birth.
⇒ Scientists discerned the primordial structure of the universe a mere
380,000 years after its birth.
(9) In her early twenties, Rebecca was able to swim across Lake Balaton.
6⇒ In her early twenties, Rebecca swam across Lake Balaton.
According to Pin˜o´n, the actuality implication induced by (8) is an entailment,
but he doesn’t argue for this claim. Note though that it would be odd to continue
(8) with ‘but they didn’t’, which suggests that the implication is indeed an entail-
ment, rather than a Gricean implicature.7 Pin˜o´n analyzes the contrast in terms
of scopal differences with respect to past tense. Roughly, be able to corresponds
to a notion of possibility which trivializes if it scopes above past tense (‘historical
possibility’). Ability-able scopes under past tense, but opportunity-able scopes
over it. As a result, opportunity-able entails that the described situation actu-
ally took place. This suggests that opportunity and ability have different logics.
Therefore, wherever this seems important, I will keep ability and opportunity
apart, reserving the term ‘dynamic modality’ for the sentences in (6).
The last two modal meanings I distinguish in this chapter are bouletic and
teleological modality. The first of these concerns what is possible and necessary
given someone’s desires. Teleological modality, on the other hand, deals with the
possible and necessary means to achieve a certain goal. Here are some illustrative
examples of bouletic and teleological modality respectively:
(10) a. She can have him, I don’t want him anymore.
b. You must come by for dinner sometimes.
(11) a. You can bring your wife flowers to surprise her.
b. To get home in time, we must take a taxi.
Bouletic modality differs from deontic modality in that the modality is relative to
desires rather than moral criteria. While the two can coincide (I may happen to
want whatever our moral code specifies), this need not be the case. Teleological
7As first observed by Bhatt (1999), in languages that mark aspect, such as French and Italian,
perfective aspect triggers the actuality implication. Hacquard (2006) argues that this cannot
be attributed to Gricean implicature because the actuality implication cannot be canceled. She
concludes that it is an entailment. The same conclusion is drawn by van Gerrevink & de Hoop
(2008) with respect to the actuality implication triggered by the present perfect of Dutch modals
Hij heeft dat moeten betalen, lit. ‘he has that must+perfect pay’.
6 Chapter 1. Semantics for modals
modality is sometimes classified as a sub-flavor of dynamic modality (Nuyts 2005),
or treated on a par with opportunity modals (van der Auwera & Plungian 1998),
but intuitively there is a difference between someone’s skills or what is possible in
view of external circumstances, and a means to achieve a goal. Of course, desires
and goals are also closely related, as we normally strive to fulfill our desires. That
is, desires may function like goals. I will call modals that are sensitive to such
‘desires-qua-goals’ teleological modals. In chapter 4 we will take a closer look at
the particular semantic challenges that are posed by goal-oriented modality.
While I distinguish between five modal flavors, linguists often divide the entire
range of modal meanings into just two groups: epistemic modality on the one
hand, and the remaining modal meanings on the other. That is, the non-epistemic
meanings are taken to constitute one category and this category is referred to as
root modality.8 As far as I know, the root-epistemic contrast was introduced by
Hofmann (1966) and was meant to capture that there are structural differences
between the two categories, in the sense that root modals are predicate operators,
while epistemic modals take a proposition as their argument.9 In what follows,
however, I will not adopt this distinction, because it gives rise to the following two
problems. First, including the non-epistemic meanings in one category suggests
that they are semantically similar, which is clearly not the case: there is no single
root modal meaning, cf. discussion in Nuyts (2005). Second, it is more likely
that the structural differences between modals of different types, if they exist at
all, do not coincide with the epistemic-root-contrast. As argued independently by
Bhatt (1998) and Wurmbrand (1999), it is not necessary to treat deontic modals
as predicate-level modals.10 Such a treatment implies that the syntactic subject
is a semantic argument of the modal, and it is often thought that this semantic
argument is the bearer of the obligation. However, Bhatt (1998) shows that the
bearer of the obligation need not be the syntactic subject:
(12) We are expecting fifty guests tonight. There have to be 50 chairs in the
living room by 5 p.m. (as said to the caterers).
Here the obligation is not put on the subject, but on the addressee. Apparently,
the context of utterance determines who is the bearer of the obligation in (12).
But if we need a pragmatic mechanism to identify the bearer for sentences like
8The term ‘root modality’ seems to refer to root clauses (simple clauses that aren’t contained
in any other clause), but this is somewhat misleading, for root modals aren’t restricted to such
clauses, cf. de Haan (2005, 6).
9This distinction between predicate and proposition operators of course corresponds to the
distinction between control and raising verbs (Ross 1969, Perlmutter 1970, Jackendoff 1972,
Brennan 1993).
10To be sure, Bhatt and Wurmbrand argue that a predicate-level analysis of root modals is
not only unnecessary, but also untenable. Their arguments come from case-marking in Hindi
and Icelandic respectively. But as these arguments are quite intricate, I leave them out of the
discussion, and refer the interested reader to the original papers instead.
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(12) anyway, it is unnecessary to assume that deontic modals are predicate-level
operators in sentences where the relevant bearer does happen to be the subject.
To sum up, in natural language five modal meanings are expressed: epistemic,
deontic, dynamic, bouletic and teleological modality (and perhaps opportunity is
a sixth category). I have defined all of these notions in terms of possibility and
necessity. This is sometimes thought to be a ‘non-starter’ (Nuyts 2005, Palmer
2001), because (i) modal expressions need not express either possibility or ne-
cessity but may also encode intermediate values (should in (5) seems a case in
point), and (ii) notions as permission and obligation are not obviously related to
notions like possibility and necessity. Nuyts (2005, 17) even writes that “without
invoking a metaphorical use of these terms, ‘possibility’ can hardly be said to
mean the same things as (dynamic) ‘ability’, or as (deontic) ‘acceptability’ or
‘permission”’. The first objection has little weight. Even though the semantics
introduced in this chapter views each modal as expressing either possibility or ne-
cessity, modals of intermediate strength can be dealt with if we modify possible
worlds semantics the way we will in section 1.3. As for the second point, while
some (usually linguists) have their doubts about the analogy between possibil-
ity and necessity and the various modal concepts we have distinguished, others,
(mostly logicians) find the analogies “numerous and obvious” (Prior 1955, 220).
I side with the logicians on this matter, and find this treatment of the various
modal concepts quite natural. An additional bonus is that this allows us to give
an elegant semantics of modality, which we will introduce in 1.2.11
1.1.2 Flexible interpretation
We have seen that the interpretation of the English modals is highly flexible:
many items can be used to convey a variety of the distinct interpretations. As
the above examples demonstrate, must and can are particularly flexible: they
can be used in any of the five modal senses. This is not a peculiarity of English,
but the modal expressions of many other unrelated languages display the same
interpretational flexibility. Perkins (1983, 28) mentions Amoy, Basque, Classical
Aztec, French, German, Italian, Kapampangan, Korean, Luisen˜o, Polish, Tai-
wanese, Tamil, Thai, Tzeltal and Welsh (see also the references in his book).
Further examples from yet other languages can be found in Palmer (2001, 87ff)
and Bybee et al. (1994, 195ff).12 Naturally, not every modal expression alternates
11The similarities between obligation and permission on the one hand and necessity and
possibility on the other have been noted time and time again, at least since the 14th century
(Knuuttila 1981), and later by Leibniz (in Specimina juris (1667) and Elementa juris naturalis
(1672), see Poser (1969)), and by von Wright, who writes that he independently made the
discovery and was then prompted to write his Deontic logic (1951a), see von Wright (1999, 28).
12Note though that these authors, as well as the authors they cite, only distinguish a subset
of the modal meanings I have listed; most only distinguish epistemic and root meanings, where
root modality comprises deontic and for some authors also dynamic modality.
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between different modal meanings, and some modals are more specialized in their
interpretation than others. For example, the English auxiliary might strongly
prefers epistemic interpretations.13
Yet it is still an open question whether flexibility is a universal feature of
modal systems. Data by van der Auwera et al. (2005) suggest that this might
not be the case. This study investigated for 241 languages whether the language
displays full flexibility (i.e. for both possibility and necessity), partial flexibility
(i.e. for either necessity or possibility but not both), or no flexibility at all (a
modal expression was considered to be flexible if it allowed both an epistemic
and a non-epistemic modal interpretation). It turned out that more than half
of the examined languages (to be precise, 123 languages) did not display modal
flexibility. On the basis of the language sample, it could further be concluded that
while partial flexibility occurs on all continents, flexibility for both possibility and
necessity is typical for European languages.
Even though flexibility might not be universal, it is still wide-spread enough to
render implausibility to the claim that modal expressions are lexically ambiguous
between the several modal flavors.14 It thus won’t do to develop an analysis
of say ability can alongside an analysis of deontic can that show no connection
to one another. In this dissertation, I follow Kratzer (1981, 1991) and assign
a basic, core meaning to each of the modal expressions, which gets fine-tuned
by the context of utterance. The main idea is that a modal like can expresses
an underspecified sense of possibility (‘mere’ possibility), which in interaction
with the context comes to indicate a more specific sense of possibility (ability, or
permission, or another kind of possibility). This idea actually originated in the
work of modal logicians, to which we turn next.
1.2 Standard relational semantics
We have just identified two desiderata for a satisfactory account of the flexible
interpretation of modals: a shared semantic core, and a contextual mechanism
for modulating this core. These desiderata turn out to be fulfilled by relational
semantics. This semantics was originally developed for modal logics, but has be-
come the standard in natural language semantics as well. The basic idea is that
modal expressions quantify over possible worlds, and that different interpreta-
13Note that there are some interesting exceptions: ‘You might try to put the key into this
slot’ (von Fintel 2006). This sentence doesn’t tell the addressee what the world might be like,
but more likely suggests to undertake a certain action. Hence, might receives a ‘directive’
interpretation, presumably because a second person pronoun is used. See Foolen & de Hoop
(2008) on the influence of person on modality.
14Van der Auwera et al. (2005) themselves agree with this writing that “the potential for
modal polyfunctionality [flexibility] is universal” (p. 258) and that “the processes through
which epistemic modality functions may arrive from situational [non-epistemic/root] ones are
semantic and universal” (p. 255), but see Nauze (2008) for a different opinion.
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tions correspond to different choices of sets of possible worlds as the domain of
quantification. These sets of possible worlds are given by an accessibility relation
(hence the name relational semantics). The idea to interpret modal sentences on
relational structures occurred independently to a number of people, but Kripke
(1959, 1963) is usually viewed as the first to have developed these ideas into a
model theory of sufficient generality. It is for this reason that relational semantics
is also known as Kripke semantics, and that the relational structures that it uses
are called Kripke models.15
This section is structured as follows. 1.2.1 introduces the language of modal
sentential logic and explains the interpretation of sentences in this language in
Kripke models. Then, section 1.2.2 presents an alternative, yet equivalent, for-
mulation of relational semantics which is due to Angelika Kratzer.
1.2.1 Modal sentential logic
The language of modal sentential logic is obtained by adding the possibility op-
erator ♦ and the necessity operator  to the language of sentential logic.16 Both
are one-place operators, meaning that they syntactically function like the familiar
negation operator in that they need to be followed by one well-formed formula
in order to form a well-formed formula. Formulas of the form ♦ϕ are read as ‘it
is possible that ϕ’, and formulas of the form ϕ are read as ‘it is necessary that
ϕ’. Notice that Greek letters ϕ, ψ are here used as meta-variables that allow us
to speak of arbitrary formulas from the object language. Importantly, ♦ and 
are neutral operators that can express various modal flavors, e.g. epistemic or
deontic modal meanings, etc.
The modal operators are interdefinable. That is, the following schemas are
valid in each modal logic that we will discuss:
(13) a. ♦ϕ↔ ¬¬ϕ
b. ϕ↔ ¬♦¬ϕ
These hold regardless of the kind of modality expressed: if a speaker knows
something to be the case, she will not consider it possible that this something
is not the case (epistemic), what is required to be done is not allowed not to be
15Meredith & Prior (1956) seem to have been the first to employ a binary relation, and
Hintikka (1957, 1961) was probably the first to explain this relation as relative possibility
between conceivable states of affairs (possible worlds). Yet another pioneer of modal logic,
Kanger (1957a,b), will remain famous for being the first who applied the semantics of quantified
modal logic to philosophical problems such as the ‘morning star paradox’ (substitution of equals
is not valid without restriction). See Goldblatt (2006) and Copeland (2002) for the history of
relational semantics.
16(Modal) sentential logic is commonly known as (modal) propositional logic, but I reserve the
term ‘proposition’ strictly for the truth set or intension of formulas from the object language.
See section 1.2.2 below for further explanation.
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done (deontic), etc. Given this interdefinability, we need only define the syntax
and semantics of one of the modal operators, the other can be introduced by
abbreviation. For ease of exposition, however, both will be introduced. The
syntax of the language of modal sentential logic is as follows:
1.2.1. Definition (The language Lm)
a. Primitive symbols
(i) Sentence constants: p, q, r, . . .
(ii) Logical operators: ¬,→,∨,∧,♦,.
(iii) Brackets: (,).
b. Well-formed formulas
(i) Sentence constants are well-formed formulas.
(ii) If ϕ and ψ are well-formed formulas, then ¬ϕ, (ϕ→ ψ), (ϕ∨ψ),
(ϕ ∧ ψ), ♦ϕ and ϕ are well-formed formulas.
Note that there is no restriction on the iteration of operators: ♦♦p and ♦♦♦♦p
are perfectly well-formed formulas. Modal operators may occur in the scope of
other operators. For example, ¬p and (p→ ♦p) are both well-formed formulas
of Lm. Whenever this doesn’t lead to confusion, outer brackets will be omitted;
so we will write p → ♦p rather than (p → ♦p). A remark on notation:
expressions from the object language (i.e. modal sentential logic) are encoded in
a sans-serif font. We will continue this practice throughout the entire dissertation.
Kripke models
As said, the semantics of modal operators depends on possible worlds.17 Possible
worlds are ways in which things might be or might have been different. Each way
in which things could be constitutes a possible world and the way things actually
stand is called the actual world. For example, you are reading this dissertation
right now, but you could have been ice-skating. There are thus possible worlds in
which you are ice-skating right now. There is also an infinite number of possible
worlds in which you are reading this dissertation right now, and one of these
happens to be the actual one.
Besides a set of possible worlds W , models for Lm consist of an interpretation
function I that assigns a truth value to the atomic sentences of our language in
each possible world. Notice that in relational semantics, we can only ever speak
17Possible worlds were first introduced by the philosopher Leibniz, who claimed that of all
the possible worlds, our world happens to be the best one God could have created; an idea for
which he was ridiculed by Voltaire (Candide). In modern day philosophy the ontological status
of possible worlds is heavily debated, see Loux (1979) and references therein, but this is not
the place for a metaphysical discussion about possible worlds. Note that from the viewpoint
of natural language semantics at least, it seems clear that speakers assume that there are such
things as possible worlds and that we can talk about them.
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of truth in a given world. We call the world in which the truth of a formula is
assessed the world of evaluation. For an actual utterance this will be the actual
world. As said, models fix the denotation (truth value) of atomic sentences in each
world (through I), but the truth value of complex sentences is determined via the
interpretation of the logical connectives. The interpretation of the connectives
familiar from sentential logic remains essentially the same: for instance, ¬ϕ is true
in a possible world exactly if ϕ is false in that world. The semantics of modal
operators, on the other hand, makes reference to other possible worlds than the
world of evaluation: the truth of ♦ϕ and ϕ in a given world may depend on the
truth of ϕ in other worlds.
In the meta-language, the modal operators are interpreted as quantifiers over
possible worlds. Possibility operators are interpreted as existential quantifiers,
and necessity modals as universal quantifiers. Thus, ♦ϕ says that there is at
least one possible world where ϕ is true, and ϕ says that ϕ is true in every
possible world. We are usually not interested in absolutely all possible worlds,
but have relative notions of possibility and necessity in mind. For instance, in
case of epistemic modality, we ignore those possibilities that we know to be false
(those possible worlds which we know not to be actual), and if we ignore the
possibilities that ought not be the case, we get deontic modality, etc. Formally,
this is captured by an accessibility relation R, that assigns sets of accessible
worlds to each possible world w: wRv means that v is accessible from w, i.e. that
v is possible relative to w. Modal operators that express relative modal notions
quantify over accessible possible worlds. It depends on the interpretation of R
which worlds are relevant. If R is an epistemic accessibility relation, it assigns
worlds v to w such that v makes true what is known in w, if R is deontic wRv
holds iff all the obligations of w are achieved in v, etc. We are now ready to define
the models for Lm:
1.2.2. Definition (Models for Lm)
A model M for modal propositional logic consists of:
(i) a set of possible worlds W
(ii) a binary relation on these worlds R ⊆ (W ×W )
(iii) an interpretation function I that assigns to each atomic sentence ϕ a
truth value from {0, 1} in each possible world of W .
The following truth definition specifies under what conditions a formula ϕ is true
in a possible world in a model:
1.2.3. Definition (Truth in a world in a model)
a. Atomic sentences
(i) M, w |= p iff I(p) = 1
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b. Complex sentences
(i) M, w |= ¬ϕ iff M, w 6|= ϕ
(ii) M, w |= ϕ→ ψ iff M, w 6|= ϕ or M, w |= ψ
(iii) M, w |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff M, w |= ϕ or M, w |= ψ
(iv) M, w |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, w |= ϕ and M, w |= ψ
(v) M, w |= ♦ϕ iff there is a v ∈W such that wRv and M, v |= ϕ
(vi) M, w |= ϕ iff for all v ∈W such that wRv: M, v |= ϕ
To illustrate the workings of this truth definition, consider the following example
of a Kripke model. Worlds are represented by dots, arrows represent accessibility.
An arrow from a world w to another world v means that v is accessible from w:
(14)
b
b
b
b
w1
w4
w2
w3
p
¬p
p
p
This model consists of four worlds, i.e. W = {w1, w2, w3, w4}. Both w2 and w4
are accessible from w1, w4 is also accessible from itself. In addition, w3 and w1
are accessible from w2. The atomic sentence p is true in w1, w2 and w3, but not
in w4. We can now read off the truth values of modal sentences in the different
possible worlds. For example, p is false in w1, because there is a world that is
accessible from w1 in which p is false, i.e. w4. Thus, M, w1 6|= p. In w2, on the
other hand, the formula is true, since p is true in every world that is accessible
to w2, therefore M, w2 |= p. We can also read off the truth value of formulas
with stacked modal operators. For instance, M, w1 |= ♦♦p, since w2 is accessible
to w1, and w3 is accessible to w2 and p holds in w3. Note that ♦♦¬p is also true
in w1, since w1 can reach w4, which is accessible to itself and in which ¬p is true.
Following Chellas (1980, 35), definition 1.2.3 can be regarded as an account
of the lowest degree of validity in modal sentential logic, i.e. truth in a possible
world in a model. The highest degree of validity is truth in all worlds in all
models. For our purposes, however, intermediate degrees of validity are more
interesting. In particular, validity in a model and validity in a class of models.
A formula is valid in a model M iff it is true in all possible worlds in M, and a
formula is valid on a class of models C iff that formula is valid in each model in
C:
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1.2.4. Definition (Validity in a model and in a class of models)
(i) M |= ϕ iff for all w in M :M, w |= ϕ
(ii) C |= ϕ iff for all M in C :M |= ϕ
Classes of models are distinguished in terms of the structural properties of their
accessibility relation, to which we turn next.
Principles of deontic and epistemic logic
The validity of modal formula schemas constrains the accessibility relation. I will
restrict my attention to a few of those that are relevant in the study of natural
language.18 For instance, the following schema is valid precisely in those models
that have a serial accessibility relation (i.e. serial models):
(15) D ϕ→ ♦ϕ
Serial accessibility relations assign at least one world v to every world w in W .
Let w be a world in a serial model, and suppose thatM, w |= ϕ. IfM, w |= ϕ,
then for every v ∈ M such that wRv : M, v |= ϕ. By the assumption that R is
serial, such a world v exists. It follows that M, w |= ♦ϕ: because for some world
v ∈M such that wRv: M, v |= ϕ. Thus, seriality ensures the validity of D. The
reverse also holds: any model in which schema D is valid must be serial. For D
to be valid in a modelM, all worlds w ∈M must either make ϕ false, or make
♦ϕ true. Either way, w must be connected to a world v: if M, w 6|= ϕ, there
must be a world v ∈ M such that wRv and M, v 6|= ϕ, and if M, w |= ♦ϕ, there
must be a world v ∈ M such that wRv and M, v |= ϕ. Conclusion: schema D
characterizes the class of serial models.
Other interesting principles are the following:
(16) K (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ)
T ϕ→ ϕ
4 ϕ→ ϕ
5 ¬ϕ→ ¬ϕ
The so-called distribution axiom K (‘K’ for Kripke) is valid in any class of mod-
els.Principle T is valid in the class of models with a reflexive accessibility relation,
i.e. those models in which each world w ∈W is able to reach itself. The validity
of 4 requires that the accessibility relation be transitive, i.e. that for all worlds
w,w′, w′′: if (wRw′∧w′Rw′′), then wRw′′. The validity of 5 requires the accessi-
bility relation to be Euclidean, or that for all worlds w,w′, w′′: if (wRv ∧ wRu),
then vRu. I leave the proofs to the reader. Note that choosing T and 5 as axioms
18See Chellas (1980) for a more complete overview of modal axioms and their corresponding
conditions on R. See Hughes & Cresswell (1996) for the historical origin of the names of the
axioms discussed here.
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results in the strongest possible system, known as S5 (the other principles above
are theorems of S5 ).19 In models for S5, every world is accessible to every world,
without restriction.
One can ask which of these schemas are intuitively valid given a particular
modal interpretation. Let’s start with epistemic modality. It is usually assumed
that this type of modality corresponds to S5.20 As said, this implies that T is
valid under an epistemic interpretation. At first sight, this seems reasonable, as
one can only know something if it is actually true. On second thought, however,
adopting T leads to the wrong predictions for natural language modalities. One
of the first to make this observation was Karttunen (1972). He noted that (17a)
seems to make a weaker claim than (17b):
(17) a. John must have left.
b. John has left.
There are two ways to approach this problem. First, one could propose that
epistemic modality corresponds to irreflexive S5 (i.e. drop T). The underlying
idea is that epistemic modals need not depend on knowledge alone, but may also
depend on other source of information, such as beliefs. Examples of this kind of
solution are Kratzer’s (1981) treatment of epistemic modality in doubly relative
semantics, which we will discuss in detail in section 1.3.3, and Veltman’s (1985)
analysis of epistemic modals in dynamic semantics. Second, one could stick to
the assumption that S5 captures epistemic modality (i.e. keep T), but attribute
the contrast in (17) to an evidential component in the meaning of must. That is,
epistemic modals depend on knowledge, but not all knowledge is created equal.
An utterance of (17a) suggests that inferential evidence is at hand, while (17b)
19The name S5 derives from Lewis & Langford (1932).
20Though some people find principle 5 objectionable. For instance, Hintikka’s (1962) epis-
temic logic corresponds to S4, rather than S5. He writes that “you may fail–unless you happen
to be as sagacious as Socrates–to know your ignorance” (p. 106). Principle 5 has been ques-
tioned in other places as well. The following poem by Donald Rumsfeld provides a lovely
example (pointed out to me by Wiebe van der Hoek (p.c.)):
The Unknown
As we know,
There are known knowns.
There are things we know we know.
We also know
There are known unknowns.
That is to say
We know there are some things
We do not know.
But there are also unknown unknowns,
The ones we don’t know
We don’t know.
Rumsfeld denies 5 in the last three lines.
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is typically uttered in face of direct evidence of rain (say that the speaker is
staring out of the window). In as far as we feel that direct evidence of rain is
more convincing than indirect inferential evidence, we feel that (17b) is stronger
than (17a). It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to decide between these
proposals, we just note that principle T cannot be accepted for epistemic modality
without qualification.
Let’s now discuss deontic modality. Schema D is plausible under a deontic
interpretation: if something is obligated, it must also be allowed. In fact, schema
D is usually taken to be valid under any modal meaning expressed in natural
language. This has the effect that natural language modals always quantify over
non-empty sets of worlds. The same intuition seems to underly the linguistic
commonplace that quantifiers are presuppositional expressions that presuppose
their domain (Strawson 1952, Geurts & van der Sandt 1999). Geurts (1995, 1999)
and Frank (1997) explicitly extend this idea to modal quantifiers.21 Schema T, on
the other hand, is obviously invalid for deontic modality: it is not the case that
whatever is obligatory is actually the case. Instead, laws and norms get broken
all the time; for instance, it is forbidden to cross a red light, but many drivers
sometimes ignore this rule. Therefore, the accessibility relation that underlies
deontic modality had better not be reflexive.22 Finally, 4 and 5 are usually taken
to be invalid as well. Thus, so-called Standard Deontic Logic (SDL) is just the
normal system D (or KD).23 To see that 5 doesn’t hold, consider its dual:
(18) 5♦ ♦ϕ→ ♦¬ϕ
This doesn’t seem reasonable. For example, the Dutch law allows that 18-year-
olds drink alcohol, hence it contains no passage that requires that they do not
drink alcohol. But it does not follow that the Dutch law requires that the law
contains no such passage.
To sum up, in modal sentential logic, modal operators are interpreted in the
meta-language as quantifiers over sets of accessible possible worlds. These worlds
are given by an accessibility relation R which is part of the models for the lan-
guage. There is a systematic correspondence between the structural properties
of R and the validity of modal formula schemas. We can use this fact to deter-
21To be sure, D is a semantic constraint, while presuppositional analyses allow that the
presupposed domain is neutralized by the context of utterance, so there are differences between
adopting D and giving a presuppositional analysis of quantifiers.
22But see section 1.3.3 below for some puzzling cases where deontic must does seem to satisfy
T.
23SDL is basically the system proposed by von Wright (1951a) except that he had the deontic
operators combine with names of acts rather than with sentences, so that deontic operators could
not be nested (formulas of the form ϕ were not well-formed). Von Wright also rejected
(ϕ∨ ¬ϕ), but otherwise adhered to all basic principles of SDL. Researchers quickly opted for
a system based on the syntax of sentential logic, returning to the approach in Mally’s (1926)
deontic logic, which was the first formal system of deontic logic. See McNamara (2008) for a
full overview of SDL.
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mine for each modal interpretation what class of models is suitable for it (since
models are classified according to the properties of their accessibility relation).
Here I have limited my attention to the best-studied modal notions, i.e. epistemic
and deontic modality, but in principle the other meanings could be treated along
similar lines.24 Linguists usually adopt an alternative formulation of relational
semantics that was developed by Kratzer (1977, 1978, 1981). This is introduced
in the next section.
1.2.2 Conversational backgrounds
Kratzer does not make use of accessibility relations, but she proposes to deter-
mine the domain of quantification by what she calls a conversational background.
A conversational background provides a set of propositions that jointly describe
the accessible worlds: quantification ranges over those worlds that make all of
the propositions in the conversational background true. Just like accessibility re-
lations, conversational backgrounds may receive various interpretations, i.e. they
may be epistemic, deontic, etc. As we will see shortly, Kratzer’s semantics is
equivalent to the one in terms of accessibility relations that we have just become
acquainted with. Note that in this section, we restrict to her semantics for ‘simple
modalities’. Below in 1.3, we will look at more complex graded modal notions.
Before we go on, a note on propositions is in order. Philosophers traditionally
think of the proposition expressed by a sentence ϕ as that what allows us to figure
out the truth value of ϕ in a given world w.25 As such, the proposition expressed
by ϕ can be said to correspond to the truth set JϕKM of the sentence ϕ in the
model M, which is defined as follows:
1.2.5. Definition (Truth sets (propositions))
JϕKM = {w ∈M :M, w |= ϕ}
The truth set of ϕ is thus the set of worlds in M at which ϕ is true. As this set
contains the information about how the sentence comes true or false in various
possible situations, I will refer to this set as the proposition expressed by ϕ.
As said, in Kratzer’s version of possible worlds semantics, the domain of quan-
tification is determined by a set of propositions that are given by a conversational
background. Technically, conversational backgrounds are implemented as func-
tions f from possible worlds to sets of propositions. I will employ the term
24Actually, this may not be completely without problems. There is, for example, quite some
discussion about what an ability is. Kenny (1976) even argues that abilities cannot be treated
in possible worlds semantics at all. Cross (1986) disagrees. For a recent solution, building on
Cross’s paper, see Thomason (2005). Also relevant is Hackl (1998).
25It should be noted that many philosophers use a richer concept of proposition; Frege (1892),
for instance, thinks of the proposition expressed by ϕ also as the mode of presentation (German:
Art des Gegebenseins) of the truth value of ϕ.
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‘conversational background’ loosely, both to refer to a function from worlds to
sets of propositions, and to the set of propositions assigned to a particular world.
Conversational backgrounds are defined as follows:
1.2.6. Definition (Conversational backgrounds)
a conversational background is a function f such that:
f :W → ℘(℘(W ))
One can construct a set of possible worlds from a conversational background f(w)
by taking its intersection
⋂
f(w). We then arrive at the set of possible worlds
that make all of the propositions in that background true. We will assume that
the conversational background is a basic constituent of the model, just as the
logician’s accessibility relation was.26 Models thus consist of a set of possible
worlds, a conversational background and an interpretation function, i.e. models
are now triples 〈W, f, I〉. The truth definition in 1.2.3 remains the same, except
that the clauses pertaining to the modal operators now become:
1.2.7. Definition (Kratzer’s truth definition for modal operators)
M, w |= ♦ϕ iff
⋂
f(w) ∩ JϕKM 6= ∅
M, w |= ϕ iff
⋂
f(w) ⊆ JϕKM
In a way, this semantics seems unnecessarily complex: why not assume that
f is a function that directly assigns a set of accessible worlds to the world of
evaluation, which, depending on its interpretation, corresponds to ‘the known
proposition in w’, or ‘the obligated proposition in w’, . . . rather than a function
that has a set of sets of worlds as its output that needs to be intersected every
time a modal is being interpreted? Indeed, this is how von Stechow (2004a)
reconstructs Krazer’s semantics. It is not clear whether Kratzer’s conversational
backgrounds have any advantages over such sets or over accessibility relations
for that matter. The main motivation seems to lie in her account of modal
expressions that are interpreted against inconsistent backgrounds. Kratzer (1977)
follows work by Rescher (1973) and looks at maximally consistent subsets of the
conversational background. Kratzer (1981) argues that modals are dependent
on two conversational backgrounds (see 1.3 below), the second of which is not
intersected to provide a set of worlds but is used to order the set of worlds
provided by the first background. Either solution clearly requires access to a set
of propositions; it wouldn’t do to take the intersection directly.
In addition, Kratzer claims that conversational backgrounds have an analogue
in natural language; this function is fulfilled by in view of -phrases. Consider:
26This is not what Kratzer assumes. She defines truth in a model relative to both a world of
evaluation and a conversational background, but nothing hinges on this.
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(19) Harry may spend his summer at the Burrow.
a. In view of what is believed, Harry may spend his summer at the
Burrow.
b. In view of what his duties are, Harry may spend his summer at the
Burrow.
The in view of -phrase in (19a) refers to a function that maps the world of eval-
uation onto the propositions that are known in it, while the in view of -phrase
in (19b) denotes a function that assigns the propositions that are Harry’s du-
ties to the world of evaluation. Perhaps this is an additional reason to adopt
conversational backgrounds.
It is easy to see that conversational backgrounds do exactly the work of acces-
sibility relations. Each conversational background f determines an accessibility
relation Rf as follows (Kratzer 1991, definition 3, p.642):
1.2.8. Definition (Background-accessibility relation correspondence)
For all w, v ∈W : wRfv iff v ∈
⋂
f(w).
Conversational backgrounds are more fine-grained though: a single accessibility
relation R may correspond to various different conversational backgrounds. Yet
if we assume that f is closed under entailment (which seems likely), there is
one-to-one correspondence between conversational backgrounds and accessibility
relations:
(20) For all w and all propositions JϕKM:
⋂
f(w) ⊆ JϕKM → JϕKM ∈ f(w).
At any rate, the potential fine-grainedness of conversational backgrounds is, as
far as I know, not put to use anywhere in the literature on modality.
We have seen that particular modal interpretations impose particular con-
straints on the accessibility relation. In the present framework, conversational
backgrounds are used to do the job of accessibility relations, thus the conditions
that go with a particular modal meaning are formulated as constraints on f(w).
For example, the validity of principle D is ensured if the conversational back-
ground is such that its intersection is non-empty, and principle T is made valid
if the world of evaluation w is included in
⋂
f(w). Table 1.1 correlates the con-
ditions imposed on R and f by the various modal principles discussed in the
foregoing.
Interim summary
We now see how standard possible worlds semantics captures the two desiderata
that we started out with: a shared semantic core and a contextual means of
modulating this core. We can say that the core meaning of possibility modals
corresponds to the meaning of ♦ and the basic meaning of necessity modals to the
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Table 1.1: Correspondences between modal principles, conditions on accessibility rela-
tions, and conditions on conversational backgrounds (free variables w, v, u are univer-
sally quantified over)
Principle R is: Condition on f :
D ϕ→ ♦ϕ serial consistency
there is at least one v s.t. wRv
⋂
f(w) 6= ∅
T ϕ→ ϕ reflexive realism
wRw w ∈
⋂
f(w)
4 ϕ→ ϕ transitive positive introspection
if wRv and vRu, then wRu if v ∈
⋂
f(w) and u ∈
⋂
f(v),
then u ∈
⋂
f(w)
5 ¬ϕ→ ¬ϕ Euclidean negative introspection
if wRv and wRu, then vRu if v ∈
⋂
f(w) and u ∈
⋂
f(w),
then u ∈
⋂
f(v)
meaning of . Particular flavors of modal expressions correspond to particular
choices of the accessibility relation or conversational background. Consider the
following sentence:
(21) You must drive very carefully.
The truth conditions of this statement are neutral with respect to the type of the
modal base, i.e. (21) is in principle compatible with a variety of modal flavors.
The context of utterance often gives clues which type of background is intended:
(22) a. I hear you’ve never had an accident. You must drive very carefully.
b. You can only rent a car on the following conditions. First, you must
drive very carefully.
In (22a) the necessity is clearly relative to a piece of evidence, while (22b) presents
the necessity as depending on a set of obligations. Hence, (22a) requires a model
where the accessibility relation or conversational background provides epistemic
alternatives, and (22b) invokes a model where the deontic alternatives are as-
signed. Formal approaches to modality usually do not have more to say about the
actual contextual mechanism which selects the appropriate accessibility relation.
An exception is the work by Geurts (1995, 1999) and Frank (1997), who think of
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modal expressions as presupposition triggers that presuppose their domain. This
means that the domain of quantification is chosen via the same mechanism that
handles presupposition resolution.
Summing up, in relational semantics the interpretation of modal expressions
varies along two parameters. First, the modal force of the expression, which is
either universal or existential. Second, the modal flavor, which may be epistemic,
deontic etc. For flexible modals, it seems that the modal force of an expression
is typically lexically given, while the modal flavor is left implicit.27 The context
of utterance determines its interpretation. Of course, not all modals are flexible.
For instance, might favors an epistemic interpretation. Such ‘pickiness’ is usually
attributed to compatibility restrictions with respect to the type of conversational
background a modal allows.
Let’s call the semantics outlined in this section the standard semantics for
modal expressions. While this analysis does well in many respects, it is also
subject to some problems. The next section discusses these problems and revises
the semantics to deal with them.
1.3 Ordering semantics
There are three main problems with the standard analysis. First, it makes the
wrong predictions whenever modal operators are evaluated with respect to incon-
sistent information. Second, the standard analysis cannot account for gradable
modal notions, as expressed by slight possibility, or more likely than. Third, the
standard analysis gives rise to paradoxes like the so-called Samaritan Paradox.
These problems are presented in 1.3.1. Then, section 1.3.2 introduces Kratzer’s
modification of the standard framework to deal with them. Finally, 1.3.3 discusses
the taxonomy of modal meanings in this modified framework.
1.3.1 Problems for the standard analysis
Inconsistent backgrounds
The first major problem for the standard analysis arises in case a modal is inter-
preted relative to an inconsistent background. Modal operators that are evaluated
with respect to such a background quantify over the empty set of worlds. Recall
that the worlds that are accessible from a world w are those worlds in which
all of the propositions that the conversational background assigns to w are true.
Obviously, if this set of propositions is inconsistent, its intersection is the empty
set of worlds. This is a problem, because in the absence of accessible worlds our
27Interestingly, in some languages the modal system appears to be organized the other way
around: the modal flavor is specified in the lexicon while the modal force is contextually sup-
plied. See Matthewson et al. (2006) on St’a´t’imcets.
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semantics makes any proposition necessary, and no proposition possible, which
does not correspond to our intuitions about what should and should not be true
in such situations.
Laws, norms and desires constitute the sort of backgrounds that might be
inconsistent, as do beliefs. We may therefore expect problems with deontic-like
modals as well as with epistemic/doxastic ones. In what follows, however, I
will limit my attention to deontic modality. Kratzer (1977) gives the following
example of an inconsistent deontic background, provided by the New Zealand
law. Suppose that the law of this country consists only of the judgments that are
handed down, and that on some issues the judges do not agree. They agree that
murder is a crime, but the Wellington law has it that deer are responsible for the
damage they inflict on young trees, whereas in Auckland they are not. The law
of New Zealand is therefore inconsistent. Intuitively, (23a) is false and (23b) is
true.28
(23) a. In view of the law of New Zealand, murder must not be a crime.
b. In view of the law of New Zealand, deer can be responsible for dam-
age they inflict on young trees.
Given the standard analysis, however, (23a) comes out as true and (23b) as false.
Note that (23a) is trivially true: according to the standard analysis anything
is obligated by the New Zealand law just because the Wellington and Auckland
judges do not agree about the liability of deer.29
Thus, on the one hand, the existence of inconsistent backgrounds, as in
Kratzer’s scenario, suggests that we were mistaken when we assumed that modal
operators always quantify over non-empty sets of worlds. That is, it seems that
the class of models that is admissible for (deontic) expressions should not make
principle D valid. On the other hand, however, our judgments concerning the
truth value of (23a) and (23b) show that we have good reason to require that the
domain of modals must be non-empty. Therefore, what we want is an analysis
of modals which allows us to accommodate examples like (23) without giving up
principle D. We will see below that Kratzer’s solution does just that.
Similar problems crop up in so-called practical inference scenarios. As far as I
know, the term ‘practical inference’ comes from von Wright (1963b) and refers to
inferences the conclusion of which leads to action. To see why such scenarios pose
a challenge to the standard analysis, first consider the following unproblematic
example:
28In this section, I will often speak sloppily about natural language sentences being true; even
though given the present system, we can only properly say that their translation into sentences
from modal sentential logic is true. In section 1.4 we will revise the system in such a way that
we can assign truth conditions to English sentences directly.
29There is actually quite some philosophical discussion on whether such things like laws or
desires are ever really inconsistent. It seems that quite often one desire is predominant, see the
papers in Gowans (1987).
22 Chapter 1. Semantics for modals
1.3.1 Scenario (Practical inference I)
In w all I want is to become mayor.
To become mayor in w one has to go to the pub regularly.
It seems that I should draw the following conclusion about what I have to do:
(24) I have to go to the pub regularly (in view of the relevant circumstances
and what I want).
Note that the standard analysis would make the wrong predictions if have to
were only evaluated with respect to my desires in w. In that case, the con-
clusion of the above inference would probably come out false: there are many
possible worlds in which I become mayor, and I do not regularly go to the pub
in everyone of these. We thus have to allow the modal to depend on the fac-
tual background assumptions as well. Let f(w) = {that I become mayor} and
f ′(w) = {that I will only become mayor if I go to the pub regularly}. We can
now evaluate (24) relative to the union of these backgrounds: f(w)∪f ′(w). Note
that this correctly predicts that (24) is a valid argument: I do go to the pub
regularly in every world v ∈
⋂
(f(w) ∪ f ′(w)).
But now consider the following scenario, which differs from the former one in
that I have an additional desire in w: I do not want to go to the pub regularly.
1.3.2 Scenario (Practical inference II)
In w all I want is to become mayor and not to go to the pub regularly.
To become mayor in w one has to go to the pub regularly.
Now the conclusion in (24) (that I have to go to the pub regularly) seems invalid.
Yet the standard analysis makes the opposite prediction. Let f(w) contain the
proposition that one can only become mayor if one goes to the pub and let f ′(w)
contain what I want, i.e. I become mayor and I do not go to the pub. The union
of these, f(w) ∪ f ′(w), is inconsistent. It follows that (24) comes out true, for
any proposition is a necessity relative to an inconsistent background.30 But this
means that the negation of (24) also comes out true, so perhaps the prediction
for necessity statement isn’t so problematic, as it also follows that you must not
go to the pub regularly. However, the predictions for possibility statements in
scenarios with inconsistent backgrounds do seem problematic. As said, against
such backgrounds, all possibility statements come out false, so we incorrectly
predict that any of the following sentences do not follow:
(25) a. I could go to the pub regularly.
30Note that if we evaluated the conclusion against the teleological background f(w) only, we
would still predict that the argument is valid.
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b. It is possible that I don’t go to the pub regularly.
Thus, unlike in the New Zealand scenario, the inconsistency in this practical
inference scenario arises not because our desires are incompatible per se, but
because the facts are such that they cannot both be fulfilled. Just like in the New
Zealand scenario, this leads to unwelcome predictions. Intuitively, what’s needed
to account for the practical inference scenario, is a system that allows the facts
to take precedence over the desires, such that the modal quantifies over those
possible worlds in which I get as much of what I want as possible, given that the
facts are such and such.
Graded modality
The second major problem for the standard analysis is that it cannot make a
distinction between different grades of possibility and necessity. The analysis
therefore cannot account for the contrast between the following sentences:
(26) a. It is possible that the butler is the murderer.
b. There is a slight possibility that the butler is the murderer.
There is a clear difference in meaning between these two sentences: someone who
utters (26b) considers it less likely that the butler did it than someone who utters
(26a). The possibility that the butler did it is presented as more remote or far-
fetched in (26b) than in (26a). Intuitively, to deal with this, we have to distinguish
between more and less far-fetched worlds. As we will see below, the notion of far-
fetchedness that is at play here according to Kratzer is far-fetchedness in view of
the normal course of events.
The semantics given thus far equally fails to account for comparative notions
of possibility and necessity, as in the following:
(27) a. The butler is more likely to be the murderer than the gardener.
b. Given your state of health, you’d be better off going to Davos than
to Amsterdam.
In the present framework (in which we haven’t yet defined an order on possible
worlds), there is no way of saying that worlds in which the gardener is the mur-
derer are more far-fetched than worlds in which the butler is the culprit. Nor can
we express that your health would be better in worlds in which you go to Davos
than in worlds in which you go to Amsterdam.
The Samaritan paradox
The third and last problem for the standard analysis is the Samaritan paradox.
The problem is that if a proposition ϕ is obligated, any proposition ψ that is
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implied by ϕ is obligated as well.31 Thus the following holds:
(28) For all models M: if M |= ϕ→ ψ, then M |= ϕ→ ψ.
If ϕ→ ψ is valid in a model M, then every ϕ-world in WM is also a ψ-world. It
follows that every deontically accessible world ϕ-world is a deontically accessible
ψ-world.32 To see the problem, consider the following sentences. The first of
these, (29a), is true, for it is morally commanded that one helps a person who
is robbed. However, helping someone who is robbed implies that someone was
robbed, hence it follows that it is also morally commanded that someone was
robbed. Sentence (29b) is also predicted to be true:
(29) a. You ought to help Jones who was robbed.
b. It ought to be the case that Jones was robbed.
Kratzer (1991, 643) discusses a conditional version of the Samaritan Paradox:
(30) For all models M:
if M |= (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ χ), then M |= (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ χ).
A conditional ϕ→ ψ implies a conditional ϕ→ χ for any χ in any model in which
ϕ is false throughout the worlds in that model. Kratzer’s example is as follows.
The law contains two propositions: that no murder occurs and that if a murder
occurs, the murderer will go to jail. In a model in which this law is obeyed, every
world will be such that no murder occurs. This makes the following two sentences
true (because conditionals with false antecedents are true, see clause (ii) of 1.2.3):
(31) a. If a murder occurs, the murderer will go to jail.
b. If a murder occurs, the murderer will be knighted.
It follows that these conditionals will also come out as necessary in view of the
law, which runs counter to our intuitions:
(32) a. It is necessary that if a murder occurs, the murderer will go to jail.
b. It is necessary that if a murder occurs, the murderer will be knighted.
31The name ‘Samaritan paradox’ was proposed by Prior (1968, 144), but the paradox itself
was recognized much earlier. For instance, the puzzle was already mentioned by Bradley (1876,
155), citing Blake’s “Pity would be no more, if we did not make somebody poor”, and long
before that time, the problem was discussed by medieval scholars, most notably by the 14th
century scholar Roger Roseth, see Knuuttila (1993, 183). Here I present Prior’s version of the
paradox.
32Note that (28) holds independent of the interpretation of . In epistemic/doxastic logic,
this gives rise to the logical omniscience problem: the standard analysis incorrectly predicts
that agents believe all tautologies as well as all logical consequences of their beliefs. A number
of solutions has been proposed to deal with this problem, see Fagin et al. (1995) for an overview.
I will not further discuss logical omniscience, for the problems associated with it do not arise
in the examples that I am interested in here.
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In principle, this unwelcome prediction can be blamed on the standard analysis
of modals or on the standard analysis of conditionals (as material implication).
Kratzer actually ends up modifying the standard semantics of both modals and
conditionals. In this chapter, however, I will concentrate on the non-conditional
version of the paradox.
1.3.2 Doubly relative semantics
Kratzer’s (1981, 1991) solution to the above problems is based on Lewis’s (1973)
ordering semantics for counterfactuals.33 Some of the leading ideas seem to be
already present in van Fraassen (1973). Kratzer proposes that the interpreta-
tion of modals depends on two conversational backgrounds which play different
roles. First, there are factual backgrounds, which describe sets of possible worlds.
Second, there are normative backgrounds which order these worlds with respect
to how well they conform to the norms. For instance, if the norm is that no
murder takes place, then any world in which no murder takes place is ordered
higher than a world in which murder does occur. These two backgrounds jointly
determine the domain of quantification (hence modal items are doubly relative).
Modals make claims about the best worlds that conform to the facts. Factual
information thus takes precedence over normative information.34
Kratzer implements this by making the interpretation of modals dependent on
two contextual parameters. The first is the modal base f , which is a function that
assigns a set of propositions to possible worlds. This set of propositions, f(w),
contains the relevant circumstances of w. The second parameter on which the
interpretation of modals depends is the ordering source g. This is also a function
from worlds to sets of propositions, but the set that is assigned to the world of
evaluation, g(w), describes the ideals in w, and determines an order on the worlds
in the intersection of the modal base, defined as follows:
1.3.1. Definition (Order determined by g(w))
For all worlds u, v ∈W :
u <g(w) v iff {p : p ∈ g(w) and v ∈ p} ⊂ {p : p ∈ g(w) and u ∈ p}.
Thus, a world u comes closer to the ideal g(w) than a world v iff u makes more
ideal propositions true than v does.35 Note that <g(w) is a transitive relation: if
u <g(w) v and v <g(w) t, then u <g(w) t.
33In fact, Lewis (1981) proved that the two are equivalent.
34In Kratzer (1977) she proposes a different solution, which consists in looking at maximally
consistent subsets of f(w) ∪ f ′(w) (based on work by Rescher (1973)). However, this doesn’t
work for practical inference, cf. Kratzer (1981), as this doesn’t give facts precedence over ideals.
35But note that if the propositions that v and u make true are disjoint, the definition makes
the two worlds incommensurable.
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Any given ordering source g(w)36 determines a selection function maxg(w)
which selects the <g(w)-best worlds from a set of worlds V :
1.3.2. Definition (Selection functions)
For all V ⊆W :
maxg(w)(V ) = {w ∈ V : there is no v ∈ V : v <g(w) w}.
This definition deviates from Kratzer’s original formulation, by making the Limit
Assumption: I assume that there is always a set of best worlds. Lewis (1973)
argued that this is not warranted, but Stalnaker (1980) maintained that we can
usually safely assume that a set of best worlds can be selected (see also chapter
2 below for further elaboration).
Models M are now quadruples 〈W, f, g, I〉. As said, modals now quantify
over those modal base worlds that are best according to the ordering source.
Accordingly, the truth definition for modal operators is as follows:
1.3.3. Definition (Revised truth definition for modal operators)
a. M, w |= ♦ϕ iff maxg(w)(
⋂
f(w)) ∩ JϕKM 6= ∅
b. M, w |= ♦ϕ iff maxg(w)(
⋂
f(w)) ⊆ JϕKM
Informally put, a sentence is possible if it is true in at least one of the worlds
in the modal base that are best according to the ordering source. A sentence is
necessary if it is true in all of these worlds. To see how this works, consider the
following simple example:
(33) According to the school’s tradition, the champions and their partners
open the ball.
Harry is a champion.
Therefore: Harry has to dance.
The modal base f(w) for have to contains the relevant circumstances in w, i.e.
that Harry is a champion. The ordering source g(w), on the other hand, contains
the set of propositions which correspond to the school’s traditions, i.e. that the
champions and their partners open the ball. The modal thus quantifies over
worlds in which Harry is a champion and that correspond most to the tradition.
If Harry dances in these worlds, the conclusion in (33) is true.
Importantly, not just any kind of proposition can make it into the modal base,
for this parameter is restricted to factual information. It follows that the modal
base is always consistent.37 In contrast, the ordering source typically contains
36As before, I will use the terms ‘modal base’ and ‘ordering source’ in a sloppy fashion when
this doesn’t lead to confusion: to refer to a function g of worlds to sets of propositions and to
refer to the set of propositions assigned to a specific world g(w).
37Thus, beliefs, which may be inconsistent are (at least in part) part of the ordering source
rather than the modal base. See 1.3.3 below.
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information that is potentially inconsistent, like what’s in the law, or what my
desires are. Because the semantics is set up in such a way that facts have priority
over ideals (the ordering source orders the modal base worlds), the requirement
that modals quantify over non-empty sets of possible worlds can be retained. Note
that for any interpretation of must and can we have that maxg(w)(
⋂
f(w)) 6= ∅.
That is, all admissible models for the modalities expressed in natural language
make principle D valid.
It is not the case that the interpretation of all modals is sensitive to an ordering
of worlds. For the sake of uniformity, these modals are modeled as taking an
empty ordering source, which induces a trivial ordering on worlds g(w) = ∅.38
The empty ordering source selects all modal base worlds as best. For example,
dynamic uses of must, as in (34), take a modal base which comprises facts about
the subject’s bodily state, and an empty ordering source.
(34) I must sneeze.
This sentence is true iff I sneeze in the best of the modal base worlds. As the
ordering is trivial, this comes down to the requirement that I sneeze in every modal
base world (i.e. every world in which my bodily state is as in the actual world).
Additionally, Kratzer takes epistemic modals to usually be sensitive to an empty
ordering source (besides an epistemic modal base). In case of epistemic modality,
however, there are exceptions, as we will see in 1.3.3. In general, modals that take
an empty ordering source depend on information that cannot be inconsistent, i.e.
they depend solely on facts.
Let’s now discuss if and how Kratzer’s modification of the standard framework
solves the three problems that we have identified for the standard analysis.
Inconsistent backgrounds
Kratzer’s example (23), which concerned the New Zealand law, is repeated below.
What we want to predict is that (35a) is false and (35b) is true, given that New
Zealand judges agree that murder is a crime, but disagree about the responsibility
of deer.
(35) a. In view of the law of New Zealand, murder must not be a crime.
b. In view of the law of New Zealand, deer can be responsible for dam-
age they inflict on young trees.
In the modified analysis, the law of New Zealand now provides the ordering
source rather than the modal base. For ease of exposition, let m be a name (in
38It might also happen that a modal is interpreted relative to an empty modal base (not to be
confused with a modal that quantifies over an empty set of worlds; such modals do not exist).
This does not arise with the modals that we are dealing with in this chapter, but does play a
role in Kratzer’s analysis of counterfactuals; as we will see in chapter 2.
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the meta-language) for the proposition that murder is a crime, and r be a name
for the proposition that deer are responsible for the damage they cause. Let −r
abbreviate for W/r; the complement of r in W . Then g(w) = {m, r,−r}. It is
clear that there is no modal base world (no matter what’s in the modal base)
that satisfies all of the propositions in this ordering source. The best worlds are
those worlds in which as many of the ordering source propositions as possible are
made true. That is, both worlds that make m and r true as well as worlds in
which m and −r are true, count as <g(w)-best. Now it is easy to see that (35a) is
predicted to be false while (35b) comes out true. It is not the case that murder
is not a crime in all the best modal base worlds, but it is the case that deer
are responsible for their actions in some of the best worlds. Kratzer’s modified
analysis thus accounts for our intuitions concerning (35a) and (35b).
What about practical inference? The relevant scenario is repeated below:
1.3.2 Scenario (Practical inference II)
In w all I want is to become mayor and not to go to the pub regularly.
To become mayor in w one has to go to the pub regularly.
To be explained is that the following sentence is false in this scenario:
(36) I have to go to the pub regularly (in view of the relevant circumstances
and what I want).
Under Kratzer’s analysis we get the following. Let m be the name for the propo-
sition that I become mayor, and p a name for the proposition that I go to the pub
regularly, and let m⇒ p abbreviate for (W/p) ∪m. The facts of w make it into
the modal base, whereas my wishes serve to order the modal base worlds, thus:
(37) f(w) = {m⇒ p}
g(w) = {m,−p}
Consider the following model. Of these four worlds, only w2, w3 and w4 are in
the modal base. Of these, the first two are the best modal base worlds, i.e.
maxg(w)(
⋂
f(w)) = {w2, w3}.
(38) w1: m, −p 2 wishes fulfilled
w2: m, p 1 wish fulfilled
w3: −m, −p 1 wish fulfilled
w4: −m, p 0 wishes fulfilled
w1 < w2, w1 < w3, w2 < w4, w3 < w4
It is now clear that (36) is predicted to be false. In some of the best modal base
worlds I go to the pub regularly, but in others I do not. It is thus not the case
that I go to the pub regularly in all of the best modal base worlds. In contrast,
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the following sentences are true relative to this f(w) and g(w):
(39) a. I could go to the pub regularly.
b. It’s possible that I do not go to the pub regularly.
Doubly relative semantics thus captures that in this scenario the circumstances
prevent me from realizing all of my desires.
It seems to me, however, that there is more to say about scenarios in which
there are incompatible desires. That is, the natural thing for me to do in this
scenario is to decide which of my desires is most important. After all, realizing
one of my desires is better than realizing none. Therefore I must prioritize. Recall
Buridan’s famous allegory where an ass dies of starvation because it cannot choose
between two equidistant and equally tempting piles of hay.39 But human beings
are not asses, and the following is a completely natural thing to say in our scenario:
(40) If I’d rather become mayor than not go to the pub regularly, I have to
go to the pub regularly.
Besides natural, this sentence is clearly true. It seems that the if -clause intro-
duces a ranking among the desires in the ordering source, such thatm is preferred
over −p. This ranking further restricts the domain of quantification to w2 and
this makes it true that I have to go to the pub (given the model in (38)). Notice
that the following sentence also seems true in our scenario:
(41) If I want to become mayor, I have to go to the pub regularly.
This suggests that (41) can be understood as ‘If I give priority to my mayor-goal,
I have to go to the pub regularly’.
The priority ranking among my desires may also be implicit. That is, (42)
might be understood as a true sentence, under the assumption that I choose to
let my mayor-goal prevail:
(42) I have to go to the pub regularly.
Intuitions are perhaps clearer for the next sentence:40
(43) I’m screwed. I have to go to the pub regularly, but I don’t want to.
It seems one can truthfully say this in our scenario. This indicates that an implicit
priority ranking is assumed, or else it couldn’t be true that I have to go to the
pub. Yet while have to is interpreted relative to my prioritized desires, want to
39Even though this example is known as ‘Buridan’s Ass’, it is in fact found nowhere in
Buridan’s writings. The example goes back at least to Aristotle’s De Caelo (295b32). It seems
to have gotten its name because it was standardly used to ridicule Buridan’s account of free
choice.
40I owe this example to Kai von Fintel (p.c.).
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is apparently sensitive to the unprioritized set of my desires, or else it couldn’t
be true that I don’t want to go to the pub.
As it stands, doubly relative semantics does not account for sentences (40)-
(43).41 For now, however, we will set these issues aside. We will address them in
the chapter about anankastic conditionals, i.e. chapter 4.
Graded modality
Kratzer also puts the ordering source parameter at work to deal with graded
modal concepts. She argues that such modals are not only interpreted relative to
an epistemic modal base, but also to a stereotypical ordering source, which ranks
the modal base worlds with respect to how well they conform to the normal course
of events. Suppose, for example, that Harry has been murdered. Ron got along
with him very well, but Draco couldn’t stand him. Since one normally needs a
motive to commit a murder, the stereotypical ordering source ranks worlds in
which Draco is the culprit higher (less far-fetched) than worlds in which Ron
killed Harry. I limit myself to the notions of slight possibility, human necessity,
and comparative possibility ; for further graded concepts the reader is referred to
the cited works by Kratzer. Slight possibility is defined as follows:
1.3.4. Definition (Slight possibility)
(44) A sentence ϕ is slightly possible in a world w in a modelM wrt. a modal
base f and an ordering source g iff:
(i)
⋂
f(w) ∩ JϕKM 6= ∅ and
(ii) maxg(w)(
⋂
f(w)) ⊆ J¬ϕKM.
That is, ϕ is slightly possible if ϕ is true in at least one modal base world, but
false in all the modal base worlds that correspond to the normal course of events.
In the murder scenario described above, (45) is true:
(45) There is a slight possibility that Draco is not the murderer.
It is not expected that Draco will turn out to be innocent, but it is a possibility.
Another graded notion defined by Kratzer (1981) is human necessity, a weaker
kind of necessity than ‘pure’ epistemic necessity. The latter kind is relative to
41Similar critique is voiced by Frank (1997, 41-46). She accounts for the resolution of conflicts
by her “multiple relative modality”: an analysis intuitively closer to that of Kratzer (1977).
Modals are relative to two conversational backgrounds, but it isn’t the case that one of these acts
like an ordering source. Instead, modals are interpreted relative to the ‘compatibility restricted
union’ of these backgrounds. This union process gives facts precedence over ideals. It seems
however, that an ordering source is still needed in the semantics, in order to deal with graded
modal notions. Frank proposes that we can define generalized quantifiers for expressions like
probably, but the fact that we cannot count possible worlds, makes it hard to see how this could
work.
1.3. Ordering semantics 31
all epistemically accessible worlds, whereas human necessity only looks at those
worlds which correspond to the normal course of events:
1.3.5. Definition (Human necessity)
(46) A sentence ϕ is humanly necessary in a world w in a model M wrt. f
and g, iff:
maxg(w)(
⋂
f(w)) ⊆ JϕKM.
Human necessity is encoded by items as probably, likely, and should. Assuming, as
before, that our stereotypical ordering source ranks worlds in which Draco killed
Harry higher than all worlds in which someone else did it, the following sentence
comes out true:
(47) It is likely that Draco is the murderer.
Finally, the semantics of comparative modal concepts also makes reference to the
ordering source parameter. For instance, a sentence ϕ is a better possibility than
a sentence ψ if some modal base world in which ϕ is true is higher ranked by the
ordering source than all those in which ψ is true:
1.3.6. Definition (Comparative possibility)
(48) A sentence ϕ is more likely than a sentence ψ iff:
for all v ∈
⋂
f(w): if v ∈ JψKM then there is a world u ∈
⋂
f(w) such
that u <g(w) v and u ∈ JϕK
M.
This notion is needed to deal with sentences like (49a) and (49b). For (49a), the
modal base contains the available evidence, while the ordering source is stereo-
typical: it orders the worlds according to their normality. In contrast, the modal
base of the modal in (49b) contains facts about your current condition, as well as
facts about the climates of Davos and Amsterdam. The ordering source orders
worlds that correspond to these facts according to how well they are for your
health.
(49) a. The butler is more likely to be the murderer than the gardener.
b. Given your state of health, you’d be better off going to Davos than
to Amsterdam.
This sums up my presentation of Kratzer’s approach to graded modality. Is
this approach adequate? Not entirely, I think, for Kratzer’s definitions are rather
rigid. That is, in her system it is an all-or-nothing matter whether a proposition
comes out as say a slight possibility. This seems to be at odds though with the
nature of graded modal concepts, the existence of which indicates that possibility
is often rather a more-or-less matter. As a consequence, Kratzer’s account of
graded modality faces two problems. First, it isn’t clear how more fine-grained
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modal concepts can be accommodated. For example, how can we define what
it means to be a very slight possibility, or even an extremely slight possibility?
The second problem is that the meaning of graded concepts seems to vary de-
pending on the standard of comparison that is chosen. Consider the following
sentence, which is a variation on an example by Lewis (1973, 52) (throughout
this dissertation, capital letters indicate stress):
(50) Compared to stones learning how to speak, it is likely that dogs learn
how to speak, but it is not LIKELY that dogs learn how to speak.
Here it seems that we are dealing with two occurrences of likely that each are rela-
tive to a different norm, which explains why (50) isn’t contradictory. On Kratzer’s
account, however, it is not expected that likely should display such contextual
variability. These problems could perhaps be solved by treating graded modality
within degree semantics, where some notion of comparative possibility is taken
as a primitive, analogous perhaps to von Stechow’s (2006) degree semantics for
temporal gradable adjective like early/earlier, and late/later. As graded modal-
ity is not one of the main topics of this dissertation, I will have to leave this for
another occasion.
The Samaritan paradox
Finally, we will discuss how doubly relative semantics solves the (unconditional
version of the) Samaritan Paradox. The modified semantics actually doesn’t
provide a full solution, but it does reduce the paradox to a different problem.
Consider again the relevant pair of sentences:
(51) a. You ought to help Jones who was robbed.
b. It ought to be the case that Jones was robbed.
Suppose that it is morally commanded that no one is robbed, and that if someone
is robbed, this person should be helped. These two propositions now constitute
the ordering source g. The modal base f , on the other hand, contains the fact
that Jones was robbed. Now (51a) is true relative to f and g because even though
worlds in which Jones is robbed are morally deficient, the relatively best ones are
those in which you help him.
What about (51b)? It is clear that this sentence is also true in the best modal
base worlds. In all these worlds it is true that Jones was robbed, so it is also true
that he was robbed in the best worlds. It thus appears as though doubly relative
semantics isn’t of much help, but note that the Samaritan Paradox now reduces
to the problem that ϕ is true whenever ϕ is true in all possible worlds. This is
a well-known problem of deontic logic, and several solutions have been proposed
to deal with it. For instance, Frank (1997) proposes that ought-sentences are
only felicitous if the modal base leaves their complement proposition open. That
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is, (51a) is only appropriate if it isn’t already considered as given that you will
help Jones (who was robbed). Similarly, (51b) requires a context in which both
worlds in which Jones was robbed and worlds in which he was not robbed come
under consideration. It follows that (51b) is infelicitous in a context where (51a)
is true; for helping someone who was robbed, entails that this person was in fact
robbed. Geurts (2005), on the other hand, assumes that (51b) contains a covert
modal on top of the overt deontic expression:42
(52) (It must be the case that) it ought to be the case that Jones was robbed
(given that he was robbed).
This covert modal expresses epistemic necessity, and the modal base of this modal
is restricted with the fact that Jones was robbed. Thus, (52b) is analyzed as the
claim that Jones having been robbed is a piece of evidence for the conclusion that
Jones ought to have been robbed. Naturally, on this interpretation, (52b) comes
out false.43
Note that in doubly relative semantics we can do justice to the intuition that it
isn’t commanded that Jones be robbed in the same way as it is commanded that
people who get robbed must be helped. The next sentence is true irrespective of
the facts. That is, relative to an empty modal base and a deontic ordering source,
(53) comes out true:
(53) If someone is robbed, he must be helped.
This does not hold for (52b). In ethical worlds, no one is robbed, so Jones isn’t
robbed either.
1.3.3 Two basic kinds of modal reasoning
Kratzer’s revised analysis has certain implications for the taxonomy of modals.
In the new framework of doubly relative semantics, the interpretation of modals
varies along three parameters. First, the modal force, which is either possibility
or necessity.44 Second, the modal base, which contains factual information, and
third, the ordering source, which contains normative information. Typical order-
ing sources are: what the law provides, what is good for you, what is moral, what
you want, what is normal, what you believe etc. But what about the modal base?
According to Kratzer, we only find two kinds of modal bases. Some modals take
an epistemic modal base, that contains all of the facts of w, while others select
42Curiously, this move actually goes back to Frank (1997) who seems to have missed the
explanatory power with respect to the Samaritan Paradox.
43Zvolenszky (2006, 2002) argues that none of these solutions are good, and that possible
worlds semantics must be abandoned all together.
44Descriptively, there are of course more than these two modal forces, but we just saw that
in this system an intermediate notion like probability is analyzed as a weak necessity; weak
because the domain of quantification is further restricted by the ordering source.
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a circumstantial modal base, which contains a relevant portion of the facts of w.
The following pair illustrates the contrast:
(54) a. Hydrangeas can grow here.
b. There might be hydrangeas growing here.
Imagine that we are walking on a tropical island. We discover that the soil and
climate are perfect for growing hydrangeas. In light of these circumstances, it is
possible that these plants grow on this island, so (54a) is true, and (54b) is also
true. But now suppose that we discover that the inhabitants of our island have
never been in contact with hydrangea growing cultures, and that their native
vegetation is very different from ours. Now (54b) is no longer true. Sentence
(54a), on the other hand, still is. It doesn’t matter whether it is highly unlikely
that hydrangeas are actually growing here, all that matters is the quality of the
soil, the climate and the properties of hydrangeas. Now, the modal in (54a) takes
a circumstantial modal base, comprised of the facts just mentioned, whereas the
modal in (54b) takes an epistemic modal base, to which all the available evidence
counts. Kratzer (1991, 646) writes:
Epistemic modality is the modality of curious people like historians,
detectives, and futurologists. Circumstantial modality is the modality
of rational agents like gardeners, architects and engineers. A historian
asks what might have been the case, given all the available facts. An
engineer asks what can be done given certain relevant facts.
Kratzer’s thesis is now that all epistemic modals take an epistemic modal base,
but that all non-epistemic modals, e.g. ability modals, deontic and teleological
expressions, take a circumstantial modal base. For instance, a deontic modal takes
a circumstantial modal base and a deontic ordering source, containing the laws in
w. A teleological modal, on the other hand, is relative to a circumstantial modal
base and a teleological ordering source that contains the goals in w. Of course,
the distinction between two kinds of modal reasoning is parallel to the root-
epistemic distinction familiar from the transformational literature, and Kratzer
indeed suggests that the distinction between modals with a circumstantial and
modal with an epistemic modal base might be reflected in a difference in argument
structure, cf. Brennan (1993).
Kratzer’s basic claim is thus that there is a counterfactual element in the
semantics of non-epistemic modals. After all, if a modal base f(w) contains only
a portion of the facts of w, the set of worlds it provides,
⋂
f(w), may contain
worlds that aren’t considered to be live options. Ability modals indeed appear to
have some counterfactual flavor. Sentence (55) may be true, even though I have
never climbed that tree, and never will:
(55) I can climb that tree.
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Indeed, it would not be odd to continue (55) with ‘but I won’t’ or ‘but I don’t
think I’ll ever will’. Similar remarks apply to the deontic modal in (56):
(56) John is allowed to stay up late (but he won’t, because he has been up for
48 hours).
The fact that we know that John will not stay up late, doesn’t change the per-
mission.
Some deontic modals, however, seem to be different. In general, it doesn’t
make sense to impose an obligation on someone when one knows that the ad-
dressee is not going to fulfill that obligation. As pointed out by Ninan (2005),
the following utterance is infelicitous:4546
(57) #You must go to confession, but you’re not going to.47
Such examples could be taken to indicate that deontic must takes an epistemic
modal base rather than a circumstantial one, from which the deontic ordering
source selects the best worlds, or perhaps this is something pragmatic.48
Similarly, in practical inference scenarios like the ones we have seen above, it
seems obvious that the speaker only has worlds in mind that might turn out to
be the actual world, as here the speaker is deliberating on what to do:
(58) I want to become mayor. Therefore, I must go to the pub regularly.
In chapter 4 we will discuss this further.
Epistemic modality and realism
As said, Kratzer claims that epistemic modals are dependent on modal bases
which contain all the facts. Obviously, such modal bases always contain the actual
world, and are thus realistic (w ∈
⋂
f(w)). This is a problem, for examples like
(59) suggest that epistemic modal bases are not realistic:
(59) a. She climbed Mount Toby.
b. She must have climbed Mount Toby.
If must were relative to a realistic modal base and an empty ordering source
(which is a reasonable assumption, given that epistemic modals depend on the
45Similar observations can be found in Palmer (2001, 73), and Werner (2003).
46Throughout this dissertation, furnishing a sentence with # means that it is semantically
odd, while a * stands for ungrammaticality.
47Helen de Hoop (p.c.) points out that the sentence seems to improve by inserting I know :
‘You must go to confession, but I know you’re not going to’. Rob van der Sandt (p.c.) finds
‘You must go to confession, but unfortunately you won’t’ not so bad.
48Ninan (2005) attempts a solution in terms of the speech act performed by an utterance of
(57).
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available knowledge, and knowledge is always consistent), we would expect (59b)
to entail (59a). But intuitively, someone who utters (59b) makes a weaker claim
than someone who utters (59a).
To deal with such examples, Kratzer argues that it must be that the modal
takes a non-empty ordering source. The modal is thus not a “pure” epistemic
modal. The ordering source contains less reliable sources of information than
the known facts in the modal base. This might be hearsay, a tourist guide, or
the normal course of events. Now, while the modal base is realistic, the set of
best modal base worlds need not contain the world of evaluation, hence it doesn’t
follow that w ∈ maxg(w)(
⋂
f(w)).
This is close to what we have proposed earlier in section 1.2.1, where we said
that epistemic modals of natural language are not so much relative to established
facts (true beliefs) as they are relative to beliefs (that might be mistaken). But
there are also some differences. In doubly relative semantics, beliefs have to end
up in the ordering source, for they might be inconsistent. That is, if we were to
formulate our previous proposal in terms of Kratzer’s framework, it seems that
we would have to say that epistemic modals take an empty modal base and an
ordering source that consists of the beliefs of a relevant believer. In contrast,
Kratzer assumes that some of our beliefs have a special status: we treat them as
facts, i.e. they end up in the modal base.
Interim summary
In this section we have extended standard relational semantics for modality with
an ordering on possible worlds. This makes modal operators doubly relative,
depending on a set of accessible worlds and a ranking of these worlds. Modal
operators then quantify over those accessible worlds that are ranked highest. We
have seen that this innovation is needed to deal with inconsistent backgrounds,
graded modal concepts, and deontic paradoxes.
Although ordering semantics clearly constitutes an overall improvement over
ordinary relational semantics, I will, in what follows, sometimes omit the order-
ing source parameter, but only if this is ‘safe’, i.e. if we are not dealing with
inconsistent backgrounds or graded concepts. This is standard practice in work
on modality, and serves to keep the definitions easy to read.
1.4 Back to natural language
In the previous sections we have been concerned with the syntax and semantics of
modal sentences in an artificial language. Now we shift our attention to natural
language. In principle, there are two ways to proceed. We could provide a
systematic translation method which maps sentences of English to formulas of
modal logic, for which we have already defined truth in a model, or we could
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assign truth conditions to sentences of English directly, i.e. without mediation of
a logical language. I follow Heim & Kratzer (1998) and opt for the latter strategy.
My object language will thus be English. My meta-language will also be English,
enriched with some technical notation. Whenever confusion can arise between
object and meta-language, I will continue to encode expressions from the object
language in a sans-serif font.49
Starting tenet is the principle of compositionality: the meaning of an expres-
sion is a function of the meanings of its parts and the way they are syntactically
combined (Frege 1892, 1923). Heim & Kratzer (1998) assume that the syntax of
English sentences is given by a generative grammar a` la Chomsky, and so will
I. The inputs for semantic interpretation will thus be Logical Forms, which are
the output of transformational derivations.50 We want our semantics to assign
meanings to each node in the syntactic tree of a sentence. In this process, we
distinguish between atomic expressions, or terminal nodes, and complex expres-
sions, i.e. non-terminal nodes. The meanings of terminal nodes are given by the
lexicon, while interpretation rules define the meanings of complex expressions.
As usual, we will assign a type to each node in a tree, which determines in which
semantic domain the node is to be interpreted. This allows us to formulate gen-
eral principles for the interpretation of syntactic constructions. The basic idea is
that each part of a sentence either denotes a function or an argument, and that
the denotation of the entire sentence can be computed by applying the functions
to their appropriate arguments.
Following von Stechow (2004a), we adopt a two-sorted typed framework. Our
types are defined recursively; we specify a list of basic types and give a rule to
derive complex types. While we were concerned with a sentential language in
sections 1.2 and 1.3, our atomic sentences now further decompose (i.e. in predi-
cates and their arguments). Accordingly, the types we will employ are defined as
follows:
1.4.1. Definition (Semantic types)
a. Basic types:
(i) e for entities
(ii) t for truth values
(iii) s for possible worlds.
49To be precise: in the running text, expressions from the object language will be italicized
(as above), examples are encoded in a normal font, as confusion is not likely to arise, but LFs
will be in sans-serif font, so that in calculations of the semantic value of an LF, object language
is strictly separated from the meta-language.
50In a way, LF functions as an intermediate level between English sentences and their truth
conditions; so the distinction between direct model-theoretic interpretation and interpretation
via translation may not be so sharp. Yet crucially, the LFs of Heim & Kratzer are derived by
syntactic transformations rather than translations from one language into another.
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b. Derived types:
(i) If τ and σ are types, then 〈τ, σ〉 is a type.
(ii) Nothing else is a type.
Each semantic type is interpreted in a specific domain of interpretation:
1.4.2. Definition (Semantic denotation domains)
(60) a. De = D
b. Dt = {0, 1}
c. Ds = W
d. D〈τ,σ〉 = a function f from Dτ to Dσ
The denotation of a derived type 〈τ, σ〉 is thus a function which maps all elements
in the domain of τ onto elements in the domain of σ. For example, 〈s, t〉 denotes
a function which takes a possible world as its input and gives a truth value as its
output. Note that propositions are precisely such functions. Also note that for
convenience, I will often shorten 〈s, t〉 to 〈st〉.
We will assume that sentences denote propositions, hence that they are of
type 〈st〉.51 Modal operators denote the kind of functions that take two conver-
sational backgrounds (they are doubly relative) and a proposition as their argu-
ment, and give a proposition as their output. We have seen that conversational
backgrounds are functions from possible worlds to sets of propositions, so they
are of type 〈s, 〈st, t〉〉. Following recent implementations of Kratzer’s semantics,
e.g. von Fintel & Iatridou (2005), von Stechow (2004a), we will assume that the
modal base and the ordering source are the first and second argument of the modal
respectively, so the type of modal expressions is: 〈〈s, 〈st, t〉〉, 〈〈s, 〈st, t〉〉, 〈st, st〉〉〉.
ModelsM now contain denotations for each type of expression, and they must
also contain an interpretation function I that assigns to each lexical item α some
element of the interpretation domain which corresponds to the type of α, i.e. it
provides the lexical entry of α. Sample lexical entries are given below. Note that
we use the λ-notation in our meta-language to define functions; also note that
x, w, p, f and g are variables in the meta-language that range over individuals,
possible worlds, propositions, modal bases and ordering sources respectively:
1.4.3. Definition (Sample lexical entries)
a. I(Harry) = Harry
b. I(be home) = λx.λw.be home(x)(w)
c. I(can) = λfλgλpλw.maxg(w)(
⋂
f(w)) ∩ p 6= ∅
d. I(must) = λfλgλpλw.maxg(w)(
⋂
f(w)) ⊆ p
51Note that sentences of modal logic were assumed to denote truth values, not propositions.
We follow von Stechow (2004a) and go intensional all the way. This is more a matter of taste
than anything else.
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We can now define the interpretation of an expression α with respect to a model
M and an assignment h, i.e. JαKM,h. The assignment function h handles the
interpretation of variables. For a variable v of type τ , h(v) is an element of
the domain corresponding to τ . In the definition below, h[x/a] is that variable
assignment that assigns x to a but is otherwise identical to h:
1.4.4. Definition (The interpretation of α)
(61) a. If α is terminal node, JαKM,h = I(α).
b. If α is a variable, JαKM,h = h(α).
c. If ϕ is a tree of the form:
A
〈σ, τ〉
λξ ϕ
where ξ is a variable of type σ and ϕ is an expression of type τ :
JAKM,h = that function f s.t. for all a ∈ Dσ : f(a) = JϕK
M,h[ξ/a].
d. If ϕ is a branching node and {β, γ} is the set of its daughters, where
β is of type 〈τ, σ〉 and γ is of type τ , then
JϕKM,h = JβKM,h(JγKM,h).
The rule in (61c) is known as λ-abstraction, and captures the fact that the λ-
operator forms new expressions from expressions by abstracting over variables.
The last clause, (61d), is known as type-driven functional application, and cap-
tures the Fregean idea that sentence composition is a matter of saturating unsat-
urated meanings (functions) with arguments.
We can now apply this to modal sentences. Let me first clarify the syntactic
assumptions I make about such sentences. I will assume that modal auxiliaries
like must are raising predicates. That is, the syntactic subject is not an argu-
ment of the modal but originated in the VP (assuming the VP-internal subject
hypothesis), and moved out of there to the subject position of the matrix clause,
leaving behind a trace:
(62) a. Harry must be home.
b. [IP Harryi [must [VP ti be home]]]
We will not only assume this for epistemic auxiliaries as in our example, but for
all modal auxiliaries. As explained in section 1.1.1, though it is often assumed
that non-epistemic modals are control predicates (i.e. predicate level operators),
it is not necessary to make that assumption (Bhatt 1998, Wurmbrand 1999). If
we can give a uniform analysis of all modals, I believe that we should. Therefore
I will treat all modal auxiliaries as raising predicates.
We will assume that at LF, the subject is reconstructed to the position of its
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(lowest) trace, so that the input to our interpretation rules is as follows.52 For
concreteness, we assume that modals combine both with a modal base projection
MB and an ordering source projection OS:
(63)
IP
〈st〉
I′
〈st, st〉
VP
〈st〉
NP V
e
Harry
〈e, st〉
be home
I′
〈〈s, 〈st, t〉〉, 〈st, st〉
OS
〈s, 〈st, t〉〉
g
MB
〈s, 〈st, t〉〉
f
I
〈〈s, 〈st, t〉〉, 〈〈s, 〈st, t〉〉, 〈st, st〉〉〉
must
I assume that the modal base f and the ordering source g are unpronounced
variables (i.e. some sort of silent pronouns), the interpretation of which is handled
by the assignment function. The truth conditions of this structure are computed
in (64):
(64) JmustKM,h(JfKM,h)(JgKM,h)(Jbe homeKM,h(JHarryKM,h)) =
λfλgλpλw.maxg(w)(
⋂
f(w)) ⊆ p] (h(f)) (h(g))(λw.be-home (Harry)(w))
= λw.maxh(g)(w)(
⋂
h(f)(w)) ⊆ λw.be-home (Harry)(w)
where h(f) = what the speaker knows and h(g) = the normal course of
events (for example)
That is, (63) expresses the proposition that Harry is home in every world that is
compatible with what is known in the world of evaluation w that corresponds to
the normal course of events.
1.5 Summary
In this chapter I have presented both ordinary relational worlds semantics and
Kratzer’s extended version known as doubly relative semantics. Relational se-
mantics offers a neat explanation of the fact that we can use the same modal
52For our present purposes, it isn’t relevant how the subject gets lowered to the position of
its trace at LF. For proposals, see May (1977, 1985), Fox (1999), Elbourne & Sauerland (2002),
among many others.
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expressions to communicate a variety of modal meanings. We can do this be-
cause modal items express restricted quantification over possible worlds. Different
modal interpretations are the result of restricting the domain of quantification in
different ways.
In doubly relative semantics, modal expressions are not only dependent on a
set of possible worlds but also on an ordering on these worlds. This ordering on
worlds is necessary to deal with inconsistent backgrounds, graded modal notions
and the Samaritan paradox. Technically, this is implemented by making the
semantics of modality dependent on two conversational backgrounds, the modal
base and the ordering source respectively. Both are functions from possible worlds
to sets of propositions.
The final section turned the basic insights of possible worlds semantics into
a compositional semantics for sentences of English. We have assumed that the
modal base and ordering source are arguments of the modal, which are filled
by some sort of silent pronouns. As pronouns correspond to variables, their
interpretation is handled by the assignment function.
Chapter 2
Semantics for conditionals
In this chapter we extend the possible worlds semantics introduced in chapter
1 to deal with conditionals. The basic idea is that conditionals just are modals,
and that different kinds of conditionals correspond to different ways of setting the
modal base and ordering source parameter. The chapter consists of two sections.
First, section 2.1 discusses indicative conditionals. Then, 2.2 is concerned with
counterfactual conditionals.
2.1 Indicative conditionals
Philosophers traditionally distinguish between indicative and counterfactual con-
ditionals. The following famous pair by Adams (1970) illustrates the distinction:
(1) a. If Oswald did not kill Kennedy, then someone else did.
b. If Oswald had not killed Kennedy, then someone else would have.
While (1a) is true, (1b) is probably false. There is thus a truth conditional
difference between indicative conditionals and counterfactuals. The conditionals
also differ in form: the verbs in (1b) carry past tense morphology.1 Typically,
this morphology need not be interpreted as past tense (that is, we are dealing
with ‘fake tense’ in the terminology of Iatridou (2000)), and its contribution is
one of the main puzzles in the compositional semantics of counterfactuals. In
this chapter, however, we set aside this question and we will concentrate solely
on the truth conditions of these sentences. The interested reader is referred to
Schulz (2007), Ippolito (2006, 2003), Arregui (2005), Iatridou (2000) and Ogihara
(2000).
There is little agreement about whether Adam’s contrast implies that if is
ambiguous. David Lewis (1973) argued that (1a) and (1b) cannot be assigned the
1Note that it is widely held that would is the past tense of will. This can also be seen in
sequence of tense environments: “She said that she would come”, cf. Abusch (1997).
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same semantics, hence that indicatives and counterfactuals correspond to different
sentential connectives. Stalnaker (1968, 1975), on the other hand, analyzed (1a)
and (1b) in terms of the same connective. Roughly, Stalnaker’s idea is that
both conditionals are evaluated relative to a possible world, but that indicative
conditionals and counterfactuals differ in which possible world counts as relevant.
The present section reviews some well-known analyses for indicative condi-
tionals, and shows how these can be unified. Section 2.1.1 discusses material
implication. Material implication goes back to Frege (1879) who introduced it to
capture the use of indicative conditionals in mathematical proofs. However, this
kind of implication was soon found insufficient for everyday uses of conditionals.
One way to account for this use is to assign indicative conditionals a stronger,
modal semantics, known as strict implication, which we will introduce in 2.1.2.
Then, in 2.1.3 we will see that the two kinds of implication can be unified.
2.1.1 Material implication
Frege (1879) analyzed indicative conditionals as truth-functional operators. That
is, the truth value of a conditional is determined by the truth values of its com-
ponents, the antecedent and the consequent. On the assumption that indicative
conditionals are truth-functional, the only reasonable choice for their semantics
corresponds to the truth function that is known as material implication.2 As
before, we assume that→ represents this kind of implication. This is a two-place
sentential connective, with the following semantics (as above in section 1.3.2,
models M are quadruples 〈W, f, g, I〉 consisting of set of possible worlds W , a
modal base f , an ordering source g and an interpretation function I):
2.1.1. Definition (Material implication)
M, w |= ϕ→ ψ iff M, w 6|= ϕ or M, w |= ψ
To see why indicative conditionals must correspond to material implication if
they are truth-functional, consider:
(2) If Mary and John are both in Paris, then Mary is in Paris.
It is impossible that the antecedent of this conditional is true while its consequent
is false. All other cases are possible though, and in all of these we want the
conditional to be true.3 Now, if conditionals are indeed truth-functional, it follows
that they are always true in these cases, cf. Edgington (1995, 242). Therefore,
2Material implication is sometimes attributed to Philo of Megara (4th century BC), but
it was Frege who championed this semantics in modern logic. Russell happily took over this
analysis and gave it its current name. For a historical overview of the battle concerning the
right conditional semantics, see Kratzer (1978).
3To be sure, the issue here is what truth value a conditional should have when its components
are (true, true), (false, true), or (false, false). The argument presented here does not establish
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if you believe that indicatives are truth-functional, you must believe that the
meaning of if corresponds to that of the connective →, as defined in 2.1.1.4
However, there is reason to doubt that indicatives are truth-functional operators.
Paradoxes of material implication
As said, Frege sought to capture the way mathematicians use if, for instance in
proofs. For other uses of indicative if material implication seems less suitable. In
fact, associating the semantics of ‘ordinary’ indicative conditionals with → leads
to counterintuitive predictions, known as paradoxes of material implication (see
Bennett (2003) for an overview). These paradoxes have two sources:
1. Whenever the antecedent is false, the conditional is true.
2. Whenever the consequent is true, the conditional is true.
The first paradox is that the material implication analysis predicts that the falsity
of the antecedent is sufficient to affirm the truth of a conditional. However, this
doesn’t seem to be borne out. We would not reason as follows: I am convinced
that the Chinese will stay out of the conflict, therefore I am convinced that (3)
is true (example from Stalnaker (1968)):
(3) If the Chinese enter into the Vietnam conflict, the United States will use
nuclear weapons.
The second paradox is that, given an analysis of indicative conditionals as material
implications, the truth of the consequent is predicted to be sufficient to affirm the
truth of a conditional. This, too, seems unwarranted. If you believe that the US
will use nuclear weapons, simply because of their arrogance, the low intelligence
of their president or whatever, but have no opinions about the future actions
of the Chinese, you wouldn’t utter (3), which seems to state that there is some
connection between the US warfare and Chinese politics. In sum, the problem
with analyzing indicative conditionals as material implication is that this makes
it far too easy for such conditionals to be true.
There might be a way to save material implication (and truth-functionality).
Many researchers have sought to explain away the apparent counterexamples as
just pragmatically incorrect. For instance, Grice (1975, 1989) maintains that
(3) is true if its antecedent is false, but concedes that uttering (3) would be
misleading if the antecedent is known to be false, for it fails to observe general
anything about the truth value of a conditional with a true antecedent and a false consequent,
as the components of (2) are such that this situation cannot occur. However, no one doubts
that a conditional is false in this situation.
4More precisely, if indicative conditionals are truth functional, and we are working in a
classic bivalent system, they must be analyzed in terms of material implication. See chapter 5
for an alternative.
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conversational maxims.5 One of these maxims is that one should always utter
the strongest statement one can truthfully make (maxim of quantity). Suppose
that the speaker knows that the antecedent is false. In that case, it would be
more informative (besides being less wordy) to utter: ‘The Chinese will not enter
into the Vietnam conflict’ than to utter (3), for ¬ϕ is stronger than (i.e. entails)
ϕ→ ψ. Now, given that the speaker didn’t do this, she must have lacked adequate
evidence for that statement. We may infer that the speaker didn’t utter the
conditional simply because she knows the antecedent to be false. This pragmatic
defense is echoed by Lewis (1976, 86) as follows:
It may happen that a speaker believes a truth-functional conditional
to be true, yet he ought not assert it. [. . . ] The speaker ought not
assert the conditional if he believes it to be true predominantly be-
cause he believes its antecedent to be false. [. . . ] In this situation,
why assert the conditional instead of denying the antecedent? It is
pointless to do so. And if it is pointless, then also it is worse than
pointless: it is misleading. The hearer, trusting the speaker not to
assert pointlessly, will assume that he has not done so. The hearer
may then wrongly infer that the speaker has additional reason to be-
lieve that the conditional is true, over and above his disbelief in the
antecedent.
Similar remarks can be made for asserting a conditional predominantly because
one knows that the consequent is true.
The Gricean defense may circumvent the paradoxes of material implications,
but it is not unproblematic. For example, on this theory it is puzzling that
asserting an indicative conditional while believing that its antecedent is probably
false is often acceptable. As Bennett (2003, 31-33) writes, “I am virtually certain
that the Polynesians didn’t originally come from India; but it is all right for me to
think and say ‘If the Polynesians did come from India, there have been inhabitants
of India whose language was not Indo-European’.” Of course, according to Grice
this is not all right to say, because the speaker could say more in fewer words.
Conclusion: what makes an indicative conditional acceptable is rather that in the
speaker’s belief state the consequent is highly probable on the supposition of the
antecedent.6
5Grice first presented his ideas in his 1967 William James lectures, given at Harvard Uni-
versity. We already find similar ideas in Quine (1950, 16): “Only those conditionals are worth
affirming which follow from some manner of relevance between antecedent and consequent [. . . ]
But such connection underlies the useful application of the conditional without needing to par-
ticipate in its meaning [. . . ] even though the meaning of the conditional be understood precisely
as [‘p→ q’]”. Strawson (1952, chapter 3) also noted that conditionals are typically used in case
the truth value of both the antecedent and consequent is in doubt, but he drew the opposite
conclusion: the meaning of indicative conditionals does not correspond to material implication.
6This criterion is known as the ‘Ramsey test’ in the literature, after Ramsey (1929). See
also 2.2.2 below.
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Is it possible to square the material implication analysis with this intuition?
The work of Jackson (1979, 1981, 1987) attempts to do just that by proposing
that indicative conditionals, though truth conditionally equivalent to material
implication, come with the conventional implicature that the speaker associates a
high probability with the consequent given the antecedent.7 But Bennett (2003,
38-42) argues that this proposal ultimately fails too. The main problem is that
it remains unclear what it is about the conventional meaning of indicative con-
ditionals (i.e. material implication) that it gives rise to this implicature. The
implicature that Jackson envisages must ultimately be assumed to differ consid-
erably from other cases of conventional implicature, such as the suggestion of
unexpectedness that is said to be associated with the conventional meaning of
but.
2.1.2 Strict implication
Alternatively, the paradoxes of material implication can be avoided by introducing
a modal interpretation for indicative conditionals. Then, indicative conditionals
state that every accessible world which makes the antecedent true also makes the
consequent true. Note that on this account, indicative conditionals are no longer
truth-functional: in order to figure out the truth value of a conditional it is not
enough to know the actual truth value of its antecedent and its consequent in this
world; we also have to know their truth values in other possible worlds. This kind
of analysis originated in the work of C.I. Lewis (1912, 1918), Lewis & Langford
(1932). He held that there is more than one kind of implication. In particular,
he argued that besides the truth-functional kind, which is captured by material
implication, there is another, stricter kind of implication. This strict implication
corresponds to necessary material implication. Lewis represented this kind of
implication by the fishhook symbol J:
2.1.2. Definition (Strict implication)
ϕ J ψ =df (ϕ→ ψ)
Obviously, strict implication is stronger than material implication. The latter
only states that it is not the case that both ϕ and ¬ψ, but the former says that
it couldn’t be the case that both ϕ and ¬ψ.
It is easy to see that a strict implication is not automatically true when its
antecedent is false. For ϕ to strictly imply ψ, the material implication ϕ → ψ
7Going back to Grice (1975), there are two kinds of implicature: conventional implicature
and conversational implicature. The first is part of the meaning of the specific words, but
the second is an inference on the basis of the fact that a sentence was uttered in a certain
context, together with the assumption that the speaker obeys general conversational rules. In
the Gricean story about indicative conditionals, the inference that the speaker doesn’t have
enough evidence to plainly deny the antecedent is a conversational implicature.
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has to be true in every modal base world. Whereas the falsity of ϕ means that
ϕ → ψ is true in the actual world, this fact doesn’t tell us anything about the
truth of the material implication in other worlds. For similar reasons, a strict
implication isn’t automatically true when its consequent is true. Thus, if we
identify the meaning of indicative conditionals with that of strict implication, the
inadequacies of material implication do not arise.
It should be noted though that while the paradoxes of material implication
are avoided, we still run into related paradoxes of strict implication (as Lewis
himself discovered):
1. Whenever the antecedent is contradictory, the conditional is true.
2. Whenever the consequent is tautological, the conditional is true.
Thus, ‘If 2+2=5, I’ll eat my shoes’ is automatically true when analyzed in terms
of strict implication. C.I. Lewis thought that these paradoxes were less severe
than the paradoxes of material implication, but not everyone agreed, see Mares
(2008).8
We have not yet addressed what kind of modality is involved in indicative
conditionals. It seems that indicative conditionals of natural language are best
treated in terms of epistemic modality, such that ϕ J ψ is true in w iff ψ is true
in all ϕ-worlds that are compatible with the available evidence in w (Veltman
1985, Kratzer 1981, 1991, Lycan 2001). At any rate, indicative conditionals may
depend on the subjective beliefs of the one who utters them. The famous example
that shows this is by Gibbard (1981, 231) and concerns a poker game. It is up to
Sly Pete to call or fold. Jack saw both the hand of Pete and that of his opponent,
and saw that Pete has the losing hand. He thus believes that (4a) is true. Zack,
on the other hand, saw the hand of Pete’s opponent and signaled it to Pete. He
knows that Pete always plays to win, therefore he believes (4b):
(4) a. If Pete called, he lost.
b. If Pete called, he won.
Intuitively, both conditionals are true. That is, uttered by Jack, (4a) is true. For
all he knows, if Pete called, he lost. If Zack were to utter the same sentence,
however, it would express a false proposition. It is not the case that for all
Zack knows, if Pete called, he lost. If indicative conditionals are epistemically
modalized, and are thus dependent on the speaker’s beliefs, we can account for
this. On such an analysis, the above sentences are equivalent to (5a) and (5b)
respectively:
8See also David Lewis (1973, 24-26) on the truth value of counterfactuals with impossible
antecedents. His semantics predicts that these are vacuously true, and he claims to be “fairly
content” with that result, as such conditionals are pragmatically pointless to assert. To be sure,
he does define a stronger semantics for counterfactuals, but writes that ordinary usage doesn’t
decide between the two accounts.
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(5) a. In view of Jack’s knowledge, if Pete called, he lost.
b. In view of Zack’s knowledge, if Pete called, he won.
The different in view of -phrases indicate that the conditionals do not depend on
the same set of worlds, which explains why they are not contradictory.
Interestingly, some researchers, e.g. Gibbard himself, and Edgington (1995),
have taken this example to indicate that indicative conditionals do not express
propositions and hence have no truth conditions. The argument runs as follows:
it cannot be the case that both conditionals are true, nor can it be that they
are both false (neither Jack nor Zack has committed an error), and it is not the
case that one of them is true but the other isn’t (which one should we prefer?).9
It should be clear what is wrong with this argument: it is possible that both
conditionals are true. If epistemic modality depends on the speaker’s beliefs, the
conditionals do not express incompatible propositions. Hence we need not give
up the assumption that indicative conditionals express propositions.
To sum up, we have now introduced two candidate analyses for indicative
conditionals. First, material implication enhanced by Gricean reasoning. Second,
strict implication based on the speaker’s beliefs (epistemic modality). It turns
out that we do not have to choose between the two analyses. That is, they can
be unified; which we will see next.
2.1.3 Unifying material and strict implication
Material implication can be seen as a special case of strict implication. That
is, if we sufficiently restrict the domain of quantification for strict implication,
it reduces to material implication. We have seen that in Kratzer’s version of
possible worlds semantics, the domain of quantification depends on a modal base
f and an ordering source g. Now, depending on the way that the modal base f is
set, we can obtain various kinds of strict conditionals. The least strict conditional
that we can obtain is material implication. We then have to evaluate the modal
operator relative to a totally realistic modal base. Such a modal base assigns to
each world w only that world itself. This makes ϕ↔ ϕ a theorem, and this in
turn means that all modal distinctions collapse:
2.1.3. Observation (Material implication)
Material implication is characterized by a totally realistic modal base f
and an empty ordering source g.
Recall that definition 2.1.2 says that an indicative conditional is true in a world w
for all alternatives v to w: either the antecedent is false in v or the consequent is
9Some believe that Jack’s knowledge is better than Zack’s. However, more symmetric cases
can easily be constructed, see Edgington (1995, 294).
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true in v. If the modal base is totally realistic, then the only relevant alternative
is the world of evaluation itself. The truth conditions thus reduce to: either the
antecedent is false in w or the consequent is true in w.
The strictest implication we can define results if we take the modal to be
alethic. Following Kratzer (1981, 1991), we will from now on reserve the label
‘strict implication’ for this strictest of the strict conditionals. Alethic modality
concerns necessity and possibility in the absolute sense. That is, all worlds in W
are relevant, which correspond to the following restriction on the modal base:
2.1.4. Observation (Strict implication (based on alethic modality))
Strict implication is characterized by an empty modal base f and an empty
ordering source g.
By posing no restrictions on f , we get that if ϕ, then ψ is true if ψ holds in every
ϕ-world.
Material and strict implication thus both involve modality, but they differ in
the nature of the modality involved. As Kratzer (1991, 655) writes, material and
strict implication can be viewed as extreme cases of epistemic modality. She says
that:
mathematicians and logicians behave like omniscient gods. For them,
then, the modal appearing in a conditional is relativized to a total
state of information. [. . . ] this state of omniscience comprises ev-
erything that is the case in the world under consideration. Their
conditionals now reduce to material implication. [. . . ] Sometimes,
however, they go for the other extreme: the state of total ignorance.
This will give them strict implication. Most of us prefer something in
between.
That is, as we as ordinary people are neither omniscient, nor completely ignorant,
our indicatives conditionals are usually relative to sets of established facts.
2.2 Counterfactuals
We have an analysis for indicative conditionals. But what about counterfactual
conditionals? It is obvious that counterfactuals cannot be analyzed as material
implication, for such conditionals typically have false antecedents. Given material
implication then, all counterfactuals would come out true, which is contrary to our
intuitions. For instance, (1b) is an example of a counterfactual that is intuitively
false.
Moreover, there is good reason to believe that counterfactuals are not truth-
functional, which means that material implication is not suitable for their analy-
sis. As Stalnaker (1968) argues, I may know the truth values of the propositions
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that Willie Mays played in the American League, and that Willie Mays hit four
hundred without knowing whether (6) is true:
(6) If Willie Mays had played in the American League, he would have hit four
hundred.
We conclude that counterfactual conditionals do not correspond to material im-
plication.
Can we treat counterfactuals in terms of strict implication? If so, a counter-
factual is true if its consequent holds in all accessible antecedent-worlds. This
raises the question which possible worlds form the domain of quantification for
counterfactuals. Intuitively, we want to look at worlds that are pretty much like
the actual world. To see this, consider the following sentence:
(7) If kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over. (Lewis 1973)
This sentence is probably true. Yet if we allow worlds into the domain of quan-
tification in which kangaroos know how to use crutches, or worlds in which they
sprout wheels, the conditional would probably come out false, for kangaroos would
not topple over in such worlds. Note that these worlds are pretty far from the
actual world; i.e. they are quite outlandish. It thus seems that we should restrict
attention to worlds that are similar to the actual world. Then (7) says that kan-
garoos topple over in the closest worlds in which they have no tails. Conclusion:
if counterfactuals are strict conditionals, they are strict conditionals correspond-
ing to an accessibility assignment determined by similarity of worlds. However,
it is often argued that strict implication isn’t enough to deal with counterfactu-
als. Instead, these conditionals require a variably strict semantics. In 2.2.1, we
present the arguments for variably strict implication. Then, in 2.2.2 we will see
Stalnaker’s formulation and in 2.2.3 we will look at Lewis’s implementation.
2.2.1 Variably strict implication
It turns out that identifying counterfactuals with strict implication is problem-
atic. As argued by Lewis (1973, 4-13), this analysis only works if we confine
our attention to counterfactuals in isolation. As soon as we consider sequences
of such conditionals, it becomes clear that there is no one accessibility relation
which is the right one for counterfactuals. He illustrates this problem by looking
at the inference pattern known as Antecedent Strengthening. It is clear that our
semantics for strict implication validates the following pattern:
(8) Antecedent Strengthening
For all models M: if M |= (ϕ1 → ψ), then M |= ((ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)→ ψ).
For all models M it holds that if ψ is true in every ϕ1-world in M, ψ is also
true in every ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2-world in M, because the set of ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2-worlds is a subset
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of the set of ϕ1-worlds. Observationally however, Antecedent Strengthening fails
for counterfactuals, since the following sentences may all be true simultaneously:
(9) If Otto had come, it would have been a lively party;
but if both Otto and Anna had come, it would have been a dreary party;
but if Waldo had come as well, it would have been lively.
Under the assumption that counterfactual conditionals are to be identified with
strict implication, this sequence is of the following logical form, where o means
‘Otto comes’, a means ‘Anna comes’ w means ‘Waldo comes’, and p means ‘The
party is lively’:
(10) (o→ p)
((o ∧ a)→ ¬p)
((o ∧ (a ∧ w))→ p)
Now, any two adjacent stages in the above sequence refute the theory that coun-
terfactuals are strict conditionals based on similarity. Take the first and second
formula of the above sequence. These formulas can only be simultaneously true
in a model if the second is vacuously true: if p is true at every accessible o-world,
and ¬p is true in every accessible o∧a-world, then there cannot be any accessible
o ∧ a-world. Yet the second sentence of (9) is not vacuously true; if it were, any
subjunctive with the same antecedent would be vacuously true, so it would follow
that if Otto and Anna had come, the cow would have jumped over the moon, but
this does not follow.
Thus, if all the sentences in (9) are non-vacuously true, each conditional has
to depend on a different accessibility relation, hence each counterfactual in the
sequence has to correspond to a different strict conditional. The further we get
down the sequence, the less stringent similarity criteria we should choose, to the
effect that we quantify over ever larger sets of worlds. The conditionals thus
become stricter at each stage (notice that with some imagination, we could con-
tinue the sequence in (9) infinitely). Conclusion: if counterfactuals are strict
conditionals there is no hope of deciding how strict they are. Rather, counterfac-
tual conditionals are variably strict ; they come in many different strictnesses.10
10Lewis argues that it won’t help to plead context dependence, as the example involves a
sequence of counterfactuals in one context. Given modern-day dynamic semantics, this as-
sumption is rather naive though. Frank (1997, 19 ff), von Fintel (1999) and Gillies (2007)
argue in favor of a strict implication approach, where the preceding context determines the
accessible worlds. A preceding counterfactual then constrains the interpretation of a later stage
conditional, a process reminiscent of modal subordination, see Roberts (1989, 1996). An ar-
gument in favor of this position is that (i) seems invalid (von Fintel attributes the example to
Irene Heim):
(i) If Otto had come, it would have been a lively party;
but if both Otto and Anna had come, it would have been a dreary party;
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The solution to this problem is to make the selection of accessible worlds sen-
sitive to the antecedent, so that quantification ranges over the closest antecedent-
worlds. So we do not first select a set of closest worlds and evaluate ϕ → ψ
in those worlds (i.e. check whether the ϕ-worlds in that set are ψ-worlds), but
rather select the set of closest ϕ-worlds and evaluate ψ there. Now, the set of
closest worlds in which Otto comes to the party, need not be identical to the set
of closest worlds in which Otto and Anna come to the party (we may have reason
to believe that it’s very unlikely that Anna shows up). Therefore, the sentences
in (9) may quantify over entirely different sets of worlds, and this explains why
they can both be true. Both Stalnaker (1968) and Lewis (1973) have proposed
a semantics for variably strict conditionals (Stalnaker: >, Lewis: ). These
theories are introduced next.
2.2.2 Stalnaker’s selection function
Stalnaker’s (1968) semantics is inspired by the so-called Ramsey Rule for evalu-
ating conditionals:11
First, add the antecedent (hypothetically) to your stock of beliefs; sec-
ond, make whatever adjustments are required to maintain consistency
(without modifying the hypothetical belief in the antecedent); finally,
consider whether or not the consequent is then true. (Stalnaker 1968,
44)
Formally, Stalnaker’s version of the Ramsey rule is implemented by a selection
function f , which takes the proposition expressed by the antecedent ϕ and the
world of evaluation w and maps these onto the possible world which makes ϕ true
that is most like w. This selected world f(JϕKM, w) may be the actual world, or
a non-actual world, depending on ϕ and the facts that hold in w.12 Stalnaker
introduces the connective > for variably strict implication, and assigns it the
following truth conditions (I assume that Stalnaker’s selection function is a part
of the model, i.e. models M are now triples 〈W, f, I〉):
but if Waldo had come as well, it would have been lively.
Therefore, if Otto had come, it would have been a lively party.
11The original Ramsey Rule assumes that the antecedent is consistent with the stock of
beliefs. In order to make this work for subjunctive conditionals, Stalnaker followed a suggestion
by Rescher: the stock of beliefs has to be adjusted to save consistency.
12Stalnaker specifies a number of conditions on selection functions, which I omit here. See
Stalnaker (1968, 46).
54 Chapter 2. Semantics for conditionals
2.2.1. Definition (Stalnaker’s conditional semantics)
(11) M, w |= ϕ > ψ iff M, f(JϕKM, w) |= ψ
Note that Stalnaker assumes that there always is a single closest possible world
in which the antecedent is true. Stalnaker is led to this Uniqueness Assumption
because he believes that the denial of a conditional is equivalent to a conditional
with the same antecedent and opposite conditional. For example, in order to
deny (12a), it is appropriate to utter (12b):
(12) a. If Kennedy were alive today, we wouldn’t be in this Vietnam mess.
b. If Kennedy were alive today, we would (still) be in this Vietnam
mess.
Stalnaker’s semantics is designed to capture exactly this. In other words, he
intends to validate what is known as Conditional Excluded Middle (CEM):
(13) Conditional Excluded Middle
(ϕ > ψ) ∨ (ϕ > ¬ψ)
Obviously, if we only take one ϕ-world into consideration CEM holds: ψ will
either be true or false in that world. However, as we will see below, it is not
reasonable to assume that there can never be two antecedent worlds that are
equally close to the actual world. That is, if we want to have CEM, we must find
another way of validating it.
As said in section 2.1, Stalnaker takes > to capture the semantics of both
counterfactuals and indicative conditionals. He thus claims that indicative con-
ditionals are just as variably strict as counterfactuals. This seems to be borne
out, as Antecedent Strengthening fails for indicatives as well (example taken from
Veltman (1985)):
(14) If there is sugar in my coffee, it will taste good.
But if there is sugar and diesel-oil in my coffee, it will not taste good.
These two sentences can both be non-vacuously true, at the same time. So it
seems that indicative conditionals are not strict conditionals after all.
Now consider Adam’s contrast again:
(15) a. If Oswald did not kill Kennedy, then someone else did.
b. If Oswald had not killed Kennedy, then someone else would have.
According to Stalnaker, the antecedent worlds must by default be found in what
he calls the context set; the set of worlds that the participants in the conversation
consider candidates to be the actual world. But in counterfactuals this default is
overridden. For these conditionals, the relevant antecedent world is thus outside
of the context set. The indicative conditional (15a) is interpreted relative to an
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antecedent world within the context set. Since we know that Kennedy was killed,
all the worlds in this set are such that he was killed. Therefore, (15a) is true. In
contrast, when evaluating the counterfactual (15b) we take an antecedent world
into account which is outside of the context set. Among the worlds outside of
this set there are worlds in which Kennedy wasn’t killed at all. Therefore, (15b)
comes out false. According to Stalnaker, it is the speaker’s choice for past tense
morphology in (15b) that indicates that she wishes to defeat the presumption
that only the worlds in the context set count.
2.2.3 Lewis’s system of spheres of accessibility
Lewis (1973) proposes a semantics for variably strict conditionals which leaves
the main ideas of Stalnaker intact.13 However, he takes issue with Stalnaker’s
assumption that there is always a single closest antecedent world. According to
Lewis, comparative similarity permits ties; it may very well be the case that two
antecedent-worlds are equally close to the actual world. Consider the following
example (due to Quine (1950, 15)):
(16) a. If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Bizet would have been
Italian.
b. If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Verdi would have been
French.
Stalnaker’s analysis requires that the selection function finds the single closest
possible world in which Bizet and Verdi are compatriots. But how can the se-
lection function choose between worlds in which both composers are French and
worlds in which they are both Italian?
A related problem is that Stalnaker’s theory cannot truth conditionally dis-
tinguish between would -counterfactuals and might-counterfactuals like (17a) and
(17b) respectively:
(17) a. If Harry had warned him in time, Sirius would not have died.
b. If Harry had warned him in time, Sirius might not have died.
In Stalnaker’s analysis, only one world is relevant for interpreting (17a) and (17b):
the closest world in which Harry warns Sirius in time. But then there is no
difference between universal and existential quantification. This is a problem,
because (17a) seems to make a stronger claim than (17b).
The obvious way to deal with these problems is to make the semantics of
variably strict implication dependent on a set selection function, which selects
a set of closest antecedent worlds as the domain of quantification. In that case,
13But of course, as said in the introduction, Lewis restricts variably strict implication to
counterfactuals. In Lewis (1976) he argues that indicative conditionals should be analyzed in
terms of material implication. It should be clear that I find Stalnaker’s proposal more attractive.
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(16a) and (16b) would both come out false, for Bizet is only Italian in some
accessible worlds (the same for Verdi being French). The difference between
(17a) and (17b) can then also be accounted for: (17a) says that Sirius lives in
every world in which Harry warned him, (17b) makes a weaker claim: in some
worlds in which Harry warns him, Sirius lives. Note that this move means giving
up CEM. Below we will review whether or not it is a good idea to do away with
CEM.
Lewis argues that if we modified Stalnaker’s analysis in this way, this would
still not be enough. Even though we now permit ties in closeness between worlds,
we nevertheless assume that there always is a set of closest ϕ-worlds. This is called
the Limit Assumption. According to Lewis, this assumption is not warranted.
Consider:
(18) If I were taller than 1.85 meter, I would be taller than my boyfriend.
The problem is that for any world in which I am taller than 1.85, there is a
world in which the antecedent is true which is more similar to the actual world
(in which I am under 1,85): for any x and any world w: if I am 1.85 + x in w,
there is a closer world v in which I am 1.85 + 1
2
x. There is thus no set of closest
antecedent worlds, and so the set-selection function cannot but assign the empty
set of worlds, which makes (18) vacuously true.
Lewis’s semantics for variably strict implication avoids this problem. This
semantics just requires that, if the antecedent expresses a consistent proposition,
as we move to closer and closer sets of antecedent worlds, we will eventually reach
a set in which the consequent holds at every antecedent world. Lewis calls a set of
accessible worlds a sphere of accessibility. Given that counterfactuals are variably
strict, their semantics is relative to a set or system of spheres of accessibility (so
these are sets of sets of accessible worlds). Lewis gives various conditions that
such a system of spheres Sw has to satisfy. Here I only mention two, see Lewis
(1973, 14) for more constraints. First, a system of spheres is centered on w, that
is, the singleton set {w} is included in Sw, for surely, the actual world is more
similar to itself than any other world. Second, the set must be nested: for any
S, T ∈ Sw : S ⊆ T or T ⊆ S (of any two spheres, one must always be closer than
the other). Lewis’s connective for (universal) variably strict implication is,
and has the following semantics (Models are now assumed to contain a system of
spheres for each w, i.e. M = 〈W,S, I〉):
2.2.2. Definition (Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals)
M, w |= ϕ ψ, iff
(i) no ϕ-world in M belongs to any sphere S ∈ Sw, or
(ii) some sphere S ∈ Sw does contain at least one ϕ-world, and ϕ → ψ
holds at every world v ∈ S
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In less formal talk: a counterfactual with antecedent ϕ and consequent ψ is true
in w if there is a world in which ϕ is true and there is a world in which ϕ and
ψ are both true, and that world is closer than any world that makes ϕ and ¬ψ
true. Existential variably strict implication can easily be defined in terms of:
2.2.3. Definition (Existential variably strict implication)
ϕ ψ =df ¬(ϕ ¬ψ)
The workings of this semantics can best be illustrated by a picture: (19) represents
a system of spheres Sw which contains four spheres S0, S1, S2 and S3. Of these,
S0 = {w}, given the centering condition (represented by a dot w). The picture
further indicates in which regions of the system the following four propositions
are true: o, a,w and p.
(19)
b
w
S1
S2
S3
w
a
o
p
Now note that the above picture can be seen as a model that simultaneously
makes o p, (o∧ a) ¬p, and (o∧ (a∧w)) p true (recall our sequence of
subjunctives in (9)). Thus, the variation in strictness is adequately captured.
There is more to be said about the relation of comparative similarity on which
subjunctives depend. Some have found Lewis’s use of this relation problematic.
A famous counterexample is (20):
(20) If Nixon had pressed the button, there would have been a nuclear holo-
caust. (Fine 1975, 452)
In the actual world, Nixon did not press the button, and no nuclear holocaust
has occurred. Therefore, worlds w in which Nixon does press the button and a
nuclear holocaust follows are less similar to the actual world than worlds v in
which he does press the button, but due to some lucky coincidence (the wire was
cut), the nuclear holocaust is not set in motion. Therefore, (20) would come out
false on Lewis’s semantics. Intuitively though, it is true.
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Lewis (1979) replied that the similarity relation he has in mind favors worlds
that have the same past as the actual world. That is, the same past up to some
point; for (20): the moment at which Nixon presses the button. Now worlds w
will count as more similar to the actual world than worlds v, because in the latter
something happened to break the connection between pushing the button and the
machinery that sets the nuclear holocaust in motion. Therefore, worlds v have a
less similar past than worlds w. See Arregui (2005) for extensive discussion.
Stalnaker versus Lewis
Stalnaker (1980) has defended his theory against the three objections that we
have encountered above:
1. The Uniqueness Assumption is unwarranted.
2. The Limit Assumption is unwarranted.
3. There is no difference between would - and might-conditionals.
Regarding the first objection, Stalnaker admits that it is not reasonable to main-
tain the Uniqueness Assumption. But he insists that the correct semantics for
conditionals must validate CEM. He argues that we can reconcile CEM and the
existence of ties in closeness if we recast the theory in a more general account of
vagueness in natural language, in particular, van Fraassen’s (1966) supervalua-
tions approach.
Let me sketch this approach in terms of admissible selection functions (fol-
lowing the presentation by Lewis (1973, 80-81), who already discussed this way
of refining Stalnaker’s theory). An admissible selection function f is a function
that assigns one of the closest ϕ-worlds to w. We can now reformulate Stalnaker’s
semantics as follows:
2.2.4. Definition (Revised Stalnaker semantics)
a. M, w, |= ϕ > ψ iff for all admissible selection functions f :
M, f(JϕKM, w) |= ψ
b. M, w, 6|= ϕ > ψ iff for all admissible selection functions f :
M, f(JϕKM, w) 6|= ψ
c. ϕ > ψ is neither true nor false in w in a model M iff for some
admissible selection functions f : M, f(JϕKM, w) |= ψ, and for other
admissible selection functions f : M, f(JϕKM, w) 6|= ψ
Let’s see what this predicts for the Bizet/Verdi conditionals of (16), repeated here
as (21):
(21) a. If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Bizet would have been
Italian.
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b. If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Verdi would have been
French.
On the revised semantics, both conditionals come out as having an indeterminate
truth value. Take (21a). As we have noted earlier, worlds in which both composers
are Italian are just as close as worlds in which they are both French. Therefore,
some admissible selection functions make the consequent true, but others make
it false. We obtain a similar result for (21b). The negations of these conditionals
are also neither true nor false. But note that the following comes out true:
(22) If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Bizet either would or would not
be Italian.
For all admissible selection functions: either the function selects a world in which
Bizet is Italian or it renders a world in which he is not. CEM thus holds.
But do we want CEM to hold? An argument in favor of CEM is that the
following piece of discourse seems incoherent:
(23) It is not the case that if Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet would
be Italian; and it is not the case that if Bizet and Verdi were compa-
triots, Bizet would not be Italian; nevertheless, if Bizet and Verdi were
compatriots, Bizet either would or would not be Italian.
In fact, even Lewis remarks: “I want to say this, and think it is probably true; my
own theory was designed to make it true. But offhand, I must admit, it sounds
like a contradiction.”(Lewis 1973, 80). It thus seems undeniable that we often do
interpret the negation of a conditional as if CEM held.
The second objection relates to the Limit Assumption: that there is always
a set of closest worlds. According to Lewis, this assumption is not warranted.
Stalnaker, however, argues that the selection function may ignore irrelevant as-
pects of similarity. If I am pondering what would be the case in a situation in
which I am taller than 1.85 meter it will usually not matter exactly how much
taller than 1.85 I am in that world. Worlds in which I am 1.86 and worlds in
which I am 1.87 are equally good candidates for the selection function to choose.
Thus, according to Stalnaker, all that matters is that the selection function ren-
ders a contextually relevant world in which the antecedent is true. To back up his
claim, Stalnaker argues that in a context in which every millimeter counts, so to
speak, it would just not be appropriate to use the antecedent If I were taller than
1.85. This would then be like using the definite description the shortest height
over 1.85 which is meaningless.14 See Pollock (1976) and Herzberger (1979) for
further arguments against Lewis’s rejection of the Limit Assumption.
14There is of course a difference between the antecedent and its corresponding definite descrip-
tion: there are contexts in which if I were taller than 1.85 can be used without any difficulties,
whereas the shortest height over 1.85 can never be coherently used.
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There is another difference between Stalnaker and Lewis: the treatment of
might-counterfactuals. As we saw, Lewis defines these in terms of his. Stal-
naker, however, analyzes such conditionals as involving an epistemic possibility
operator (expressed by might) on top of his conditional connective >. They thus
have the following form:
(24) ♦(ϕ > ψ)
Evidence comes from the fact that it is impossible to deny a would -conditional
and assert the corresponding might-conditional at the same time:
(25) A: Would kangaroos topple over, if they had no tails?
B: No, definitely not; but they might topple over.
B’s utterance is infelicitous, which is unexpected on Lewis’s analysis. On Stal-
naker’s epistemic approach, however, this comes out as a Moore-paradoxical se-
quence: the speaker is convinced that kangaroos would topple over, yet considers
it possible that they wouldn’t. But note that this example hinges on CEM. It is
because we interpret B’s denial as saying that tailless kangaroos would not topple
over that his utterance feels inconsistent. Note that, against Stalnaker and pro
Lewis, the following dialogue is fine:
(26) A: If Harry had warned Sirius in time, he would not have died.
B: That’s a bit fast. If Harry had warned him on time, Sirius MIGHT
not have died.
Lewis (1973) discusses Stalnaker’s defense as a possible analysis of what appear
to be might-counterfactuals, but rejects it on the basis of the following counterex-
ample. Suppose I have no penny in my pocket, but do not know this, because I
have not looked in my pocket. Lewis claims that the following sentence is plainly
false:
(27) If I had looked in my pocket, I might have found a penny.
Stalnaker, however, predicts this to be true: for all I know, I could have found a
penny had I looked.
Stalnaker replied that his analysis can do justice to Lewis’s intuition about
the falsity of (27). If (27) is evaluated against a state of perfect knowledge, the
sentence comes out false. Thus, on this theory, (27) seems false to us because we
know that there is no penny in my pocket. It seems to me, however, that Lewis’s
intuition is not that we judge (27) false because we know that there is no penny
in my pocket, but because our world is such that my looking in my pocket has no
effect on its contents. As far as might-counterfactuals are concerned then, I prefer
Lewis’s theory over Stalnaker’s. This is not to deny that (27) has an interpretation
which corresponds to an epistemic possibility modal embedding a counterfactual.
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It probably does, but this doesn’t speak against Lewis’s analysis, as he could
follow Stalnaker and analyze sentences like (27) in terms of ♦ embedding.
To sum up, one important difference between Stalnaker’s version of variably
strict implication and Lewis’s version is that Stalnaker validates Conditional Ex-
cluded Middle, while Lewis does not. It seems that the facts speak in favor of
Stalnaker’s analysis here. Another important difference is that Lewis’s semantics
treats would -counterfactuals andmight-counterfactuals as interdefinable, whereas
Stalnaker’s semantics does not. With respect to this issue, I prefer Lewis’s anal-
ysis. In the next section, we will look at Kratzer’s modal account of variably
strict implication. Her framework is similar to Lewis’s theory, hence does not
validate CEM. I will follow this framework, but it should be noted that CEM is
an important principle. However, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to
explain the interpretation of conditionals under negation.
2.3 Kratzer’s account in terms of modalities
In 2.1.3 we have shown that material implication can be seen as a special case
of strict implication. The idea was that both kinds of implication involve a
modal operator, but that this modal operator may receive various interpretation,
depending on the restrictions on its domain of quantification. We will now show
that variably strict implication can also be thought of in these terms. That is, we
can characterize a modal which corresponds to variably strict implication, and
then strict implication (and with it material implication) comes out as a special
case of variably strict implication. Consider the following sentence:
(28) If it were snowing, it would be cold.
We saw that Lewis argued that this sentence involves quantification over those
antecedent worlds that are most similar to the actual world. This means that
(28) cannot be analyzed as follows (s stands for ‘It is snowing’, and c for ‘It is
cold’):
(29) (s→ c)
According to this analysis, the interpretation of  is independent of the proposi-
tion that is expressed by s. But we want  to be sensitive to that proposition.
Kratzer (1981, 1991) presents the following solution. The modal and the
antecedent must be interpreted as one modal complex. That is, when evaluating
(28), we first interpret would if it were snowing, and then apply this to it is cold.
In other words, (28) is not to be analyzed in terms of a conditional sentence in the
scope of a modal operator, but in terms of a modal operator which is restricted
by the antecedent. Accordingly, (28) should be analyzed as in (30), while we have
to make sure that  ranges over possible worlds in which it is snowing:
62 Chapter 2. Semantics for conditionals
(30) c
The following interpretation rule makes sure of this. (We shift to models for
doubly relative semantics again, i.e. M = 〈W, f, g, I〉):
2.3.1. Definition (Kratzer’s analysis of conditionals)
M, w |= if ϕ,modal ψ iff M′, w |= modal ψ
where M ′ = 〈W, f+, g, I〉 such that f+(w) = f(w) ∪ {JϕKM}
What is the domain of quantification for the modal in (28)? As the conditional
is counterfactual, the modal base and ordering source must be as follows:
2.3.2. Observation (Counterfactuals)
A counterfactual is characterized by an empty modal base f and a totally
realistic ordering source g.
A totally realistic ordering source assigns to w all the propositions that are true
in w. This corresponds to an ordering on possible worlds in terms of similarity to
w. As the modal base is initially empty, we predict variable strictness: the most
similar worlds in which Anna comes to the party need not be the most similar
worlds in which Anna and Otto both come.
Note that, somewhat paradoxically perhaps, in Kratzer’s analysis, there are
no conditionals. There are just constructions involving a modal and an if -clause
which restricts the modal. In the linguistic literature, it is generally agreed upon
that we need to abandon the assumption that if -constructions correspond to some
kind of conditional meaning (i.e. to any of the connectives introduced above), if
we want to give a compositional account of the interpretation of if -clauses in the
scope of a quantifier.15 Consider for example (31):
(31) If Draco committed a murder, he ought to be sent to jail.
The meaning of this sentence does not involve an indicative conditional (with
epistemic flavor) that embeds a deontically modalized proposition. That is, the
following analysis is wrong (m is ‘Draco commits a murder’, and j is ‘He is sent
to jail’,  represents epistemic necessity and ⊡ deontic necessity):
(32) (m→ ⊡j)
According to this analysis, (31) claims that the fact that Draco committed a
murder licenses the conclusion that the law is such that he ought to be sent to
jail. But intuitively (31) doesn’t make a statement about what the law must be
15The argument goes back to a paper by David Lewis (1975). In chapter 5, I discuss this
argument at length.
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like in this case, but rather makes a claim about the actual law. It is said that the
actual law is such that Draco ought to be sent to jail given that he committed a
murder. If the if -clause is not analyzed in terms of a conditional connective, but
as a restrictor of ought, this is of course predicted. Then (31) has the following
truth conditions:
(33) (31) is true in w iff maxg(w)(
⋂
f+(w)) ⊆ JjKM
where f+(w) = f(w) ∪ JmKM
What about ‘bare’ conditionals that do not occur embedded under a quantifier?
(34) If it is snowing, it is cold.
Kratzer proposes that such sentences involve an unpronounced modal operator,
usually an epistemic modal. This results in the same semantics that a strict
implication analysis would assign (assuming that the strict implication analysis
depends on epistemic modality).
Of course this is a very concise version of Kratzer’s semantics for conditional
modalities. In the chapters to come, most notably chapter 4 and 5, we will discuss
the theory in much greater detail.
2.4 Summary and look ahead
In this chapter we have presented the standard analysis of conditionals as modals.
In Kratzer’s semantics this is especially explicit: the if -clause is merely a domain
restrictor; the ‘conditional’ meaning is located in a (possibly covert) modal opera-
tor. Various types of conditionals can be derived by imposing different constraints
on the modal base and ordering source parameter of the modal.
A look ahead
This chapter concludes my presentation of what may be considered the standard
semantics for modality and conditionals. Each of the chapters to come will ar-
gue for modifications of the standard framework, in order to account for further
puzzling data. Here is an overview of what is on the agenda:
• Chapter 3 is concerned with the possibility for concord interpretations of
combinations of modal verbs and adverbs. For example, ‘It may perhaps
be raining’ can be understood as conveying just a single modality, i.e. ‘It
may be raining’. To deal with this in a compositional fashion, I argue
that we must abandon the idea that all modal adverbs are quantificational
expressions. When they occur with a modal verb of the right kind, modal
adverbs do not contribute quantification over possible worlds, but rather
correspond to a test on the modal verb they combine with.
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• Chapter 4 deals with the semantics of anankastic conditonals ‘If you want
to go to Harlem, you must take the A train’. Intuitively, the modal in these
conditionals quantifies over worlds in which the goal set in the antecedent is
reached. However, the standard analysis of conditionals doesn’t deliver this
meaning, and it isn’t obvious how to repair this analysis in a compositional
fashion. I argue that the best way to get the predictions right is offered by
the so-called nested modality analysis. In this analysis, evaluating ‘If you
want to go to Harlem, you must take the A train’ proceeds as follows: the
if -clause takes us to worlds in which you want to go to Harlem, and then
we check whether it holds that you must take the A train in those worlds.
• Finally, chapter 5 discusses an alternative conditional semantics, along the
lines of Belnap (1970, 1973). In this framework, the existence of conditional
connectives in the logical forms of sentences in natural language is recon-
ciled with the domain restricting power of if -clauses. The question is of
course whether this constitutes an improvement over existing analyses, and
I will present several reasons for believing, pace Kratzer, that there may be
conditional connectives.
Chapter 3
Modal concord
Sentences in which a modal verb is combined with a modal adverb that is both
similar in force (possibility/necessity) and flavor (epistemic/deontic, etc.) allow
a concord interpretation in which the two modals somehow seem to ‘fuse’ to
communicate just a single modality. The present chapter compares three ideas
for analyzing this phenomenon. First, the null-hypothesis is that modal concord
follows from the logic of iterated modalities. On the other hand, modal concord
might also be treated as a form of syntactic agreement (Zeijlstra 2007b), or in
terms of a type-shifting rule (Geurts & Huitink 2006). I am going to argue in
favor of the last theory.
The chapter is structured as follows. First, 3.1 introduces modal concord, and
3.2 compares the phenomenon to negative concord. After that, 3.3 discusses the
three possible analyses just mentioned. Then, section 3.4 asks which one works
best and, finally, 3.5 discusses concord combinations with the adverb probably.
We will see that such combinations are problematic for each analysis discussed.
3.1 The phenomenology of modal concord
3.1.1 What is modal concord?
We speak of concord in case a sentence in which several operators of the same kind
occur, is interpreted as if it contained only one such operator. It is well-known
that this may happen with negation (‘negative concord’), but concord occurs with
modal operators as well. As far as I know, this was first discovered by Halliday
(1970) and Lyons (1977). In the best examples, a modal verb combines with a
modal adverb:
(1) Possibly this gazebo may have been built by Sir Christopher Wren.
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As noted by Halliday, this expresses more or less the same content as either
of the following:1
(2) a. Possibly this gazebo was built by Sir Christopher Wren.
b. This gazebo may have been built by Sir Christopher Wren.
Thus, although (1) contains two modal expressions, the sentence is interpreted as
if it contained just one. Pre-theoretically at least, concord phenomena challenge
the principle of compositionality: the meaning of a compound expression is a
function of the meanings of its parts and the way they are combined (Frege
1892).2 If both possibly and may express quantification over possible worlds
(and (2a) and (2b) suggest that this is correct), it is expected by compositional
semantics that (1) conveys a doubly modalized statement. But observationally
(1) expresses only one modality, and this is the puzzle that the present chapter
addresses.
Not any modal verb-adverb combination participates in modal concord.
Rather:
[A] clear distinction can be drawn between pairs which are felt to be
equivalent, and thus reinforce each other (as ‘concord’) when both
are present, as in perhaps he might have built it, and those which are
not equivalent and are thus cumulative in meaning, as in certainly he
might have built it ‘I insist that it is possible’ or ‘I grant that it is
possible’). (Halliday 1970, 331)
For pairs like may certainly, a concord interpretation is intuitively unavailable due
to a mismatch in modal force of the modals, certainly expressing universal and
may existential quantification over possible worlds. However, even for pairs of
modals that do express the same modal force, a concord reading isn’t guaranteed.
For such a reading to be possible, the modals must also be equivalent in modal
flavor. Consider:
1Many people feel that (1) presents the possibility that this gazebo was built by the famous
architect as more tentative than (2b) (intuitions are less clear about (1) versus (2a)). We will
address this in 3.2.
2It seems clear that Frege assumes compositionality in U¨ber Sinn und Bedeutung ‘On sense
and reference’ (1892). Strictly speaking, however, he doesn’t give an explicit formulation of the
principle in this article. The locus classicus is Frege’s Gedankengefu¨ge (1923): “It is astonishing
what language can do. With a few syllables it can express an incalculable number of thoughts,
so that even a thought grasped by a terrestrial being for the very first time can be put into
a form of words which will be understood by someone to whom the thought is entirely new”
(translation by Geach & Stoothoff (1977)). But see Janssen (2001), who argues that Frege
never fully adhered to (strong) compositionality, as he never abandoned contextuality: don’t
ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a sentence.
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(3) Hermione must certainly be clever,
a. given that she got perfect scores on her exams.
b. in order to defeat Voldemort.
While certainly unambiguously conveys epistemic necessity, must also allows non-
epistemic interpretations. Consequently, (3) is ambiguous between a concord
interpretation and a double modal reading, brought out by the continuations
in (3a) and (3b) respectively. (3a) clearly presents a piece of evidence, which
suggests that must is intended epistemically. As a result, must and certainly
engage in concord. The continuation in (3b), however, makes a goal explicit, and
this favors a teleological interpretation of the auxiliary. Apparently, this makes
must incompatible with certainly (as far as concord is concerned), for a double
modal reading arises: it follows from the speaker’s knowledge that Hermione is
required to be clever if she wants to defeat Voldemort. In this reading, each
modal expression contributes its own modal operator to the semantics, just as is
expected in a compositional framework. Note that in this double modal reading
the epistemic modal takes wide scope, even though at surface it occurs under the
teleological modal. In fact, sentence (3) has no compositional reading in which
the scopal order is reversed. This could be due to the fact that the reverse order
simply makes no sense (Papafragou 2000, ch. 3), or perhaps this points to rather
deep differences between epistemic and non-epistemic modality (Cinque 1999,
Nuyts 2001, 2004, Nauze 2008), but this is not the place for a in-dept comparison
between these positions.
In the absence of contextual clues (like continuations), (3) seems to favor a
concord reading. The reason for this could be that we expect the speaker to
have included the adverb in order to disambiguate the auxiliary. Consider the
following example by Hoye (1997, 105):
(4) As prices go on rising and the value of money declines (as, it seems to me,
must inevitably happen), . . .
Without inevitably, the meaning of this sentence is potentially unclear, as must
in principle allows a wide range of modal interpretations. Compare (4) to (5):
(5) As prices go on rising and the value of money declines (as, it seems to me,
must happen), . . .
Here it could be that the speaker is simply expressing her opinion that it should
happen that prices go on rising. In contrast, in (4) there is no question which
kind of necessity the speaker has in mind. As Hoye (1997, 105) writes, here the
adverb focusses “primarily on the inferential nature of the auxiliary”. The result
is a concord reading.3
3In (4), the adverb is used to disambiguate the verb’s modal flavor. In other languages,
modals are underspecified with respect to their modal force, and it turns out that this ambiguity
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To summarize, combinations of a modal verb and a modal adverb that are
both similar in modal force and similar in modal flavor may participate in modal
concord. Prima facie, combinations like may probably seem to contradict the
claim that the verb and adverb must be equivalent in modal force:
(6) Owing to a lack of evidence, the hacker may probably not be arrested.
This sentence expresses that it is likely that the hacker won’t be arrested. That is,
even though the verb and adverb are not of equivalent force, they nevertheless fuse
and just communicate a single modality. In a way, the adverb seems to strengthen
the force of the auxiliary. This example could be taken to suggest that modal
expressions only have to be sufficiently similar to participate in concord (may
and probably being close enough, but may and certainly too far apart). However,
there is another way of looking at examples like this, which we will discuss below
in section 3.5. For now, we will set such examples aside.
From the point of view of compositional semantics, modal concord is clearly
puzzling. The following two questions arise:
• How are concord interpretations in the modal domain to be explained?
• Why is concord only possible between verbs and adverbs that are equivalent
in modal force and flavor?
Before we start comparing various explanations, we should first have a closer look
at the relevant data.
3.1.2 Modal concord in Dutch and English
Modal concord has never been intensively studied, and as a consequence, there
aren’t many data available yet. To somewhat fill this gap, I here present an
investigation into the phenomenon as it manifests itself in Dutch, my native
language, and compare this language to English.
Dutch data
In Dutch, the addition of modal adverbs to reinforce the meaning of a modal
auxiliary is quite frequent, with various types of modal flavor:
(7) a. Iedereen
everyone
in
in
Nederland
Netherlands
moet
must
verplicht
obligatorily
Nederlands
Dutch
leren.
learn
‘Everyone in the Netherlands has to learn Dutch.’
can also be resolved by the addition of an adverb. Nauze (2008, 45-46) reports that in Fongbe,
the adverb da`nda`n (‘necessarily/obligatorily’) is used to force a strong deontic interpretation
for verbs that in isolation also allow a weak necessity reading.
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b. Frank
Frank
Rijkaard
Rijkaard
moet
must
gedwongen
forcedly
weg
away
bij
at
Barcelona.
Barcelona
‘Frank Rijkaard has to leave Barcelona.’
c. Ik
I
moet
must
nodig
necessarily
plassen.
pee
(Ad Foolen p.c.)
‘I have to pee.’
d. Ze
she
moest
must+past
onbedaarlijk
uncontrollably
lachen.
laugh
‘She had to laugh.’
e. Dat
that
moet
must
ongetwijfeld
undoubtedly
zijn
his
vrouw
wife
zijn.
be
‘That has to be his wife.’
These sentences are completely natural, and in each case it is clearly the intention
of the speaker to communicate a single modality. For example, (7c) doesn’t convey
that I have to have to pee, but just that I have to. On the other hand, many
people feel that a speaker uttering (7c) presents her need to pee with a greater
urgency than someone who utters plain ik moet plassen ‘I must pee’. Thus, (7c)
conveys that the speaker really has to pee. In the other sentences above, the
modal adverbs also seem to intensify the modal auxiliary they occur with. That
is, in (7b), gedwongen ‘forcedly’ gives additional information of the conditions
under which Frank Rijkaard has to leave Barcelona.4 Note that just uttering (8)
could easily give rise to misunderstanding:
(8) Frank
Frank
Rijkaard
Rijkaard
moet
must
weg
away
bij
at
Barcelona.
Barcelona
‘Frank Rijkaard has to leave Barcelona.’
This is compatible with Rijkaard leaving because he wants to take care of his
sick grandmother, or because there is some rule according to which he has to
be offered a permanent position after four years, or perhaps the speaker dislikes
Rijkaard and is expressing that she wants Rijkaard to leave, etc. In contrast, (7b)
will not be misunderstood: he was fired by the board, because his results have
been poor.
In isolation, (most of) the modal adverbs in (7) would introduce a modal
operator:
(9) a. Verplicht
obligatorily
Nederlands
Dutch
leren
learn
is
is
niet
not
leuk.
fun
‘It isn’t fun to obligatorily learn Dutch.’
b. Ongetwijfeld
undoubtedly
kent
know
u
you
hem
him
wel.
particle
‘You undoubtedly know him.’
4To be sure, we are talking about the Dutch ex-trainer of the soccer club F.C. Barcelona.
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Moreover, the adverbs in (7) participate in double modal readings (compositional
readings). If, for example, Rita Verdonk5 utters (7a) this sentence is likely to
be understood as an expression of her opinion that everyone in the Netherlands
should be obliged to learn Dutch. We then understand from the sentence that
everyone isn’t obliged to learn Dutch yet, and that Rita thinks that this should
become an obligation.6 This reading requires an independent interpretation of the
verb and adverb. In light of this, the interpretation of (7a) is obviously surprising:
if verplicht normally introduces a deontic necessity operator, and must does so
too, then how come (7a) seems to express just one? Also consider:
(10) Marie is in charge of the household, assigning chores. We know she
doesn’t like Jan very much, and we conclude:
a. Jan
Jan
moet
must
ongetwijfeld
undoubtedly
het
the
toilet
toilet
schoonmaken.
clean
‘There is no doubt that Jan will have to clean the toilet.’
Here, (10a) clearly expresses a double modal reading, which leads us to suspect
that ongetwijfeld ‘undoubtedly’ is indeed a modal quantifier in its own right.7
The combinatoric possibility of modal verbs and adverbs is subject to idiosyn-
cratic restrictions.8 For example, one doesn’t sound natural uttering ik moet
onbedaarlijk plassen ‘I must uncontrollably pee’, or ze moest nodig lachen ‘she
necessarily had to laugh’. In fact, onbedaarlijk is typically used to talk about
laughter, or about crying; Ze moest onbedaarlijk huilen ‘She uncontrollably had
to cry’, while nodig goes with the actions that we should perform in the bath-
room. Another typicality is that Dutch dynamic possibility expressions only seem
to participate in concord when they are in the scope of negation. The negation
is then marked on the adverb:9
5Rita Verdonk is a Dutch politician who is known for her unfriendly attitude towards immi-
grants.
6To express should, one often combines infinitive moeten with the counterfactual auxiliary
zou in Dutch: Ik zou harder moeten werken ‘I should work harder’, but according to my
intuitions, plain (finite) moeten is usually also fine in these cases. On the cross-linguistic
tendency to express should by means of counterfactual morphology, see von Fintel & Iatridou
(2006).
7The example is helped by the fact that the complement predicate describes an event, which
makes it impossible for moeten to express epistemic necessity. The same holds in English: if
must is combined with an eventive predicate, it resists an epistemic reading. Why this is so, is
still a mystery, but see Nilsen & Lekakou (2007).
8This need not be very surprising. As noted by Greenbaum (1970, 83 ff.), the realm of lexical
items expressing intensification abounds in fixed combinations.
9In this respect, Dutch is like German, cf. ‘Ich kann unmo¨glich . . . ’. In English, negation
would be marked on the modal: ‘I can’t possibly arrive on time’. See also the examples in (19).
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(11) a. Ik
I
kan
can
onmogelijk
impossibly
op
on
tijd
time
komen.
come
‘I cannot arrive on time.’
b. Ik
I
ben
am
met
with
geen
no
mogelijkheid
possibility
in
in
staat
state
om te
to
functioneren.
function
‘I am not able to function.’
Positive dynamic possibility modals do not get reinforced by modal adverbs.
For instance, (12), in which kunnen ‘can’ combines with mogelijk ‘possibly’ (the
positive counterpart of the adverb in (11a)), clearly makes a doubly modalized
statement:
(12) Ik
I
kan
can
mogelijk
possibly
het
the
plafond
ceiling
aanraken.
touch
‘Perhaps I can touch the ceiling.’
This says that the speaker might have the ability to touch the ceiling. Assuming
that modal verbs are combined with adverbs for the purpose of emphasis, one
wonders whether there is some deep reason behind this positive-negative contrast:
is there generally a greater need to reinforce that you cannot do something, than
that you can? But what could this reason be? I actually think that we are able
to say something about why (12) has no concord reading, but we will have to
wait until 3.2 for the explanation.
Modal concord is subject to locality constraints. More specifically: the verb
and adverb have to be clause mates:
(13) a. Het
it
kan
can
misschien
perhaps
gaan
go
regenen.
rain
‘It might rain.’
b. Jan
Jan
zei
said
misschien
perhaps
dat
that
het
it
kan
can
gaan
go
regenen.
rain
‘Perhaps Jan said that it might rain.’
c. Als
if
het
it
kan
can
gaan
go
regenen,
rain,
moeten
must
we
we
misschien
perhaps
een
an
paraplu
umbrella
meenemen.
bring
‘If it might rain, perhaps we should bring an umbrella.’
Intuitively, misschien and kunnen appear too far apart from each other in (13b)
and (13c) for misschien to ‘work its magic’. As a result, each modal contributes
its own modal operator to the semantics of these sentences.
Although in many of the sentences above the verb and adverb occur in adjacent
positions, this is not necessary:
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(14) Ik
I
moest
had to
gisteren
yesterday
ontzettend
very much
nodig
necessarily
plassen.
pee
‘Yesterday I really had to pee.’
Here the verb and adverb are separated from one another. Still, the sentence
expresses a concord interpretation.
Finally, in Dutch we find instances of obligatory modal concord. For example,
the particle combination wel eens only has a modal meaning when it co-occurs
with other modals. In (15a) wel eens expresses epistemic possibility and engages
in concord with epistemic zou kunnen ‘could’, whereas in (15b) wel eens lacks this
modal interpretation. Here wel eens contributes its ordinary temporal meaning:
(15) a. Dat
that
zou
would
wel
wel
eens
eens
de
the
vrouw
wife
van
of
Jan
Jan
kunnen
can
zijn.
be
‘That could well be Jan’s wife.’
b. Heb
have
jij
you
Jan’s
Jan’s
vrouw
wife
wel
wel
eens
eens
gezien?
seen
‘Have you ever seen Jan’s wife?’
Interestingly, it seems that at least some particles from other languages also
require obligatory modal concord. Grosz (2008) shows that the German discourse
particles JA, ruhig, and bloß require the presence of a modal operator to be
acceptable.
Comparison to English data
Now that we have an idea of what modal concord amounts to in Dutch, let’s
make a comparison to modal concord in English. For this language, we find
many relevant examples in the corpus study by Hoye (1997), including:10
(16) a. We’ll send a car . . . as soon as we possibly can.
b. Might I just possibly have a word with you?
c. It must certainly bring him to grief sooner or later.
d. They can’t possibly be playing tennis.
10It should be noted that he also offers many sentences that I do not take to exemplify
modal concord. Hoye’s study pertains to the regular co-occurrence of modals and adverbs
(‘collocation’), for instance:
(i) a. You simply must see the new baby.
b. The chemist really ought to be open by this time.
But as simply and really do not clearly contribute a modal operator when used on their own,
such examples are not challenging for compositional semantics, and therefore do not constitute
the main problem of this chapter.
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As in Dutch, we here have modal verbs combining with modal adverbs to com-
municate a single semantic modality. In these sentences, just using the verb or
the adverb alone would in principle suffice to express the intended modality.
There are also some differences between English and Dutch. For instance,
although (15c) asks for permission, deontic modal concord appears to be less
pervasive in English. At any rate, combinations like must obligatorily or may
permissibly are not listed by Hoye, nor by Coates (1983); to my knowledge the only
other corpus study that has looked at modal concord. Perhaps such combinations,
if they occur at all, are just not very frequent. A Google search indicates that
people actually do say things like may permissibly, though we cannot be sure that
all these people are native speakers:
(17) a. A doctor may permissibly relieve pain in a patient (e.g., by giving
morphine), even if she knows with certainty that this causes the
death of the patient.
[Frances M. Kamm, Physician-assisted suicide, the doctrine of double
effect, and the ground of value. In Ethics 109 (April 1999): 586-605.]
b. An intonational break is obligatorily required before the Right-
dislocated phrase which often has a low and level pitch intonation.
[Ann Law, Right dislocation in Cantonese as a focus-marking device.
www.phon.ucl.ac.uk/home/PUB/WPL/03papers/law.pdf.]
c. The most interesting ‘hot button’ at the session was the issue of
whether or not the compound semi industry must mandatorily follow
the lead of the silicon world.
[Compound Semiconductors News Online.
http://tiny.cc/compoundsemi.]
English modal concord appears to be subject to the same locality restrictions as
Dutch. Compare (16c) to (18):
(18) It must bring him to grief that she will certainly marry someone else.
This sentence expresses a double modal reading: the speaker is confident that
he will be grieved because it is certain that she will marry someone else. This
interpretation seems to be forced by the modals not being clause-mates in (18).
For some verb-adverb combinations there are even tighter restrictions (Hoye
1997). For example, can’t and possibly have to occur in a fixed order to participate
in modal concord:
(19) a. I can’t possibly eat any more.
b. You possibly can’t eat any more.
While (19a) prefers a concord reading, (19b) is naturally read as an estimation
of the chance that the addressee isn’t able to eat anymore. This is obviously a
compositional reading, in which the verb and the adverb both contribute their
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own modal operator. According to Hoye, verb-adverb combinations range from
relatively frozen units, to more productive combinations. The contrast in (19)
indicates that can’t possibly is among the more idiomatic examples of modal
concord.
I am not aware of such frozen combinations in Dutch. In our examples, the
only way to reverse the order of the expression is by fronting the adverb. This
may make the sentence sound a bit odd, as the adverb then becomes topicalized,
but it doesn’t force a compositional interpretation:
(20) a. Onmogelijk
Impossibly
kan
can
ik
I
uitdrukking
expression
geven
give
aan
to
mijn
my
liefde
love
voor
for
jou.
you
‘I cannot find the words to express my love for you.’
b. Nodig moet ik plassen.
Necessarily must I pee
‘I have to pee.’
Though (20b) is somewhat odd, (20a) is perfectly fine.
Beyond modal concord
The examples above illustrate the verb-adverb synergy that I take to be at the
heart of modal concord. But one might think that sentences like the following
should also be included:
(21) Alice thought “O Mouse” must be the right way of speaking to a mouse.
This is an example by Drubig (2001), who attributes it to Westmoreland (1998)
(quoting Lewis Carroll). Drubig writes:
It is important to see that MUST ϕ [. . . ] is not the proposition which
functions as the complement of the propositional attitude verb think.
The propositional complement of think is ϕ. (Drubig 2001, 3)
Thus, according to Drubig, two modal expressions occur in (21), but only one
is interpreted (assuming, as standard, that attitude verbs quantify over possible
worlds). This certainly ‘smells’ of modal concord.
But upon closer scrutiny, this phenomenon seems to be different from what
we have seen thus far. First, whatever mechanism underlies the interpretation of
(21), this mechanism is clearly able to cross clause boundaries. Yet we saw in
(13), (18) and (19) that ‘modal concord proper’ is subject to much tighter locality
restrictions. Second, according to my intuitions, the interpretation of (21) seems
to involve some element of quotation: ‘Alice thought to herself: ““O Mouse”
must be the right way of speaking to a mouse”’. That is, the writer seems to
have added must to signal that Alice’s ‘mental speech’ actually contained this
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word. If this is on the right track, Drubig is plainly wrong about the complement
of the attitude verb in (21) (as it is interpreted).
Note that the auxiliary in (21) seems to have the same function that subjunc-
tive mood has in German (Konjunktiv I). As Fabricius-Hansen & Sæbø (2004)
point out, the ‘reportative subjunctive’ may coerce an embedding verb that is
not a typical verbum dicendi into one. That is:
(22) Das
the
Gericht
court
bedauerte,
regretted
dass
that
es
it
nicht
not
erma¨chtigt
empowered
sei,
be+konj.i
ein
a
Berufsverbot
profession prohibition
zu
to
verha¨ngen.
issue
‘The court regretted that it was “not empowered to issue a Berufsverbot.”’
The subjunctive has a clear meaning effect: (22) suggests that someone actually
expressed his regret, more or less directly in these words. This is quite different
from the reinforcement of modal meaning by adverbs that we looked at earlier. It
isn’t clear at all that the expression of regret and the subjunctive ‘work together’
to express one modal operator, nor is it clear for (21) that must is emphasizing
thought.
Other examples of ‘redundant’ auxiliaries in embedded positions also appear to
express mood rather than modality. Consider for instance the following examples
by Portner (1997):
(23) a. Jack wishes that you may be happy.
b. I pray that God may bless you. (from Palmer (1990))
Here the auxiliaries seem to act as expressions of the optative mood, which typi-
cally occurs with wishes or hopes. Dutch also uses modal auxiliaries to express
this type of mood:
(24) Ik
I
hoop
hope
dat
that
je
you
lang
long
mag
may
leven.
live
‘I hope that you may have a long life.’
Portner (1997) argues that there are close relations between mood and modality.
It is therefore not surprising that languages should use the same word for both
functions. In this chapter, however, such uses of auxiliaries are not of our concern,
but we rather focus on modal verb-adverb combinations, where it is not clear that
one of the modals is a mood-indicator.
Of course, the phenomenon we set aside here is subject to selectional restric-
tions that are reminiscent of modal concord, for instance I’m convinced that tends
to go together with must rather than might, while I suspect that exhibits the op-
posite tendency, i.e. this expression goes together with might, but not with must.
However, neither of the two main concord theories discussed in this chapter is able
to deal with examples like these. This is very clear for the type-shifting analysis,
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as this theory requires a logical constituent structure which can probably not be
derived for expressions that are not clause-mates (I will explain this in 3.3.3), but
the agreement theory also fails. Contrary to its predictions, embedded auxiliaries
often are interpreted. This is convincingly argued by Rau (2007), pointing out
that German (modal, not reportative) sollen ‘should’ seems to participate in con-
cord interpretations when it occurs in a finite complement clause, but not when
it occurs in a infinite complement clause:
(25) a. Er
he
befiehlt
orders
ihr,
her,
dass
that
sie
she
arbeiten
work+infinitive
soll.
should
‘He orders her that she should work’
b. #Er
he
befiehlt
commands
ihr
her
arbeiten
work+infinitive
zu
to
sollen.
should
‘He commands her to have to work.’
Sentence (25a) is fine, and the modal in the complement clause seems redundant.
But (25b) is infelicitous, and this seems to be due to the fact that sollen is
interpreted (then (25b) says that he commands her to be obligated to work,
and this is an odd thing to command). According to the agreement theory this is
impossible. In 3.3.2, I will argue that the agreement theory faces similar problems
in the interaction between modal verbs and adverbs.
To summarize, in this section we have seen that both in English and in Dutch,
modality is often expressed by combining a modal verb with a modal adverb. To
the two questions that a satisfactory analysis of modal concord must answer, that
were listed at the end of section 3.1, we can now add:
• How can modal concord have a disambiguating function?
• Why is modal concord unable to cross clause-boundaries?
Below when we evaluate the possible analyses for modal concord, we will come
back to these desiderata.
3.2 Modal concord versus negative concord
Since modal concord is relatively unknown, it seems sensible to compare it to the
more familiar phenomenon of negative concord. In 3.2.1 we introduce the relevant
phenomena in the negative domain. Then, 3.2.2 compares negative doubling to
modal doubling.
3.2.1 Negative concord and emphatic negation
As observed by Zeijlstra (2007b), modal concord seems to share properties with
negative concord, but also with a negative doubling phenomenon that is called
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emphatic negation. Let me therefore introduce both. The distinction between
negative concord and emphatic negation goes back at least to van der Wouden
(1994, 145ff), and pertains to the grammatical status of bipartite negation. Neg-
ative concord is the phenomenon that one semantic negation has to be marked
twice in the syntax. For instance, in Italian, the only grammatical way to express
that Gianni hasn’t called anybody is by using both a negative marker non and
an n-word nessuno:11
(26) Gianni
Gianni
*(non)
not
ha
has
telefonato
called
a
to
nessuno.
nobody
(Zeijlstra 2004)
‘Gianni hasn’t called anybody.’
The sentence becomes ungrammatical if non is left out; hence negative concord is
obligatory. Negative concord is also a local phenomenon, in that the two negative
expressions have to be clause-mates (Ladusaw 1992).
Negative concord has been the subject of extensive discussion over the past
thirty years. Following de Swart & Sag (2002), theories of negative concord can
roughly be divided in local and global theories. Local theories give strictly com-
positional accounts of negative concord by reinterpreting the lexical semantics of
(some of the) concord items. Thus, some theories take n-words to be close to NPIs
(Laka 1990, Ladusaw 1992, van der Wouden 1994, Giannakidou 2000), while oth-
ers treat them as indefinites that only morphologically express negation (Zeijlstra
2004), Penka (2007b). On such local approaches, negative concord is explained
because some of the allegedly negative expressions have no negative semantics
after all. Global approaches on the other hand, retain the standard meaning
of the relevant items, and account for concord interpretations by allowing non-
compositional ways of constructing the meaning of natural language sentences.
For example, going back to Zanuttini (1991), negative concord has been ana-
lyzed in terms of polyadic quantifiers, i.e. quantifiers that bind more than one
variable, see Haegeman (1995), Haegeman & Zanuttini (1996), de Swart & Sag
(2002). Such quantifiers are formed by non-compositional processes, like de Swart
& Sag’s quantifier resumption.
The reader will notice that local theories and in particular Zeijlstra’s analysis
of negative concord are given more attention in this dissertation than global the-
ories. This is not because I believe that local theories are most appropriate for
negative concord (I choose to remain agnostic with respect to the best analysis of
this phenomenon), but because this is the only analysis of negative concord that
has been extended to deal with modal concord (Zeijlstra 2007b). Besides, global
theories are not straightforwardly applicable to modal concord. For negative con-
cord, the polyadic quantification theory works as follows. On one of its readings,
the two negative quantifiers in (27) are interpreted as one negative quantifier com-
11The term ‘n-word’ goes back to Laka (1990) and refers to the fact that in many languages
the items that participate in negative concord start with an ‘n’.
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plex that binds two variables (These interpretations are directly taken over from
de Swart & Sag (2002) – I trust that the notation is comprehensible enough):
(27) No one loves no one.
NOhuman×humanE2 (LOVE)
¬∃xy Love(x, y)
De Swart & Sag define a mechanism of quantifier resumption which leads to the
observed interpretation. If two ‘similar’ quantifiers both bind variables of a subset
of a domain of discourse E, the resumptive quantifier binds pair variables that are
members of a subset of E2 (I will not spell out the details further).12 Thus, the
quantifier ranges over pairs of human beings. For modal concord, this analysis
doesn’t seem to work, as our sentences do not express relations between worlds.
For example, the resumption of may and perhaps in (28) would give rise to the
following interpretation, where the quantifier ranges over pairs of worlds such
that wRv and vRu (let Rw be the set of worlds accessible from w and Rv the set
of worlds accessible from v):
(28) It may perhaps rain.
SOMERw×RvE2 (RAIN)
∃vu Rain(u)
But this says that it rains in a world u which is accessible from the actual world
in two steps, mediated by a world v. But we want to say that there is a world u
which is directly accessible from w in which it rains. Moreover, it isn’t clear how
quantifier resumption could be sufficiently restricted to deal with modal concord.
That said, let’s get back to negative concord vs. emphatic negation. We just
saw that negative concord is the obligatory use of double negation. In contrast,
emphatic negation is the optional usage of multiple negation, to the effect that
the negative force of the utterance becomes strengthened. This kind of negative
doubling is typically found in ‘double negation languages’, i.e. in languages in
which two negative expressions most of the time cancel each other out. This is
the case in certain varieties of Dutch. As (29a) demonstrates, bipartite negation
isn’t obligatory. On the other hand, it may nevertheless happen that two negative
expressions yield a single semantic negation. In (29b) and (29c) we see that this
has an emphatic effect:
(29) a. Niemand
No one
houdt
loves
nergens
nothing
van.
of
‘No one loves nothing.’ (i.e. Everyone loves something)
12I deliberately chose an example where two n-words may give rise to a concord reading. To
deal with concord between an n-word and a negative marker ‘He don’t love nobody’, de Swart
& Sag assume that negative markers are zero negative quantifiers, i.e. quantifiers that bind no
variable.
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b. Hij
he
heeft
has
nergens
nowhere
geen
desire
zin
in
in.
‘He doesn’t feel like doing anything at all.’
c. Hij
he
geeft
gives
me
me
nooit
never
geen
no
aandacht.
attention
‘He never gives me any attention at all.’
The interpretation of (29b) and (29c) contrasts with the interpretation of Italian
(28) which simply expresses plain negation. In fact, in order to convey emphatic
negation, the negative concord construction is dispreferred in Italian. Instead,
one has to use an NPI:
(30) Non
not
ha
has
visto
seen
alcunche´.
anybody
(Zeijlstra 2007a)
‘He didn’t see anybody at all.’
In the literature on negation, emphatic negation plays an important role in the
so-called Jespersen cycle:
The history of negative expressions in various languages makes us
witness the following curious fluctuation: the original negative adverb
is first weakened, then found insufficient and therefore strengthened,
generally through some additional word, and this in turn may be felt
as the negative proper and may then in course of time be subject to
the same development as the original word (Jespersen 1917, 4)
The cycle of meaning strengthening and meaning loss that Jespersen has in mind
can be beautifully illustrated for French. In Old French, pas (lit. ‘step’) was used
to highlight the negation expressed by ne:
(31) Mais
but
a
to
bataille
battle
n’oset
not-dared
il
he
pas
step
venir.
come
(Eckardt 2006)
‘But to battle he didn’t dare at all (a step) to come.’
Bare ne was still a grammatical means of conveying negation. In Middle French,
however, the pattern changed and bipartite negation became the only grammat-
ical option:
(32) a. Jean ne vient pas. (‘Jean doesn’t come’)
b. *Jean ne vient.
Unsurprisingly, the emphatic effect of pas vanished during this development, as
to emphasize everything is to emphasize nothing. Nowadays, we witness a trend
in spoken French to drop ne (though this hasn’t become grammaticalized yet):
(33) Jean vient pas.
80 Chapter 3. Modal concord
So it seems that French negation is currently undergoing weakening again.
Do sentences like (29b) indicate that Dutch is currently changing from a dou-
ble negation language into a negative concord language? This depends on how
emphatic negation should be analyzed. There are two theories on the market.
First, van der Wouden (1994) and Giannakidou (2000) treat emphatic negation
as a special case of negative concord (it should be noted that although these au-
thors champion local theories of negative concord, the same analysis is possible
on global theories). The only difference between negative concord and emphatic
negation is the optionality of emphatic negation. It seems likely that this op-
tionality explains why (29b) and (29c) express strengthened negation. Van der
Wouden suggests that Horn’s (1984) division of pragmatic labor applies:
The use of a marked expression when there is a shorter and less ‘ef-
fortful’ alternative available signals that the speaker felt s/he was not
in a position to employ the simpler version felicitously (Horn 1984,
31)
Thus, (29b) has a simpler alternative:
(34) Hij
He
heeft
has
nergens
n-where
zin
desire
in.
in
‘He doesn’t feel like doing anything.’
Therefore, a speaker would only utter (29b) in case there is some good reason not
to opt for (34). The addressee of (29b) knows this, and to explain the speaker’s
effort, reads more into the sentence than is literally said.13
Zeijlstra (2004, 2007a), on the other hand, argues that emphatic negation
should not be treated like ordinary negative concord.14 He points out that there
are syntactic differences between the two. For instance, emphatic negation is
subject to much tighter locality restrictions. In fact, the two negative expressions
have to be adjacent:
(35) Nergens
nowhere
heeft
has
hij
he
geen
no
zin
lust
in.
in
‘There is nothing that he doesn’t want to do.’
This unambiguously conveys a double negation meaning. To explain this, Zeijl-
stra proposes to treat combinations like nergens geen in (29b) as single lexical
items. Yet, the unit nergens geen ‘nowhere not’ consists semantically of one
negative indefinite nergens, and an additional non-negative indefinite geen (i.e.
13In Horn’s terminology, we are dealing with an R-implicature here. Such implicatures gen-
erally enrich the meaning of the utterance that gives rise to them. In contrast, Q-implicatures
(quantity implicatures) restrict the truth-conditional meaning of the utterance.
14Note that Zeijlstra’s negative concord analysis does not extend to emphatic negation, so he
has to argue in favor of a difference. See also section 3.3.2 below.
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in emphatic negations, geen just means een ‘a(n)/one’). Zeijlstra views the re-
analysis of nergens geen as single lexical unit as the result of negative concord
disappearing from Dutch, rather than as indication that Dutch is turning into a
negative concord language. But I won’t go over the details of his proposal. To
explain why nergens geen expresses emphatic negation in (29b) rather than plain
negation, Zeijlstra observes that inclusion of a redundant indefinite in general
gives rise to emphatic effects:
(36) a. John never eats.
b. John never eats anything.
(36b) is more emphatic than (36a).
Now that we know what negative concord and emphatic negation amount to,
we are ready to compare these two phenomena to modal concord.
3.2.2 Comparison to modal concord
If we compare modal doubling to negative doubling, we must conclude that modal
concord is like negative concord in some respects, like emphatic negation in other
respects, and unlike any of them in yet other respects. Let me clarify this. First,
as far as locality constraints are concerned, modal concord appears similar to neg-
ative concord rather than to emphatic negation. While both negative and modal
concord are clause-bounded, emphatic negation is subject to even tighter locality
constraints. In other respects, however, modal concord is obviously reminiscent
of emphatic negation. It is not obligatory to use a verb-adverb combination in
order to express a modality (at least in English and Dutch).15 This is just one
way to express modality. Moreover, the verb-adverb combinations that we have
seen all seem to convey a richer meaning than the verb would convey in isolation.
In this sense, one can speak of an emphatic effect.
But while the emphatic effect of emphatic negation in Dutch is probably
reducible to Horn’s division of labor, the emphatic effect of modal concord seems
to be due to disambiguation. Intuitively, speakers add an adverb on top of a modal
verb to disambiguate that verb. Modal verbs typically encode underspecified,
neutral senses of either possibility or necessity (though there are exceptions, like
might). Only in interaction with the context of utterance do they express a
specific modal flavor. Now, sometimes a speaker may feel that the context isn’t
clear enough, and include an adverb, for adverbs typically are much richer in
content. They are often lexically specified for a particular modal flavor. To
illustrate, compare (37a) and (37b). The first is much more restricted in meaning:
it expresses a law-dependent deontic necessity. In contrast, (37b) is open to
various other deontic interpretations, that appear to be weaker: (37b) might
15Except of course some particles do require the presences of another modal to be acceptable,
recall example (15a).
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express just the speaker’s wishes, or a moral standard.
(37) a. Je moet verplicht je wachtwoord wijzigen.
‘You absolutely have to change your password.’
b. Je moet je wachtwoord wijzigen.
‘You have to change your password.’
Intuitively, (37b) leaves more room for you to ignore the obligation to change your
password than (37a), which seems to allude to a rule, and suggests that this rule
cannot be disobeyed without there being serious repercussions (say you wouldn’t
be able to log in anymore).
Interestingly, those modal auxiliaries that do not get reinforced by adverbs,
appear to be exactly the ones that are more specialized in the modal flavor they
express. Take the Dutch verb mogen. This modal is lexically specified to convey
permission (i.e. unlike English may, mogen has no epistemic sense).16 There is
thus little chance to be misunderstood if one uses this modal. We therefore expect
that speakers will not be prompted to reinforce the meaning of mogen. This is
borne out. In fact, there doesn’t even seem to be an adverb which conveys
permission in Dutch.17 Similar considerations might apply to positive kunnen
‘can’. In Dutch, kunnen predominantly encodes ability (Nuyts 2001). In normal
circumstances it will thus be clear which modal flavor is intended, and there will
be no reason for adding additional emphasis. When kunnen is negated, however,
it alternates between ability and epistemic interpretations. Accordingly, we find
that reinforcement is frequent in negative contexts.
I should stress though that disambiguation is not the only reason to use a
16Although mogen can be used in a concessive sense:
(i) Dat mag zo zijn, maar . . .
‘That may be so, but . . . ’
17The most likely candidate is toegestaan. One can use this item to form an adjectival phrase
that expresses permission:
(i) Het
it
is
is
toegestaan
allowed
dat
that
Jan
Jan
vandaag
today
uitslaapt.
sleep late
‘It is allowed that John sleeps late today.’
In Dutch, adverbs are usually identical to adjectives cf. het is verplicht/onmogelijk ‘it is obliga-
tory/impossible’ vs. verplicht/onmogelijk ‘obligatorily/impossibly’. Yet, there doesn’t seem to
be an adverb toegestaan ‘permissibly’:
(ii) *Jan mag toegestaan uitslapen.
‘Jan may permissibly sleep late.’
This feels ungrammatical. In fact, according to my intuitions toegestaan just cannot be used
as an adverb. Given that verb-adverb combinations have some disambiguating purpose, this is
only to be expected.
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verb-adverb combination. For instance, in English one often combines might
with perhaps, yet both modals (more or less) unambiguously convey epistemic
possibility. Nevertheless, their combination has an effect that the use of either
one of them in isolation would not have:
(38) You might perhaps have overlooked this counterexample.
Here, the use of two modal expressions serves to make the utterance more polite.
It seems that although (38) is truth-conditionally equivalent to either ‘You might
have overlooked this counterexample’ or ‘Perhaps you have overlooked this coun-
terexample’, we tend to read more into the utterance. Of course, this is precisely
because we recognize that there are simpler ways to convey the literal content
of (38). We conclude that the speaker must have felt to be not in the position
to utter either of these. As a result, we understand that the speaker offers the
possibility that you have overlooked this counterexample, while viewing this as a
far-out possibility. It is of course more polite to suggest that it is hard to imagine
that you overlooked something, than that it is rather probable.
It is an interesting question whether there might be something like a Jespersen
cycle in the development of modality. For Dutch, this would mean that over
time moet verplicht ‘must obligatorily’ will become the only grammatical way of
expressing deontic necessity, and perhaps that after even more time plain verplicht
will come to be used. However, to the best of my knowledge, there is no evidence
whatsoever that points in this direction. This is in spite of the fact that there
is already quite a lot of work done in the diachronic development of modality
(Sweetser 1990, Nordlinger & Traugott 1997). One would expect that if there
were a modal Jespersen cycle, this would have been discovered by now. Note that
this is another respect in which modal concord differs from negative concord.
To summarize, modal concord shares properties with negative concord and
emphatic negation. Like negative concord, modal concord is clause-bounded.
Like emphatic negation, modal concord is optional. However, modal concord is
also quite different from negative doubling: it seems that speakers use two modals
to help the hearer disambiguate their message. This is not the case with negative
concord nor with emphatic negation. I consider it an open question whether
this means that modal and negative concord cannot be treated on a par, but the
theory that I will eventually champion for modal concord only extends to negative
concord on assumptions that are not universally accepted in the literature.
3.3 Three analyses
As said in the introduction, there appear to be three possible analyses for modal
concord:
1. an analysis in terms of modal logic
84 Chapter 3. Modal concord
2. an analysis in terms of syntactic agreement (Zeijlstra 2007b)
3. a type-shifting analysis (Geurts & Huitink 2006)
The first of these is what can be considered the null-hypothesis: if it follows
logically that iterated modalities semantically collapse into one, we get an expla-
nation of modal concord for free, and it will be compositional as well. In 3.3.1,
however, I will argue that it isn’t clear that this is going to happen. We are then
left with two options: to the best of my knowledge these are the only theories on
the market. In section 3.3.2 we will discuss the agreement analysis proposed by
Zeijlstra, and in 3.3.3 we will look at the type-shifting approach that I proposed
in collaboration with Bart Geurts in (2006).
3.3.1 The logic of iterated modalities
From a logical point of view, modal concord doesn’t seem nearly as problematic
as negative concord. While two negative operators logically cancel each other out,
this is not necessarily the case for two modal operators. In certain logical systems
(i.e. with sufficient restrictions on modal accessibility), iterated modalities may
be equivalent to single modalities (or at least entail single modalities). If so, then
we can maintain that both modals in (39) contribute a modal operator to the
semantics of the sentence:
(39) It may perhaps be raining.
The idea is that the reason why may and perhaps seem to express a single
modal meaning is that the double modal reading that (39) expresses is truth-
conditionally equivalent to (or entails) a single modal reading. That is, if r means
‘it is raining’, the logical form for (39) is ♦♦r, which is equivalent to ♦r.
If modal concord indeed follows logically, the following two schemas must be
valid. This means that the accessibility relation underlying our modal operators
must be transitive and dense (free world variables are universally quantified over;
I leave the proofs to the reader):
(40)
a. ♦♦ϕ→ ♦ϕ transitivity if wRv and vRu, wRu
b. ϕ→ ϕ density if wRv, there is a u: wRu and uRv
Thus, as long as we make sure that models for natural language modality depend
on accessibility relations that meet these two criteria, modal concord doesn’t
challenge compositional semantics at all.
But the question is: is it reasonable to assume that these hold for natural
language? For epistemic modality, in as far as this modality is characterized
by (irreflexive) S5 (see discussion in 1.2.1), it probably is. For most researchers
assume that epistemic modality satisfies positive introspection, which corresponds
to transitivity, and negative introspection, which corresponds to Euclidity, which
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in turn implies density. What about deontic modality? For this modal flavor,
matters are simply not clear. As said in section 1.2.1, in Standard Deontic Logic
(SDL) the deontic accessibility relation is only assumed to be serial, i.e. not
transitive or dense.18 But it has been argued, by e.g. Prior (1955, 225), that SDL
needs to be strengthened with the following axiom:
(41) (ϕ→ ϕ) secondary reflexiveness if wRv, then vRv
If this principle is adopted, we get (40d) for free.19 Roughly, (41) says that it is
required that obligations are fulfilled. This is a much debated principle, making
a contingent proposition obligatory as a matter of deontic logic. For example,
Chellas (1980, 193-194) criticizes it, because (41) implies that any world in which
ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ is true is universally unacceptable. That is, for a world v to count as
ideal from our perspective, it not only has to fulfill the obligations in our world,
but also its own obligations. Perhaps this is too much to ask for.20 Chellas goes
on to consider the plausibility of the weaker (40b). This principle says that the
only things that are required to be obligatory, are the things that actually are.
It’s validity implies that every deontic alternative is a deontic alternative to some
deontic alternative (possibly, but not necessarily itself). Chellas leaves it to the
reader to decide whether this is a principle we want to adopt.
But this is a difficult matter to decide. It is clear that deontic alternatives
to our world should fulfill the obligations in our world, but I don’t have strong
intuitions about whether deontic alternatives cannot have more obligations than
we do. Say that in our world, Harry must do his homework. Now imagine a world
w′ in which he does his homework, and in which he is required to do the dishes,
but he doesn’t. Is w′ a deontic alternative to our world? One the one hand, I’d
say it is, because it seems irrelevant whether or not Harry might have further
obligations. On the other hand, there is the feeling that w′ is not a deontically
perfect world, as there are unfulfilled obligations in w′.
Upon further reflection, (40b) leads to unwanted consequences, for it excludes
that there can ever be genuine differences between the obligations that are ac-
tually in force and those that should be in force, cf. Forrester (1996). It seems
obvious that such differences do exist:
(42) Everyone should be obliged to study logic.
18In fact, in many systems, iterations of deontic operators are syntactically ruled out, as
deontic operators are prefixed to names of acts. The first to set up his system in this way was
von Wright (1951a), but nowadays many logicians still shy away from nested deontic modality,
cf. Belnap & Bartha (1995).
19Since (ϕ→ ϕ) → (ϕ→ ϕ) is just a special instance of the distribution axiom K,
so that given (41), ϕ→ ϕ follows via modus ponens.
20Though Chellas’ explanation of this point is somewhat misleading, writing that “If there
are any unfulfilled obligations, then ours is the worst of all possible worlds” (p. 194). In SDL
we do not have an order on worlds, nor does acceptance of (41) commit one to the view that
the deontically accessibility relation ranks possible worlds, see also Vorobej (1982).
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This sentence makes a claim about what should be obligatory. If (42b) were valid
though, (42) would be equivalent to a single modal claim, yet neither ‘Everyone
is obliged to study logic’ nor ‘Everyone should study logic’ means quite the same
as (42).
One might object that counterexamples like (42) prefix a so-called ought-to-
be-modality to an ought-to-do-modality, i.e. (42) says that it ought to be the case
that everyone ought to undertake some action, i.e. study logic. This traditional
distinction (see e.g. Marcus (1966), Feldman (1986)) is illustrated by the following
pair:
(43) a. The new headmaster must be chosen democratically. (ought-to-be)
b. Harry must do his homework. (ought-to-do)
Intuitively, the difference between ought-to-be and ought-to-do modality is that
the former describes what the world should be like in view of the law (for (43a):
the school rules), while the latter additionally specifies which action needs to be
performed to bring it about that the world conforms to the law, and also specifies
who is responsible for undertaking that action. Arguably, ought-to-be-deontics
differ in logical behavior from ought-to-do-deontics. If so, then perhaps sentences
like (42) do not provide any evidence about the validity of axioms about nested
operators, assuming that these pertain to nested operators of the same kind.
But it is far from clear that if we distinguish between these different oughts, the
axioms in (40) are justified. For instance, iterations of ought-to-be-deontics make
perfect sense, and, crucially, are not equivalent to single ought-to-be-statements:
(44) It ought to be the case that the new headmaster must be chosen demo-
cratically.
Suppose that we are currently in the process of rewriting the school rules, and
that we do not agree about what they should require. If I believe that new
headmasters are to be chosen democratically, I might utter (44). But you might
disagree, and propose that new headmasters must be selected by their predecessor.
We are disagreeing about what ought to be required by the school rules. There is
no guarantee that the rules will eventually say that new headmasters are chosen
democratically (we might go with your proposal), so it seems that ϕ → ϕ
isn’t valid. Yet if this principle isn’t valid, the concord reading for sentences like
(45) remains mysterious:
(45) The new headmaster must obligatorily be chosen democratically.
Note that this sentence conveys an ought-to-be-modality. Therefore, if we set
up our logic in such a way that the concord reading for (45) follows, we would
automatically predict such a reading for (44) and this would be wrong.
One might still complain that nested ought-to-be-deontics only make sense if
each is interpreted with respect to a different set of norms. For instance, one
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could say that the outer modal in (44) depends on my wishes, while the inner
modal is dependent on the school rules. Again, this could be a logically important
distinction, and the reduction axioms might only apply to two operators of the
same kind. But then the only examples we can use to asses whether double
deontics imply single deontics are stilted ones like (46):
(46) In view of the school rules, it ought to be the case that in view of the
school rules, new headmasters are chosen democratically.
Does this imply that in view of the school rules, new headmasters are chosen
democratically? I expect that most people find it hard to answer this question,
as (46) is near incomprehensible. Do we conclude from the fact that (46) feels
like ‘stuttering’ that ϕ → ϕ is valid? I don’t think we should, for if the
validity of this principle leads to awkward iterations, sentences like (47) would
also be expected to be odd:
(47) Train tickets must obligatorily be bought before boarding the train.
But (47) is much better than (46).
Summing up, for deontic modality intuitions are fleeting. I know of no truly
convincing argument in favor of the reduction axioms. Therefore, if we would
go with the logical analysis of modal concord, our analysis would be based on
principles that are controversial. Because this isn’t very satisfactory, it is worth
looking at other places for an analysis.
3.3.2 Modal concord as syntactic agreement
An alternative analysis of modal concord is Zeijlstra’s (2007b) syntactic agree-
ment approach. He argues that modal auxiliaries are semantically empty across
the board; they never contribute any meaning. It is plain that on this assumption
concord interpretations are no longer problematic for compositional semantics. In
addition, the restrictions on modal concord are analyzed as the outcome of a syn-
tactic agreement relation between modal auxiliaries and modal adverbs, parallel
to Zeijlstra’s (2004) analysis of negative concord. In fact, this analysis of modal
concord is part of a general approach to doubling phenomena in natural language,
built around the hypothesis that doubling effects are the result of grammatical-
ization, as explained in detail in Zeijlstra (2008). Let me first introduce the main
ideas underlying Zeijlstra’s approach, and then discuss the proposed extension to
modal concord.
Following Chomsky’s (1995) minimalist program, Zeijlstra adopts a feature
theory according to which (possibly abstract) items either carry an interpretable
feature [iF] or an uninterpretable feature [uF]. These two kinds of features differ
from one another in that interpretable features are semantically interpreted, while
uninterpretable features are morphologically interpreted. This means that they
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must be checked against an interpretable feature of the same type. Note that since
uninterpretable features carry no semantic content, they would violate Chomsky’s
Principle of Full Interpretation if they weren’t deleted. Zeijlstra argues that the
relevant syntactic checking relation is that of agreement, hence that a feature [iF]
can only check a feature [uF] if [iF] c-commands [uF]. This is not some outlandish
view on agreement, but is for instance in line with the proposal in Adger (2003).
The following example provides an illustration:
(48) a. Du
you
komm-st.
come-2sg
(German)
‘You come.’
b. [TPDu[i2sg] kommst[u2sg]]
In (48a), number and person are encoded twice, once on the subject and once on
the verb. Semantically, however, there is only one second person subject. This is
explained if the inflection on the verb doesn’t affect its meaning, i.e. corresponds
to an uninterpretable feature [u2sg]. In other words, kommst just refers to the
set of individuals that come. The pronoun, on the other hand, must be assumed
to carry an interpretable person feature. Assuming that pronouns correspond
to variables, the feature on the pronoun restricts the reference of the variable
denoted by Du to the addressee of the conversation. The pronoun must check the
feature of the verb under agreement, which reflects the fact that were a pronoun
other than Du chosen as the subject, the person marking on the verb would be
ungrammatical.21
Zeijlstra claims that this process underlies all kinds of doubling constructions,
including, of course, concord phenomena. A good example is negative concord.
Recall that we speak of negative concord when two or more negative elements
occur but only a single negation is interpreted, as in the next Italian sentence:
(49) Gianni
Gianni
*(non)
not
ha
has
telefonato
called
a
to
nessuno.
n-body
‘Gianni didn’t call anybody.’
This example contains an expression of sentential negation non, as well as a so-
called n-word nessuno. In spite of the occurrence of two negative expressions,
however, the sentence is interpreted as if it contained only one negative item, and
this is unexpected from the perspective of compositional semantics.
Zeijlstra (2004) proposes to account for negative concord within a feature
21It seems problematic that a semantically empty feature [uF] should carry the information
that it needs to be checked by a feature [iF] that encodes particular semantic information.
Apparently, semantic properties already play a role during the syntactic derivation, cf. the
problem of Look Ahead (Chomsky 2001). However, Zeijlstra (2008) argues that [iF] has both
syntactic and semantic content, and it is the syntactic content of [iF] that causes [uF] to be
deleted.
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theory as just sketched. Recall that two problems need to be explained: (i)
the interpretation of sentences like (49) and (ii) the ungrammaticality of such
sentences if non is omitted. To deal with these problems, Zeijlstra proposes
that n-words are semantically non-negative markers of the presence of negative
operators. That is, semantically, n-words are just like indefinites, i.e. nessuno
means ‘someone’. This obviously accounts for problem (i). Morphologically,
however, n-words carry an uninterpretable negative feature [uNEG], which needs
to be checked by a semantically negative marker which carries a feature [iNEG].
This job is fulfilled by non:
(50) [TPGianni non[iNEG] ha telefonato a nessuno[uNEG]]
This solves problem (ii): n-words are only grammatical in the scope of a negative
marker.22
We are now ready to consider how this type of analysis can be applied to
modal concord. To explain why verb-adverb combinations may receive a concord
interpretation, Zeijlstra (2007b) proposes that modal auxiliaries are, despite first
appearances, semantically non-modal. In fact, he claims that modal auxiliaries
are semantically empty. He doesn’t provide any independent argument for this
claim. This is unfortunate, because prima facie, this is of course not a very
intuitive or appealing idea (and below I will argue that it is probably false). It
forces us to reassess our analysis of sentences that were not problematic to begin
with, i.e. sentences in which an auxiliary occurs in isolation but nevertheless
expresses a modality:
(51) It might be raining.
If might is meaningless, then why is (51) interpreted the way it is? We will
look at Zeijlstra’s answer to this question shortly. For now, however, we set such
examples aside, and we concentrate on auxiliary-adverb combinations. According
to Zeijlstra, such combinations may receive a concord interpretation, because
modal auxiliaries are semantically empty, which sets them apart from modal
adverbs, which do have meaning. This obviously predicts that sentences that
contain both an adverb and a modal auxiliary are interpreted as conveying just
a single modality: the one expressed by the adverb.
22Note that I have only presented Zeijlstra’s theory for non-strict negative concord languages
like Italian. For strict negative concord languages like Czech, the theory works slightly different.
Moreover, I left out Zeijlstra’s explanation for the fact that in Italian, n-words in preverbal
position are fine:
(i) Nessuno
N-nody
ha
has
telefonato.
called
‘Nobody has called.’
For all this, the reader is referred to Zeijlstra (2004).
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Of course, a theory of modal concord must not only account for the existence
of concord interpretation, but must also explain the following:
• that modal concord is a fairly restricted phenomenon: only modals that
are equivalent in modal force and in modal flavor may engage in concord
interpretations
• that modal concord is clause-bounded
• that modal concord (in part) arises from the need to disambiguate
About the last two desiderata we can be brief. Zeijlstra’s theory does seem to
provide an explanation of the locality constraints on modal concord. As modal
auxiliaries have to agree with modal adverbs (we will deal with the specifics of
this below), and agreement is a local phenomenon, clause-boundedness might be
expected.23 As for the intuition that modal concord happens for disambiguation
purposes, this also follows. Although on this theory, modal auxiliaries are seman-
tically empty, a (grammatically correct) sentence containing one is ambiguous,
because the modal could be agreeing with a variety of covert operators. The in-
clusion of an explicit adverb (with a specific modal flavor) obviously reduces this
ambiguity. However, the agreement analysis of the restrictions on modal concord
is problematic. We turn to this point next.
The restriction on force
Zeijlstra’s theory is that modal auxiliaries, while semantically empty, function as
markers of the presence of a (possibly covert) modal operator. Thus, in a way,
they behave much like the inflectional morphology we saw in (48). This amounts
to saying that modal auxiliaries carry uninterpretable features that need to be
checked by an operator with a suitable interpretable feature. As modal adverbs
are semantically modal, they carry such interpretable features. The restrictions
on modal concord should then follow from the agreement relation between adverbs
and auxiliaries. We will first look at the restriction on modal force. As we have
seen above, modal concord is only possible if the modal elements involved convey
a similar degree of modality, i.e. if they all convey either possibility or necessity.
As the modal force of modal elements is (in most languages) lexically encoded,
Zeijlstra assumes that this shows up in the featural decomposition. It follows
that we should adopt two pairs of interpretable and uninterpretable features:
23Though it should be noted that Zeijlstra intends his theory to also cover examples like
‘The general demands that the troops must leave’, where the two relevant expressions are not
clause-mates. He doesn’t explain how his theory can account for the difference in locality
constraints between this example and sentences in which an auxiliary combines with an adverb.
Either syntactic agreement is not subject to tight locality restrictions, but then the restrictions
on sentences like ‘It may perhaps be raining’ are not accounted for, or syntactic agreement is
clause-bounded, but then the theory is too restrictive to account for ‘The general demands that
the troops must leave’.
3.3. Three analyses 91
(52) Features responsible for modal concord:24
[i♦] [u♦]
[i] [u]
We may thus distinguish between two kinds of modal concord: existential modal
concord and universal modal concord.
It should now be clear how this explains why a concord interpretation is
possible for (53), but not for (54). In (53), the auxiliary can have its feature
checked, as is illustrated below:
(53) You may perhaps have read my paper.
[CPyou perhaps[i♦] may[u♦] have read may paper]
In (54), however, even if it moved to a position in which it would c-command the
auxiliary, the adverb cannot check the [u♦] feature of the auxiliary, for it carries
an interpretable feature [i] of the wrong type.
(54) It may necessarily be the case.
[CP it may[u♦] necessarily[i] be the case]
Yet, the sentence is not ungrammatical, but it is interpreted as a doubly modalized
statement. To account for this, Zeijlstra assumes that there must be a covert
modal operator that checks the feature of the auxiliary may. This leads to the
underlying structure in (55) for (53):
(55)
[CP it OP[i♦] may[u♦] necessarily[i] be the case]
Assuming that the covert modal has a meaning similar to the adverb perhaps, the
sentence is predicted to convey that it is possible that it is necessarily the case.
We can now see how the approach treats sentences like (56), in which an
auxiliary is used on its own. Recall that the question is how (56) can express a
modality if auxiliaries are semantically vacuous.
(56) John may be at home.
To answer this question, Zeijlstra takes there to be a covert modal operator OP,
with a feature [i♦], such that the underlying structure is really:
(57) [John OP[i♦] may be home]
24Zeijlstra uses the following notation: [i∃-MOD], but I prefer the shorter modal logic oper-
ators.
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Of course, one doesn’t want to generally allow the positing of abstract opera-
tors of this kind, for this would mean that any sentence might express a modality.
Zeijlstra proposes the following economy condition on such operators, which says
that they can only be assumed present if there are overt elements with [uF] which
could not have been licensed by any other element:
(58) Economy condition:
Only if a particular sentence is grammatical and none of the overt el-
ements is responsible for the grammaticality of the sentence, must the
sentence be grammatical due to a covert element.
Thus, in (57), a covert operator must be assumed because otherwise the sentence
would be predicted ungrammatical, which is contrary to our intuitions. Note
though that this economy condition is a somewhat extraordinary rule.25
The restriction on flavor
A potential problem for Zeijlstra’s analysis of modal concord is that it doesn’t
require that the modals in a concord construction are similar in their modal flavor.
It follows that the theory often fails to predict compositional readings. To see
this, consider (59):
(59) Perhaps[i♦] John may[u♦] become a doctor some day. (Zeijlstra 2007b)
This sentence is ambiguous between a concord reading ‘it is possible that John will
become a doctor some day’ and a compositional reading ‘it is possible that John
will receive permission to become a doctor some day’. Zeijlstra’s theory, which
assumes that modal auxiliaries are semantically empty, clearly accounts for the
concord reading, but what about the compositional interpretation? Prima facie,
it seems that this reading can only be explained on the assumption of the presence
of a covert modal. But the economy condition specifies that such operators can
only be posited to avoid ungrammaticality, and (59) cannot in any way be said
to be ungrammatical. All relevant features are checked. Note that the problem
cannot be solved simply by assuming additional features in light of which (59)
could be ungrammatical, i.e. features that encode the modal flavor of modal
expressions. Modal flavor is typically not lexically encoded, but is determined by
the context of utterance instead. It would therefore make little sense to adopt
features such as [iEPI] or [uDEO].
Moreover, even if it could be argued that such features do exist (modal flavor
certainly could be lexically encoded, and perhaps there are syntactic differences
between epistemic and deontic modals which would motivate such a featural de-
composition), the theory would still face problems. Recall sentence (7a), repeated
25(58) cannot be implemented in a derivational system. It must therefore be a parsing con-
straint.
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below:
(60) Iedereen
everyone
in
in
Nederland
Netherlands
moet
must
verplicht
obligatorily
Nederlands
Dutch
leren.
learn
‘Everyone in the Netherlands has to learn Dutch.’
As discussed above, this sentence is ambiguous between a modal concord reading
and a double modal reading ‘It should be the case that everyone in the Nether-
lands is obliged to learn Dutch’. It is hard to see how Zeijlstra’s theory could
ever predict the latter reading, for both modals have universal force, and both
have deontic flavor, i.e. there is no need to postulate a covert operator. Of
course, in the double modal reading, the modals each depend on a different set of
norms, but it is not clear that this fact can be used to help the agreement theory.
Though the type of conversational background that an expression combines with
might be lexically encoded, its actual content is surely determined by the context
of utterance. In sum, the agreement theory is too rigorous to deal with modal
concord.
Zeijlstra tries to work around this problem, and proposes that in (59) may is
contextually specified for deontic modality:
[T]he modal auxiliaries in a Modal Concord construction do not have
to be specified for their modal type, as the modal type of a modal aux-
iliary is already given by the element that checks its uninterpretable
feature. But nothing forbids that modal auxiliaries are contextually
specified for a modal type in such cases. (Zeijlstra 2007b)
But it is completely unclear how this is supposed to work. There seem to be two
ways to understand Zeijlstra’s proposal. First, contextual specification affects
the semantics of modal auxiliaries. If so, modal auxiliaries aren’t semantically
empty after all, and Zeijlstra seems to contradict himself. Second, it could be that
contextual specification is supposed to have some morphological effect, but this is
plainly absurd. Contexts just do not work in this way. We are forced to conclude
that modal concord isn’t so similar to syntactic agreement after all. Apparently,
modal auxiliaries only behave like inflectional morphology half of the time. This
sets modal concord apart from the phenomena for which Zeijlstra wants to give
a unified analysis. In most negative concord languages, for instance, n-words
are not ambiguous between a non-negative meaning which marks the presence
of a negative operator and a negative meaning. Similarly, in German kommst
(‘come+2sg’) cannot be used to express that the addressee is coming. What
prevents the context from specifying the semantics or the morphology of these
words?
In short, the problem for the agreement theory is that modal auxiliaries often
are interpreted. In light of this, it just doesn’t seem plausible that they are
semantically empty. It is clear that a theory that has this as a starting tenet,
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must at some point stage a deus ex machina like contextual specification to get the
predictions right. Note that it is exactly one of the differences mentioned between
modal and negative concord that seems fatal for the agreement theory: modal
concord is only optional. The syntactic agreement theory, however, seems to be
more a model for languages in which concord has become grammaticalized. It
seems that if there is something like a Jespersen cycle for modality, the agreement
theory might model the outcome of this (i.e. it would suit Dutch very well, were
moet verplicht ‘must obligatorily’ the only way to express deontic necessity).
Arguably, in such a scenario, the meaning of modal auxiliaries has been weakened
to the point where they become virtually meaningless. But of course, there is no
evidence that such a Jespersen cycle exists. Clearly though, the agreement theory
has a less than perfect fit with the contemporary manifestations of modal concord.
To make things worse, it seems that it cannot be upheld that just the modal
auxiliaries are meaningless. Zeijlstra presumably proposes that this particular
class of modals is semantically empty because (i) the auxiliaries are more gram-
maticalized than other modals (as said, Zeijlstra’s theory is intimately connected
with grammaticalization), and (ii) Zeijlstra believes that modal concord is only
possible between an auxiliary and another modal item. To back this up, he points
out that (61), for instance, has no concord reading:
(61) Harry obligatorily mandatorily reads a book.
Zeijlstra attributes the missing concord reading to the fact that (61) contains no
auxiliary. However, it isn’t clear that the claim that auxiliaries are essential for
modal concord is empirically correct. Consider the following sentence, which is
used in Bodomo & Hiraiwa (2004, 58)):
(62) In this case a resumptive pronoun is optionally allowed for objects and
obligatorily required for subjects.
Arguably, this sentence contains two concord combinations which both involve
a full verb (rather than an auxiliary) and an adverb: optionally allowed and
obligatorily required. It thus seems that to make the agreement theory work, it
must be assumed that modal auxiliaries are not the only meaningless modals.
In fact, this is independently needed to account for modal concord between an
auxiliary and mulptiple other modal expressions. A case in point is the following
example by Geurts & Nouwen (2007, 550):
(63) Ze
she
zou
would
misschien
perhaps
wel
wel
eens
eens
dronken
drunk
kunnen
can
zijn.
be
‘Perhaps she is drunk.’
This sentence contains three modal expressions (assuming that the verbal com-
plex zou kunnen counts as one modal). If only the verb(s) of these were mean-
ingless, (63) would make a doubly modalized statement. Yet this isn’t borne out.
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The agreement theory is thus forced to conclude that meaninglessness is quite
widespread among modals. This not only raises doubts on the proposed connec-
tion between concord and grammaticalization, but also means that ‘contextual
specification’ is needed more often than one might think at first (say that full
modal verbs are meaningless as well, then the interpretation of sentences like
‘John must be required to file his dissertation’ also depends on it). It is unfortu-
nate that the theory should rely so heavily on such a mysterious mechanism.
Summing up, we have seen that the agreement approach has two essential
ingredients. First, it is assumed that modal auxiliaries carry no semantic mean-
ing whatsoever, which makes possible a fully compositional account of modal
concord. Second, modal auxiliaries are treated as morphological markers of the
presence of possibly covert modal operators. The restrictions on modal concord
can then be referred to a morphological process of feature checking. At any
rate, the restriction on modal force falls out naturally by requiring modal force
features on modal operators. The main attraction of the agreement theory is
that it can be extended to numerous phenomena. Besides person features and
negative concord, von Stechow (2006) includes gender features, sequence of tense
(see also von Stechow (2004b)), morphological markers of aspect, comparatives,
counterfactual morphology, and, of course, modal concord.
However, as far as modal concord is concerned, the theory also faces some
challenges: it fails to predict double modal readings for verb-adverb combinations.
Besides, the theory is clearly baroque and ad hoc. Let me make a list of all the
ingredients that are needed to account for modal concord:
• Special features
• Meaningless auxiliaries
• Covert adverbs
• An economy condition on covert adverbs
• Contextual specification
Fortunately, there is a simpler alternative, to which we turn next.
3.3.3 A type-shifting analysis
The only alternative left in the literature, is the type-shifting analysis that I
proposed in Geurts & Huitink (2006). Recall that a theory of modal concord must
both explain how concord interpretations arise and why they are only possible for
modals that are similar in modal force and modal flavor. This can be achieved
by treating modal adverbs as polysemous between their standard meaning and a
functional meaning, which performs a test on its argument. On this functional
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meaning, the adverb tests whether its argument, the modal auxiliary, is of the
right type, i.e. whether it has the same meaning as the adverb on its standard
interpretation. If so, the function yields the meaning of the adverb as output,
and a concord reading ensues.
This idea is implemented in a partial two-sorted type theory. The standard
interpretation of modal expressions is represented as usual. Simplifying things,
we will assume that modal operators are interpreted relative to a modal base
only; ordering sources play no role. This is justified, since we are not dealing
with inconsistent background information. Simplifying things even further, I will
assume that the modal base is not an argument of the modal, but is specified in the
lexicon. That is, modals like perhaps and may will be analyzed as propositional
operators of type 〈st, st〉. In the entries below, p is a variable over propositions
(of type 〈st〉), while w and v are variables over possible worlds (of type s), and f
is a constant denoting an epistemic modal base:26
3.3.1. Definition (Entries for perhaps and epistemic may)
JperhapsK = JmayK = λpλw.
⋂
f(w) ∩ p 6= ∅
We thus treat auxiliaries like may as lexically ambiguous items. Deontic may
will depend on modal base other than f , and must therefore have a lexical entry
that differs from (63). Of course, modal auxiliaries are not actually lexically
ambiguous. Rather, they have a uniform core meaning, which gets fine-tuned by
the context of utterance (Kratzer 1981, 1991). Lexical ambiguity is only assumed
temporarily because this allows to illustrate the main idea in a simple fashion.
Below we will reformulate the proposal such that it is more true to the facts.27
For (64), the following truth conditions are obtained:
(64) JBarney may be homeKM,h
= JmayKM,h(JBarney be homeKM,h)
= λpλw.
⋂
f(w) ∩ p 6= ∅(λv.be home(Barney)(v))
= λw.
⋂
f(w) ∩ λv.be home(Barney)(v) 6= ∅
This gives the canonical interpretation for (64): it expresses that there is an (epis-
temically) accessible possible world such that Barney is home in it. Obviously,
the same interpretation is predicted for ‘Perhaps Barney is at home’.
As for the functional meaning of modal adverbs, we define a type-shifting rule,
which maps JperhapsK onto a function which yields JperhapsK if its argument de-
notes JperhapsK. To formulate this, we must first introduce the following ancillary
26Note that we use the common notation J·K for the interpretation function I of chapter 1
27We will see below that all that we need to make the theory work is that may and per-
haps are similar in meaning, on at least one of their readings. Thus, even though 3.3.1 says
that JperhapsK = JmayK, we are not committed to the view that epistemic may can always be
substituted by perhaps.
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construct, where P and Q are variables over modal operators (of type 〈st, st〉).
Let’s call this construct ‘modal fusion’, and read P
.
= Q as ‘P and Q fuse together
to communicate one modality’ (i.e. P ).
3.3.2. Definition (Modal fusion)
JP
.
= QKM,h = JP KM,h if JP KM,h = JQKM,h, undefined otherwise
What this definition says is that modal fusion is only defined for two modals
that are identical in their semantics. The type shift rule which maps adverbs
onto operators that check whether their argument is of the right sort can now be
formulated as follows:
3.3.3. Definition (Type shift rule)
λPλQ.[P
.
= Q]
The type shift rule is thus constructed as a function itself. Applied to JperhapsK,
this yields the following functional meaning for the adverb:
(65) λPλQ.[P
.
= Q](JperhapsK)
= λQ.[λpλw.
⋂
f(w) ∩ p 6= ∅
.
= Q]
We see that application of (64) turns JperhapsK into a function which takes another
modal as its argument, and if this modal has the same meaning as the adverb has
on its standard interpretation, the two modals fuse and the adverb’s standard
interpretation will be the output of (65).
It is now predicted that (66) on one of its readings (the one where perhaps is
read as a functional modal) means the same as ‘Perhaps Barney is asleep’ (where
perhaps receives its ordinary interpretation) or ‘Barney may be asleep’:
(66) Perhaps Barney may be asleep.
To see this, let c© denote the type shift operation in definition 3.3.3. The analysis
of (66), on its concord reading, is then as follows:
(67) J ( c©perhaps (may)) (Barney be asleep)KM,h =
λpλw.
⋂
f(w)∩ p 6= ∅
.
= λpλw.
⋂
f(w)∩ p 6= ∅ (λv.be asleep(Barney)(v))
= λw.
⋂
f(w) ∩ λv.be asleep(Barney)(v) 6= ∅
Sentence (66) is thus predicted to have a single modal interpretation: there is an
epistemically accessible possible world such that Barney is asleep in it. We may
therefore conclude that the idea that adverbs may shift into a functional meaning
that amounts to modal fusion accounts for concord interpretations.
As we saw above, a theory of modal concord should not just account for the
existence of concord interpretations, but also for:
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• the fact that only modals of similar modal force and modal flavor may
participate in concord
• the locality constraints on modal concord
• the disambiguating function of modal concord
The type-shifting analysis clearly accounts for all the restrictions on modal con-
cord. On their functional meaning, adverbs check the meaning of the auxiliary
in their scope, and this meaning consists both of a quantifier and an accessibility
relation. Only if the two modal expressions are identical in these two respects,
does a concord interpretation follow. This correctly excludes the possibility that
(68) allows a concord interpretation:
(68) This certainly may be true.
J( c©certainly may) (this be true)KM,h = #
If certainly is interpreted functionally, the meaning of (68) won’t be defined. Due
to the mismatch in modal force, the adverb is not able to check any of the possible
meanings of the auxiliary. The only option then is to assign its standard inter-
pretation to certainly. As a result, (68) is read as a doubly modalized statement:
it is necessary that it is possible that this is true.
Likewise, in this semantics it is prohibited that two modals of the same force
that convey a different modal flavor can receive a concord reading. Take (69) for
example. When the adverb is read as a functional modal, its modal fusion with
may will only be defined if may is understood as an epistemic modal. Assume
for concreteness that maye expresses epistemic possibility as defined in 3.3.1, and
that mayd expresses deontic possibility according to the following entry where
f ′ is a constant denoting a deontic modal base JmaydK = λpλw.
⋂
f ′(w) ∩ p 6= ∅.
We then get (here Jhtv abbreviates for ‘Harry joins our team in v’):
(69) Harry may perhaps join our team.
(i) J( c©perhaps mayd) (Harry join our team)KM,h
= λpλw.
⋂
f(w) ∩ p 6= ∅
.
= λpλw.
⋂
f ′(w) ∩ p 6= ∅(λv.Jhtv)
= #
(ii) J( c©perhaps maye) (Harry join our team)KM,h
= λpλw.
⋂
f(w) ∩ p 6= ∅
.
= λpλw.
⋂
f(w) ∩ p 6= ∅(λv.Jhtv)
= λw.
⋂
f(w) ∩ λv.Jhtv 6= ∅
Whether or not the deontic construal is actually the preferred reading for a given
sentence depends of course on the context of utterance. But it is clear that if
the context should favor a deontic reading for may, (68) is predicted to make a
doubly modalized contribution, for only if perhaps has its standard meaning will
the sentence be interpretable.
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The locality constraints on modal concord can probably also be made to follow.
Our theory requires that the adverb takes the auxiliary as its sister. Though I
have not specified how this logical constituent structure is derived from the surface
syntax, it seems clear that for sentences like (70) may will not be the argument
that perhaps requires (on its shifted meaning):
(70) Perhaps Mary believes that it may be raining.
For many of the above sentences, it is unproblematic to require that the verb
and adverb are sisters. At least, for ‘Harry may perhaps join our team’, nothing
seems to exclude the following LF:
(71) [IP Harryi [may perhaps [VP ti join our team]]]
Of course, for sentences in which the adverb and verb do not occur next to each
other at surface, the proposal needs to be spelled out further. Take ‘Ik moest gis-
teren nodig plassen’ (lit. I had to yesterday necessarily pee). To derive its concord
reading, it seems that we must assume that nodig ‘necessarily’ somehow moves
to join moeten ‘must’, which is not a straightforward process. Unfortunately, I
will have to leave this to future research.28
Finally, the disambiguating function of modal concord provided the impetus
of this analysis. One may wonder how the type-shifting analysis implements the
intuition that adverbs may serve as domain restrictors. After all, on its shifted
meaning, an adverb like perhaps doesn’t encode an epistemic accessibility relation,
but rather a function from modal operators to modal operators. However, the net
effect is the same. The meaning of the complex ( c©perhaps (may)) is the same as
that of may when combined with an epistemic accessibility relation. This becomes
clearer once we reformulate the theory without assuming that modal auxiliaries
are lexically ambiguous.
Reformulation
Zeijlstra (2007b) has objected that the type-shifting analysis wrongly presupposes
that adverbs like perhaps and may are identical in their lexical semantics. This is
wrong because the interpretation of perhaps is much more restricted than that of
may ; the adverb only allows an epistemic interpretation, whereas may can also
be used to convey deontic modality. However, this objection doesn’t really hold.
As should be clear from the discussion above, we do not presuppose that perhaps
and may have the same lexical semantics; all that is presupposed is that on one of
its possible construals, may communicates the same as what perhaps expresses.
But this is a harmless assumption. Of course, while implementing the proposal,
28Note that Zeijlstra’s analysis also assumes some restructuring, the adverb nodig ‘necessarily’
must be assumed to move to a position where it c-commands the verb in ‘Ik moest gisteren
nodig plassen’ in order to be able to check it’s feature.
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we treated auxiliaries as lexically ambiguous items. This can be objected to, for
it is more or less agreed upon that auxiliaries aren’t lexically ambiguous, but
rather have a core semantics which gets filled in by the context of utterance.
But this objection isn’t very strong, because the theory can be reformulated such
that modal auxiliaries have their standard underspecified semantics. To see this,
adopt the following more realistic entries for perhaps and may :
3.3.4. Definition (Revised entries for perhaps and may)
a. JperhapsK = λfλpλw.
⋂
f(w) ∩ p 6= ∅
b. JmayK = λfλpλw.
⋂
f(w) ∩ p 6= ∅
Note that modal operators are now no longer of type 〈st, st〉, but are instead
of type 〈〈s, 〈st, t〉〉, 〈st, st〉〉. As before, we assume that the restrictor argument
slot for each modal is filled by a silent pronoun f which must be handled by the
assignment function h, i.e. (72) is parsed as follows:
(72) JPerhaps Barney is homeKM,h
= JPerhaps f Barney is homeKM,h
= JperhapsKM,h(JfKM,h)(JBarney is homeKM,h)
As f is a variable, its interpretation is handled by the interpretation function,
i.e. JfKM,h = h(f). As perhaps is lexically specified as an epistemic modal, I will
assume that any assignment h(f) which is not epistemic is not in the domain of
JperhapsKM,h. It follows that a sentence like Perhaps (f) Barney is home has no
truth value iff the assignment function doesn’t map f onto an epistemic modal
base.
To derive modal concord and its restrictions, the type shift rule must now be
redefined, so that it maps JperhapsK onto a function which takes a modal base f
as its first argument and a modal operator applied to a modal base as its second
argument, and which denotes JperhapsK(JfK) iff its second argument means the
same as JperhapsK(JfK). This can be defined as follows, where P is a variable of
type 〈〈s, 〈st, t〉〉, 〈st, st〉〉, Q is a variable of type 〈st, st〉, and f is an accessibility
relation of type 〈s, 〈st, t〉〉:
3.3.5. Definition (Revised type shift rule)
λPλf.λQ.P(f)
.
= Q (= c©)
Application to perhaps yields the next functional meaning:
(73) J c©perhapsK = λfλpλw.
⋂
f(w) ∩ p 6= ∅
.
= Q
It now follows that ‘Barney may perhaps be asleep’ has a concord reading in
case the assignment function maps both modal base pronouns onto an epistemic
modal base:
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(74) J c©perhaps (f) (may (f’)) (Barney be asleep)KM,h =
(λfλpλw.
⋂
f(w) ∩ p 6= ∅(JfKM,h)
.
= λfλpλw.
⋂
f(w) ∩ p 6= ∅(Jf ′KM,h))
(λv.Sbv)
Given the definition of modal fusion, this is defined in case h(f) = h(f ′). Thus,
the analysis still works if we drop the assumption that auxiliaries are lexically
ambiguous. Though may is in principle compatible with more modal flavors than
perhaps, the two modals will only be able to fuse if the context assigns may the
same meaning as perhaps. In this way, the inclusion of perhaps can be said to
disambiguate may. Summing up, the theory does not rest on the false assumption
that perhaps andmay have the same meaning, nor does it have to postulate lexical
ambiguity for auxiliaries. Zeijlstra’s objection is thus countered.
To conclude, it is possible to account for modal concord by means of a simple
type shift rule which maps modal operators into functions that pose restrictions
on their argument, which is also a modal operator. If these restrictions are met,
the output of the function is a single modal operator. We have seen that this
theory meets all of the desiderata we have listed for a theory on modal concord.
In the next section, we make a detailed comparison between the type-shifting
analysis, and the other two. We will also ask how the type-shifting analysis is to
be understood. Is this a mere exercise in writing types, or is there some underlying
intuition?
3.4 Discussion
We are now in a position to compare the three theories of modal concord intro-
duced in section 3.3, i.e. the logical analysis, the agreement analysis, and the
type-shifting analysis. Let’s first look at the complexity of the theories. Clearly,
the logical analysis is the simplest theory. In this theory, there is nothing extraor-
dinary about modal concord. There wasn’t even good reason to be puzzled by
the phenomenon. However, it seems that there are reasons to dismiss the logical
analysis: it is probably too restrictive. Of the two theories left, it is obvious that
the agreement approach is far more complex than the type-shifting analysis. As
discussed above, Zeijlstra’s (2007b) agreement theory proposes to reduce modal
concord to syntactic agreement. The idea is that modal auxiliaries are semanti-
cally empty markers of the presence of a (possibly covert) modal operator. As
such, modal auxiliaries can be likened to inflectional morphology. Zeijlstra (2004)
gave an analysis along these lines of negative concord. But it should be clear by
now that his analysis does not straightforwardly carry over to modal concord. In
fact, many additional assumptions are necessity specifically for modal concord:
• morphological features the encode modal force
• semantically empty auxiliaries
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• covert modal adverbs
• an economy condition on covert adverbs
• some mechanism like ‘contextual specification’ to assign modal flavor
None of these is independently motivated.
The type-shifting in analysis advocated in 3.3.3 proposes that modal adverbs
are polysemous between their ordinary modal reading, and a functional reading,
on which they perform a congruence test on their argument, the modal verb. If
this verb has the same meaning as the adverb on its ordinary reading, a concord
interpretation ensues. In contrast to the agreement approach, the type-shifting
analysis consists of just two ingredients:
• a simple type-shifting rule
• a way to derive the right logical constituent structure from the surface
structure
We saw that the type-shifting rule is thus defined that all restrictions on modal
concord straightforwardly follow. There is no question which of the agreement
approach and the type-shifting analysis accounts for the facts in the simplest way.
But of course, simplicity isn’t the only desideratum for a good theory. The
underlying intuition is just as important. At first sight, it seems that the agree-
ment approach does better in this respect than the type-shifting analysis. Recall
that Zeijlstra (2007b) presents his agreement approach as a very general analysis,
which reduces all kinds of doubling constructions to just one phenomenon that
no one doubts is important in natural language: syntactic agreement. However,
as we saw, the integrated account of modal and negative concord comes at a cost.
To make the agreement theory work, one has to make special assumptions and
resort to further mechanisms like contextual specification.
What about the type-shifting analysis? How general is this? What motivates
this theory? Thus far, we have not addressed these questions yet, and the reader
may therefore feel that the analysis is stipulative, a mere exercise in type writing.
But we can tell a story here.
Reinforcement by repetition
The type-shifting analysis can be seen as a very general approach to reinforcement
by repetition:
Reinforcement is a feature of colloquial style whereby some item is re-
peated (either in toto or by pronoun substitution) for purposes of em-
phasis, focus, or thematic arrangement. Its simplest form is merely the
reiteration of a word or a phrase for emphasis or clarity (Quirk et al.
1972, 970-971)
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Such cases of double marking are of course usually forbidden by school grammars.
Nevertheless, they occur quite often, and one might argue that one can therefore
not really say that they represent ill usage of language. Here are some examples
(the first two are by van der Wouden (1994, 145), who also gives examples of
modal concord ‘We must necessarily assume that the clock has operated’ (though
he doesn’t call this modal concord)):
(75) a. I am very very happy with this result.
b. It’s far, far too expensive.
c. Do you like him like him?
d. There is nothing wrong with that – nothing.
In some sense, one of the expressions that occurs twice in these sentences performs
a test on the other. That is, they shift into a functional expressions which tests
whether its argument has the same meaning as they do on their ordinary meaning.
For instance, (75a) is then to be analyzed as:
(76) I am c©(very)(very) happy with this result.
Of course, we have not yet defined c© for expression of the type of very, but it
is clear that should we do this, (76) comes out semantically equivalent to ‘I am
very happy with this result’. This seems to be exactly what we want.
In as far as negative concord can also be seen as reinforcement by repetition,
the type-shifting analysis can also be seen as a unified account of negative and
modal concord, albeit not under universally accepted assumptions. Note that un-
like modal concord, negative concord doesn’t involve semantically identical items:
n-words typically have more content than just a negative element. This means
that in order to apply type-shifting we have to assume that n-words decompose
into a negation and a quantifier. Consider sentence (77), which in non-standard
varieties of English may receive a concord interpetation amounting to just a single
negation:
(77) Mary didn’t talk to nobody. (Ladusaw 1992)
This means that Mary didn’t talk to anybody. On the type-shifting analysis,
this could be explained iff (77) is analyzed as follows, where c© is a function that
takes two operators of type 〈st, st〉, as defined in 3.3.3 (of course, the type-shifting
analysis would require an additional theory of syntactic restructuring to get the
right function-argument structure):
(78) J( c©¬¬)(∃x(talk(m, x)))KM,h = J¬∃x(talk(m, x))KM,h
On the one hand, decomposing n-words is perhaps not the most attractive way of
dealing with negative concord, but on the other hand, we may need to decompose
anyway. For instance, negative indefinites give rise to split readings, as illustrated
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by German (79):
(79) Du
you
brauchst
need
keine
n-one
Jacke
jacket
anziehen.
wear
‘You don’t need to wear a jacket’
One way to deal with this, is by assuming that keine decomposes into a negation
and a quantifier which take scope independently of one another:
(80) ¬∃x(jacket(x) ∧ wear(x, d))
Of course, other analyses are possible. In fact, one of these involves uninter-
pretable features and agreement. Penka (2007a) proposes that negative indefi-
nites carry uninterpretable negative features (i.e. are semantically non-negative).
The semantic negation in (79) can thus not come from keine, but must come from
a covert negative operator. As this operator can scope over the modal (in fact
has to, as brauchen is an NPI), the indefinite can be interpreted in situ:
(81) Du OP[iNEG] [[keine[uNEG] Jacke anziehen] brauchst]
Note that this departs from Zeijlstra’s (2004) analysis of negative concord. Ger-
man is a double negation language, and therefore keine has to carry [iNEG] on
Zeijlstra’s theory. Penka, on the other hand, proposes that it nevertheless carries
an uninterpretable negative feature. The difference between concord languages
and double negation languages is, according to Penka, not that n-words in the
former are not negative, whereas n-words in the latter are inherently negative,
but that double negation languages do not allow Multiple Agree (i.e. one negative
marker that checks several negative features), whereas concord languages do.
But of course, this analysis is mostly attractive if one has already decided
that much of semantics should be handled in terms of feature checking under
agreement and covert operators etc. If, on the other hand, such a system is not
adopted, I do not see why a decompositional analysis of words like keine should
be implausible. Similarly, if one is working in the minimalist framework, one may
want to analyze negative concord in the way that Zeijlstra proposes. But I see
no principled reason why an analysis that makes use of type-shifting wouldn’t
capture the semantic facts just as well.
To sum up, of the three analyses of modal concord discussed in 3.3, our type-
shifting analysis gives the simplest account of modal concord and its restrictions.
The analysis can be seen as a general account of reinforcement by repetition:
this is now reduced to testing for congruence. Admittedly, the analysis is still
somewhat stipulative, but if the phenomenon we are dealing with is indeed this
reinforcement by repetition, it seems that further ‘non-stipulativeness’ cannot
reasonably be required.
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3.5 Concord combinations with probably
As said in 3.1, it is possible for a modal verb and an adverb to participate in
modal concord while they are not equivalent in modal force. It seems that they
only need to be sufficiently similar. A case in point is:
(82) If Dillon does as he did the other night, he may probably visit the bar.
(Hoye 1997, 97)29
This sentence expresses that it is probable that Dillon will visit the bar. That is,
may and probably ‘merge’ together and it seems that in the process, the modal
force of may is raised to probability by the adverb. Obviously, all the analyses
above make the wrong predictions for this sentence. After all, these were based
on the assumption that concord readings are only available for modals of identical
force. Examples like (82), however, seem to suggest that the modals only have
to be sufficiently close in modal force. Apparently, probably and may meet this
criterion. On the other hand, certainly and may count as too far apart, for the
next sentence has no concord interpretation:
(83) There may certainly have been weapons of mass destruction.
As might be expected, probably may also yield a concord interpretation in com-
bination with must :
(84) a. Those links of connection with the Odyssean cycle must probably
have been already concocted at this period.30
b. St. Valentine must probably be turning in his grave.31
Here the effect of adding probably goes in the opposite direction of (82); it seems
that the modal force of must is weakened. At any rate, the underlying proposition
is presented as probable, not as certain.
Interestingly, languages appear to differ in which modals count as sufficiently
similar. For example, in Dutch waarschijnlijk ‘probably’ doesn’t combine with
possibility modals but only with expressions of necessity:
(85) a. Jan
Jan
kan
can
zich
self
waarschijnlijk
probably
verslapen
overslept
hebben.
have
‘Jan can probably have overslept.’ (cumulative only)
b. Dat
that
moet
must
waarschijnlijk
probably
in
in
1943
1943
zijn
be
geweest.
been
29Kai von Fintel (p.c.) informed me that native speakers he asked find this sentence rather
awful. Yet this is an actually occurring example; Hoye found it in Jack Higgin’s novel Thunder
point (1993), Berkely Publishing Group. This, and the large amount of Google hits for might
probably (about 200.000) lead me to do accept (82) as data.
30http://ancienthistory.about.com/library/bl/bl_text_mommsen_2_9_12.htm
31http://tiny.cc/valentine551
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‘That was probably in 1943.’
Sentence (85a) borders on infelicity. It seems that the auxiliary kan ‘can’ is most
likely meant to convey ability, but it is plain weird to say of someone that he
is able to have overslept. It is somewhat surprising that kan should favor this
reading, for its complement predicate normally raises the salience of an epistemic
interpretation. Indeed, omitting waarschijnlijk ‘probably’ from the sentence turns
it into a felicitous epistemic statement:
(86) Jan
Jan
kan
can
zich
self
verslapen
overslept
hebben.
have
‘Jan may have overslept.’
Perhaps kan ends up being interpreted as an ability modal, because of the fact
that the sentence lacks a concord reading. Assuming that kan and waarschijnlijk
do not count as similar enough for speakers of Dutch, (85a) must be understood
as a doubly modalized statement. But it seems more likely then that the speaker
intended to make a statement about the likelihood of a no-epistemic modality,
than that she wanted to say that it is probable that it is possible that Jan over-
slept. If we can ever really make sense of the sentence by construing both modals
as epistemic, it seems to requires a rather outlandish context.32
To sum up, to participate in concord constructions, the modal verb and adverb
have to be close in their modal force, they don’t have to be identical. English
and Dutch differ in their choices of what counts as close enough. In English,
probably is both close to possibility modals like may and might, and to necessity
modals like must. In Dutch, however, waarschijnlijk ‘probably’ is sufficiently
close to necessity modals, but not to possibility expressions. All analyses of
modal concord that we have discussed in 3.3 wrongly exclude modal concord in
these cases.
So how can we accommodate concord examples with probably? In our (2006)
paper, we argued that modal concord involving probably is not as problematic
for the type-shifting analysis as it appears. Let me first discuss the English data.
Prima facie, it seems that may and probably are not identical in their modal force,
32To be sure, even though using the verb cluster zou kunnen lit. ‘would can’ often seems a
more natural way to convey epistemic modality in Dutch than plain kan, replacing kan by this
verb cluster doesn’t help the example:
(i) ?Jan
Jan
zou
would
zich
self
waarschijnlijk
probably
verslapen
overslept
kunnen
have
hebben.
‘Jan would probably be able to have overslept.’
This still is a weird thing to say. In the most prominent reading, zou and kunnen are not
interpreted as one modal, but independent of one another, with the effect that (i) seems to
make a statement about the abilities Jan would probably have had in counterfactual worlds.
The sentence cannot mean that Jan has probably overslept.
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and that our analysis predicts that concord is ruled out, i.e. that J c©probably
perhapsKM,h = #. Recall that in Kratzer’s (1981, 1991) analysis of probably, the
adverb expresses what she calls a human necessity. That is, the adverb depends
on an ordering of worlds, which ranks the modal base worlds with respect to how
well they conform to the normal course of events:
3.5.1. Definition (Entry for probably)
JprobablyK = λfλgλpλw.maxg(w)(
⋂
f(w)) ⊆ p
It seems clear that this meaning cannot fuse with the meaning expressed by may :
this item expresses existential quantification over possible worlds.
Upon closer scrutiny, however, it is not so clear that modal fusion is not
defined for the combination may probably. That is, it could be that, on one of its
readings, may expresses probability. But if this is the case, it is not surprising
that may should engage in modal concord with probably. Concord readings for
must probably can be explained along similar lines. That is, must doesn’t always
express certainty, but it may also be used to convey a weaker notion of necessity,
more or less equivalent to probability. Pairs like Karttunen’s (1972) seem to
corroborate this:
(87) a. John must have left.
b. John has left.
(87a) makes a weaker claim than (87b). In fact, as we saw in chapter 1, Kratzer
(1981, 1991) takes such pairs to indicate that epistemic must depends both on
a set of accessible worlds and an ordering on these worlds. That is, it expresses
a human necessity, just as probably does, i.e. on one interpretation, JmustK =
JprobablyK.33 But under this reading, modal fusion is obviously defined between
must and probably.34
What about the difference between English and Dutch? If the story just told
is on the right track, it seems that Dutch kunnen differs from English may in
that it cannot express probability, but is restricted to rather low values on the
epistemic scale. This suggests that there are rather subtle differences between
English and Dutch. This is not completely implausible, as the lexical field of
33One might wonder whether epistemic must is ever perfectly strong. I agree with
von Fintel & Gillies (2008b) that it sometimes is. Their best example is:
(i) The ball is in A or in B or in C
It is not in A. . . . It is not in B.
So, it must be in C.
34It is perhaps less obvious that on one reading it also holds that JmustK = JprobablyK.
However, if suitable domains are chosen for each, there isn’t such a big difference between
universal and existential modals.
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epistemic modality in one language need not map one-to-one to its counterpart in
another language. It is very well possible that the division of labor between modal
lexemes differs from one language to another. To be sure, this is an empirical
issue, but one that is difficult to decide. One would perhaps like to test sentences
like the following:
(88) a. It isn’t just possible that he is in Paris, but he even may be in Paris.
b. It isn’t true that he may be in Paris, but it is possible that he is
there.
In these sentences, may is contrasted with an expression of mere possibility, in an
attempt to force its strong probability reading. If English and Dutch differ in the
way just suggested, it is predicted that these English sentences are better than
their Dutch counterparts:
(89) a. Het is niet alleen mogelijk dat hij in Parijs is, maar hij kan zelfs in
Parijs zijn.
b. Het is niet waar dat hij in Parijs kan zijn, maar het is mogelijk dat
hij daar is.
Unfortunately, the prediction doesn’t seem to be borne out; the Dutch sentences
are bad, and the English sentences are at least as bad, if not worse (to my ear,
(89a) is not completely out). It seems though that this departure from our predic-
tions can be independently explained. Perhaps the sentences in (88) are not good
due to the fact that we are dealing with contrastive contexts, in which stress on
the auxiliary is expected, but we would normally opt for a phonologically heavier
modal if we wanted to place an accent on it.35 Perhaps (89a) is slightly better
than (88a) because non-epistemic readings for kunnen interfere. In particular, it
seems that an opportunity interpretation surfaces (as far as I know, may doesn’t
have such an interpretation; one would use could in this case; whereas for Dutch
kunnen this interpretation is readily available). If these explanations count for
anything, the matter is undecided. There may be a subtle difference in meaning
between English may and Dutch kunnen, and there may not be. It is hard to tell.
Note though that it is hard to see how the type-shifting analysis could oth-
erwise be repaired. One option that comes to mind is to try to redefine modal
fusion in such a way that adverbs on their functional reading only test the modal
flavor of their argument. This would surely predict that sentences like (82) have a
concord reading. And we would get this prediction without having to claim that
may sometimes means the same thing as probably. But even apart from the fact
it is difficult to see how such an analysis could be formulated in our framework, it
is obvious that the resulting analysis would be too weak. It would falsely predict
concord readings between may and certainly. One could of course try and prag-
35This is not to say that speakers never put emphasis on short words (‘I like HIM, and him
alone’), but heavy stress on an auxiliary doesn’t seem very common.
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matically restrict the analysis by demanding that the two expressions engaging in
modal concord must be sufficiently close in modal force. But note that we would
then need to argue on independent grounds that there is a difference in similarity
judgments between English and Dutch. We would thus be back at square one.
To summarize, concord combinations with probably are problematic for all
theories of modal concord discussed in this chapter. I have presented an out-
line of an explanation: may and must may express epistemic probability, but
Dutch kunnen can’t. But it is an open question whether this can empirically be
confirmed. I will have to leave this to another occasion.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter I made the following points. First, modal concord exists! Not
only does it exist, but it is a rather natural and pervasive phenomenon. It hap-
pens often that a modal verb and a modal adverb ‘join forces’ to express a single
modality. As any concord phenomenon poses a challenge to compositional se-
mantics, modal concord is in need of explanation. The second point I made is
that of the explanations on the market, the type-shifting analysis that we pro-
posed in Geurts & Huitink (2006) works best to explain modal concord and its
restrictions. Its main contender, Zeijlstra’s (2007b) agreement analysis suffers
from implausibility. This theory claims that modal auxiliaries are meaningless
across the board, but the facts are that at least in some case they do seem to
contribute a modal operator. Third and last, the type-shifting analysis can be
understood as a general account of reinforcement by repetition, i.e. using the
same item twice to stress its meaning. This may even include certain instances
of negative concord.
Chapter 4
Anankastic conditionals
You must take the A train
to go to Sugar Hill way up in Harlem.
If you miss the A train
you’ll find you’ve missed the quickest way to Harlem.
Hurry, get on, now it’s coming.
Listen to those rails a-thrumming.
All aboard! Get on the A train.
Soon you will be on Sugar Hill in Harlem.
- Lyrics by Joya Sherill (1944),
to music by Billy Strayhorn (1941)
This chapter is devoted to the analysis of so-called anankastic conditionals ‘If
you want to go to Harlem, you must take the A train’. There are two problems
with these constructions. First, it turns out to be quite a challenge to derive
the meaning of such sentences in a compositional fashion. In particular, it seems
that the expression of intention, want, is somehow skipped during the process
of interpretation. This has prompted several scholars to propose that the if -
clause doesn’t contribute to the anankastic meaning at all; it merely expresses a
conditional speech act. The goal of this chapter, however, is to show that such a
move is unnecessary. The trick is to find the right semantics for goal-expressing
if -clauses.
The second problem is posed by scenarios in which multiple goals (conflicting
with the hypothetical goal or not) are relevant. The solutions currently on the
market essentially solve this problem by denying thatmust is a teleological modal.
I will consider a different solution: must is a normal goal-sensitive modal, and
the judgments in scenarios with conflicting goals rely on interpreting if you want
to go to Harlem as if the one thing you want is to go to Harlem.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 explains the two problems
of anankastic conditionals. Then, 4.2 discusses several solutions to the compo-
sitionality problem. After that, 4.3 discusses how to deal with multiple goals.
Finally, in 4.4 I will address the problems associated with existential anankastic
conditionals.
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4.1 Two problems
Anankastic conditionals express what must, ought to, or can be done to achieve
some goal that is set in their antecedent. Examples are:
(1) a. If you want to go to Harlem, you must take the A train.
b. If you want to go to Harlem, you ought to take the A train.
c. If you want to go to Harlem, you can take the A train.
Sentence (1a) goes back to seminal work by Sæbø (2001, 1986), and has become
the standard example of an anankastic conditional. It is often said that this
conditional expresses that taking the A train is a necessary condition for getting
to Harlem, but this is true only in a relative sense of necessary condition. If
(1a) conveyed that the A train was the only way to get to Harlem, it would be
nearly impossible to utter (1a) truthfully, for there are surely other means of
getting there: you might walk there, or take a taxi, etc.1 Yet it is easy to think of
scenarios in which (1a) does seem to express something true: for instance in case
it is established that Harlem is too far to walk, and that you don’t have enough
money for a taxi, etc. Thus, what (1a) says is that relative to a conversational
background in which other means of transportation are ruled out, taking the A
train is a necessary condition of going to Harlem.2 In contrast, sentence (1b)
doesn’t claim that you have to take the A train to get to Harlem, but rather that
the A train is the best way to get there. Finally, (1c) expresses that the A train
is a means of going to Harlem.
A note on terminology: the name ‘anankastic’ was suggested by von Wright
(1963a, 10) to capture the idea that anankastic conditionals express necessary
conditions, deriving from the Greek word for necessity: ngkh. Strictly speaking
then, only (1a) can properly be called an anankastic conditional, but it is more in
line with the contemporary literature to call all of the above sentences anankastic
conditionals ((1c), for example, is usually called an ‘existential anankastic’, and
this is what I will do, too).
The compositionality problem
There are two problems in the semantics of anankastic conditionals. First, as
pointed out by Sæbø (2001, 1986), they resist standard treatments of modalized
conditionals. Even worse, it seems that their meaning cannot be derived in a
compositional manner. Intuitively, the domain of the modal in an anankastic
1Perhaps a relative necessary condition cannot really be called a necessary condition in the
philosopher’s sense, but nothing hinges on this.
2In the real world, several trains will get you to Sugar Hill in Harlem (145th Street station),
but in this chapter I will often pretend that the A train is the only train that goes there. See
http://www.columbia.edu/~brennan/subway/ for a map of the New York subway system.
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conditional is restricted by the goal that is expressed in the if -clause. To see this,
consider the following contrast by Hare (1971, 45):
(2) a. If you want sugar in your soup, you should ask the waiter.
b. If you want sugar in your soup, you should get tested for diabetes.
While (2a) is an anankastic conditional, (2b) has a different meaning: it does not
in any way suggest that getting tested for diabetes is a means of getting sugar in
your soup. The main difference between the two interpretations seems to lie in
the contribution of the if -clause. Hare wrote:
Let us consider the meaning of ‘If you want’ in the two cases. In the
‘diabetes’ case, a first approximation would be to say that it means
the same as ‘If you, as a matter of psychological fact, have a desire’.
I am very much inclined to deny that it means anything like this in
the ‘waiter’ case. (Hare 1971, 46)
It seems that the if -clause in (2b) acts like most other if -clauses and contributes
a hypothetical fact. The if -clause in (2a), on the other hand, is different, because
it expresses a hypothetical goal. This should have the effect that the modal in
(2a) quantifies over worlds in which you get what you want if you want sugar in
your soup. But it isn’t clear at all how the if -clause achieves this. As we will see
in 4.2.1, Kratzer’s theory of the interplay between modals and if -clauses doesn’t
extend to if -clauses that express hypothetical goals.
Note that the expression of intention that occurs in the if -clause is of course
not a part of the goal that this clause expresses. For example, in (1a) it is not your
goal to want to go to Harlem, but your goal is just to go there. But this means
that the sentence expresses a relation between the consequent and the antecedent
minus ‘want’.3 In other words: anankastic conditionals contain an expression of
intention which does not figure in their truth conditions. Accordingly, paraphrases
of the meaning of (1a) typically skip want :
(3) a. Unless you take the A train, you do not go to Harlem.
b. If you don’t take the A train, you cannot go to Harlem.
It thus seems that the meaning of anankastic conditionals is derived in a non-
compositional fashion in the sense that the restriction of the modal is determined
by looking inside the if -clause.4 This is the first problem.
3Recall that in Kratzer’s analysis of modalized conditionals, the conditional operator is
expressed by the modal, and so the modal is not part of the consequent.
4This is not to say that a compositional analysis of anankastic conditionals is impossible, but
just that pre-theoretically this seems difficult. We will actually encounter several compositional
accounts in the sections to come.
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The problem of interfering goals
The most obvious way to fix Kratzer’s standard treatment of modalized condi-
tionals is by allowing if -clauses to somehow add their complement proposition to
the modal’s ordering source. Then the modal quantifies over worlds in which you
achieve as much of your goals as possible, and your hypothetical goal is added
to the set of your goals. However, it turns out that this isn’t good enough to
account for the meaning of anankastic conditionals. What is needed in addition
is a way for the hypothetical goal to override any other goals that you have. To
see this, consider the following scenario, due to von Fintel & Iatridou (2005):5
4.1.1 The Hoboken scenario
In the actual world, w@ you want to go to Hoboken, but I don’t know that.
To go to Hoboken, one has to take the PATH train, while to go to Harlem,
one has to take the A train.
It seems that I can felicitously utter (4) in this scenario, and that I can truthfully
do so:
(4) If you want to go to Harlem, you must take the A train.
However, if the ordering source (via some mechanism yet to be defined) contains
both your actual goal, i.e. to go to Hoboken, and your hypothetical goal, i.e.
to go to Harlem, the ordering source will be inconsistent, as you cannot realize
both of these goals at the same time. Consequently, modal base worlds in which
you go to Hoboken are ranked just as high as modal base worlds in which you
go to Harlem. It follows that you do not take the A train in the best modal
base worlds. In some of these, you will take the PATH train. This is called the
Hoboken problem. As von Fintel & Iatridou write:
In the correct analysis of anankastic conditionals, we need the “hy-
pothetical” goal expressed in the if-clause (that you want to go to
Harlem) to override or take precedence over any conflicting goals that
you actually have. [. . . ] What we need to do is to get rid of or at
least demote your actual goal (of going to Hoboken) and to make
your hypothetical goal (of going to Harlem) be the one that counts.
(von Fintel & Iatridou 2005, 8)
One might be tempted to explain away the Hoboken problem by insisting that
one can never really want two things that are incompatible with one another.
However, even if a case could be made for that claim, it would still not be enough.
5They adapted this scenario from Sæbø (2001). The original scenario had you wanting to
go to Brooklyn, but von Fintel & Iatridou found that unrealistic, as there are too many ways
to get to Brooklyn.
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This was the point of my Ruud van Nistelrooy scenario, which I presented in
Huitink (2005a,b). The scenario is this:
4.1.2 The Ruud van Nistelrooy scenario
You are a huge fan of the Dutch soccer star Ruud van Nistelrooy, and you
would like nothing more than to meet him. It so happens to be that Ruud is
on the A train. However, the A train is not the only way to get to Harlem.
You can also take the B train there.6
The Harlem-sentence has a false reading, because there are two trains that go to
Harlem (some people can read (5) as true in the given scenario. We will come
back to this in 4.3):
(5) If you want to go to Harlem, you must take the A train.
But if the modal in (5) is evaluated against an ordering source that contains
both my hypothetical goal of getting to Harlem, and my actual goal of meeting
Ruud, (5) comes out true: in all the worlds in which I achieve all of my goals
I take the A train. Of course, getting to Harlem and meeting Ruud van Nistel-
rooy are not inconsistent at all: I might actually get everything I want. Thus,
an analysis which demands that must is evaluated with respect to a consistent
teleological ordering source (no matter how this restriction were implemented),
will still make the wrong predictions for (5). I call this the Ruud van Nistelrooy
problem. Summing up, the second problem concerning anankastic conditionals is
this: the hypothetical goal is the only goal that counts, goals other than the one
expressed in the if -clause should be kept from interfering.
In what follows, I will discuss the two problems just explained separately.
First I will consider several ways to get the if -clause to contribute to the modal’s
ordering source in 4.2. Then, in 4.3, I will discuss ways to demote other goals
you might have.
4.2 Dealing with hypothetical goals
We have just said that the if -clause in an anankastic conditional doesn’t seem
to make a factual hypothesis, but rather a normative one. Prima facie, the same
holds for some if -clauses in non-anankastic conditionals:
(6) a. If Wilbur must mow the lawn, he must mow the lawn.
b. If jaywalking is illegal in this town, that guy over there has to be
punished.
6In the Ruud van Nistelrooy scenario of Huitink (2005a) my goal was to kiss Ruud, but here
I changed this to the less ambitious goal of meeting him.
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Example (6a) comes from Geurts (2005). It seems that someone uttering this
sentence is unsure about Wilbur’s obligations. In a similar fashion, someone
who utters (6b), which is an example by von Fintel & Iatridou (2005), does not
know whether jaywalking is illegal or not. In this sense, the if -clauses of both
conditionals can be said to make a normative supposition: when evaluating (6a)
we suppose that Wilbur is obligated to mow the lawn and then we check whether
it is true that he must mow the lawn, and when evaluating (6b) we work under
the hypothesis that jaywalking is illegal in this town.
In this section we will compare ways of dealing with such if -clauses. For good
measure, we will first show in 4.2.1 that the standard treatment fails, for in that
treatment, if -clauses can only modify the modal base of the modal they combine
with. Then, in 4.2.2 we will discuss Sæbø’s proposal that some if -clauses modify
the ordering source rather than the modal base. However, this proposal is not
compositional. In 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 we will therefore look at compositional alter-
natives, in 4.2.3 we will discuss the ‘elliptical’ approach of von Fintel & Iatridou
(2005) and von Stechow et al. (2006), and in 4.2.4 we will discuss Frank’s (1997)
nested modality proposal. I will argue that of the existing analyses, this last pro-
posal works best. But perhaps we need not assume a nested modality structure.
In 4.2.5, I will explore this possibility.
4.2.1 The standard analysis fails
Modalized conditionals are standardly treated in Kratzer’s (1981, 1991) doubly
relative semantics. However, this framework makes the wrong predictions for
anankastic conditionals because all if -clauses are taken to express hypothetical
facts; there is no room for if -clauses that express hypothetical goals. Recall that
in doubly relative semantics, the interpretation of a modal expression depends
on two conversational backgrounds that play different roles. The first is a factual
conversational background, which is called the modal base, and the second is
a normative background, which is called the ordering source. The modal base
supplies a set of propositions that jointly describe the accessible worlds. The
ordering source ranks these worlds with respect to how well they conform to
some given norm. Modal expressions quantify over those modal base worlds that
are as good as possible according to the ordering source. Consider:
(7) Harry must go to see Dumbledore.
Imagine that the relevant facts are that Harry is a student at Hogwarts, that
Dumbledore is Hogwarts’ headmaster, and that Harry’s scar hurts. The norm at
play is Harry’s godfather’s wish that he goes to see Dumbledore in case his scar
hurts. Putting everything together, (7) says that Harry goes to see Dumbledore
in all possible worlds that are compatible with the facts that correspond to this
norm as much as possible.
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As we saw in chapter 1, the modal base and the ordering source are imple-
mented as functions from possible worlds to sets of propositions, respectively f
and g. As said, the ordering source g, when applied to a world, gives the set of
norms of that world, and this set determines a partial order <g(w) on the modal
base worlds. For ease of exposition, I repeat the relevant definition:
4.2.1. Definition (The order <g(w))
For all worlds u, v ∈
⋂
f(w) :
u <g(w) v iff {p : p ∈ g(w) and v ∈ p} ⊂ {p : p ∈ g(w) and u ∈ p}.
Thus, a world u conforms better to the relevant norms than a world v iff u makes
more propositions of g(w) true than v does. We can now define what it means
for a world to be among the <g(w)-best worlds in a given set of worlds:
4.2.2. Definition (<g(w)-best worlds)
For all w ∈ V s.t. V ⊆W : w is among the <g(w)-best worlds in V iff there
is no u ∈ V s.t. u <g(w) w.
As before, the entries for must and can are:7
4.2.3. Definition (must and can)
a. JmustK = λfλgλpλw. for all worlds v in
⋂
f(w) that are <g(w)-best:
p is true in v
b. JcanK = λfλgλpλw. for some worlds v in
⋂
f(w) that are <g(w)-best:
p is true in v
How does this semantics interact with conditionals? As we saw in chapter 2,
Kratzer follows Lewis (1975) and assumes that if -clauses in the scope of a modal
serve to restrict its domain. More precisely, she proposes that such if -clauses
restrict the factual domain of the modal operator; i.e. its modal base. In other
words: if -clauses express hypothetical facts. For many conditionals this seems to
be exactly right. Consider:
(8) If Harry’s scar hurts, he must go to see Dumbledore.
Someone who utters this, is typically unsure of the facts; does Harry’s scar hurt
or not? The idea behind Kratzer’s semantics is that evaluating (8) proceeds by
first making the temporal assumption that Harry’s scar does in fact hurt, which
7Note that we presume that there always is a <g(w)-best world; i.e. that the Limit Assump-
tion is justified. Also note that we now state the semantics explicitly in terms of quantification
rather than in terms of set inclusion. Set theoretic terms are arguably more appropriate in
Kratzer’s framework, but we opt for the most readable rendition, as we will be dealing with
increasingly complex examples.
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is followed by checking Harry’s obligations in this situation. What (8) then says
is that in all of the worlds that are compatible with the facts, in which Harry’s
scar hurts, and in which he follows his godfather’s commands, he goes to see
Dumbledore.
Usually little is said about how this semantic analysis relates to the syntax of
modalized conditionals. For concreteness, we will follow von Stechow’s (2004a)
syntacticized version of the Lewis/Kratzer approach to conditionals, and assume
that the if -clause of (8) is base-generated as a sister to the modal base of the
modal (overt word order must then be the result of moving the if -clause). This
leads to the following LF for (8), where as before the modal combines with two
silent pronouns f and g, which need to be mapped to a conversational background
by the assignment function in order to be interpreted:
(9)
I′
I′ OS
g
I
must
MB
〈s, 〈st, t〉〉
MB
〈s, 〈st, t〉〉
f
CP
〈st〉
if IP
〈st〉
Harry’s scar hurts
IP
VP
he goes to see Dumbledore
The semantic function of the if -clause is to add its complement proposition to
the modal base. We will assume that if itself is semantically vacuous, so that
the denotation of the entire if -clause is the proposition that Harry’s scar hurts.
This proposition combines with the modal base through a rule which I will call
‘modal base modification’:
4.2.4. Definition (Modal base modification)
If ϕ is a tree and {α, β} is the set of its daughters such that α is of type
〈st〉 and β is of type 〈s, 〈st, t〉〉, then JϕKM,h = λw.(JβKM,h(w) ∪ JαKM,h)
(i.e. if β = f and JfKM,h = h(f) = f, JϕKM,h = λw.(f(w) ∪ JαKM,h)).
Applied to (8), we predict that this sentence is true in a world w if and only
if Harry goes to see Dumbledore in those possible worlds that are compatible
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with the relevant facts and in which his scar hurts, and in which he obeys his
godfather’s wishes (I leave it to the reader to work through the tree).
Let’s now apply this to anankastic conditionals. Take the standard example
again:
(10) If you want to go to Harlem, you must take the A train.
Conventionally, the modal in the consequent depends on a circumstantial modal
base which comprises the relevant facts in the world of evaluation (say facts about
the geography, rail road schedules, etc.) and on a teleological ordering source that
contains your goals in that world. In Kratzer’s analysis of modalized conditionals,
an embedded if -clause adds its proposition to the modal base. For anankastic
conditionals, however, this gives the wrong results. The prediction is that (10)
has the following truth conditions:
(11) Sentence (10) is true in w@ iff you take the A train in all worlds v in
(
⋂
(f(w@) ∪ {that you want to go to Harlem}) that are <g@(w)-best.
But, as the ordering source contains what you actually want, this doesn’t restrict
the domain of quantification to worlds in which you reach your hypothetical goal.
It could be that you actually want to go to Hoboken. If so, (10) is predicted
to claim that you take the A train in all the worlds in which you want to go to
Harlem but get to Hoboken. Under this analysis, (10) is clearly false, because
in the worlds in which you go to Hoboken, you will take the PATH train (given
the Hoboken scenario); not the A train. Intuitively though, goals other than the
Harlem-goal are irrelevant for the truth of (10).
4.2.2 Sæbø: if -clauses may modify the ordering source
That Kratzer’s analysis fails for anankastic conditionals was first discovered by
Sæbø (2001). He then concluded that to get the predictions right, the modal
of an anankastic conditional like (10) should be interpreted in view of what you
want if you want to go to Harlem. To achieve this, he proposed that the if -clause
of an anankastic conditional serves to modify the ordering source rather than the
modal base argument of the modal. That is, the if -clause attaches to the ordering
source pronoun g rather than to the modal base pronoun f; which leads to the
structure in (12) (Sæbø himself doesn’t adopt a syntacticized version of Kratzer’s
doubly relative semantics, so what I am presenting here is my reinterpretation of
his theory):
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(12) IP
VP
you take the A train
I′
OS
OS
g
CP
if you want to go to Harlem
I′
I
must
MB
f
It is clear that we cannot interpret the combination of g and the if-clause via
modal base modification (as defined in 4.2.4). If we applied that rule to (1a), the
proposition that you want to go to Harlem would be added to the ordering source.
But this implies that the modal in an anankastic conditional is sensitive to your
goal of wanting to go to Harlem. Intuitively however, this isn’t the relevant goal,
and we want the proposition that you go to Harlem to be added. We are forced
to conclude that the interpretation of anankastic conditionals proceeds in a non-
compositional fashion. The interpretation rule for ‘ordering source modification’
must somehow be able to ‘look inside’ the if -clause and find the complement
of want, and add this proposition to the initial ordering source. This could be
formulated as follows:
4.2.5. Definition (Ordering source modification)
If ϕ is a tree and {α, β} is the set of its daughters such that α is of type
of 〈st〉 and β is of type 〈s, 〈st, t〉〉, then JϕKM,h =
λw.(JβKM,h(w) ∪
⋂
v∈JαKM,h Gα(v))
where Gα is the normative ordering source expressed in α
(i.e. if β = g and JgKM,h = h(g) = g,
JϕKM,h = λw.(g(w) ∪
⋂
v∈JαKM,h Gα(v))).
Here Gα is what you want. Applied to a world, this gives the set of propositions
that you want in that world Gα(v) = {p : you want p in v}. Assuming that the
worlds w1 . . . wn are the worlds in which you want to go to Harlem, the set of
propositions that makes it into the ordering source is Gα(w1) ∩ . . . ∩ Gα(wn).
8
The idea is that we add this set ‘what you want in all those worlds in which you
want to go to Harlem’ to the initial ordering source.
8More precise: if α = that you want to go to Harlem, then
⋂
v∈JαKM,h Gα(v) =
{p : for all v such that you want to go to Harlem in v, you want p in v}. This ensures that the
proposition that you get to Harlem is in the set. Assuming closure under entailment, any
consequences of you getting there are in the set too.
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The main problem with this analysis is that it leaves one wondering what
the compositional role of the expression of intention in the antecedent is. Ac-
cording to Sæbø, any intentional attitude verb may occur in the antecedent of
an anankastic conditional: intend, hope, plan, aim, fear. Semantically, however,
these expressions make no contribution apart from indicating the kind of ordering
source the modal depends on. So in (13), the use of fear is a signal that the modal
is sensitive to what your fears are, i.e. what you hope to avoid.
(13) If you fear to lose your job, you have to work harder.
But it seems obvious that in figuring out which kind of ordering source is indicated
by the expression of intention, we interpret this expression.9
4.2.3 The ‘elliptical’ approach
A clever way to improve Sæbø’s analysis is to exploit the fact that anankastic
meanings need not be expressed by combining a modal with an if -clause. As
pointed out by Sæbø himself, a purpose to-clause may be used instead:
(14) You must take the A train, to go to Harlem.
Intuitively, the to-clause seems to have the same function as the if -clause in (13):
it restricts the modal’s domain of quantification to worlds in which you get to
Harlem. But it should be noted that the two sentences aren’t completely alike
in meaning. According to Bech (1957, §370), sentences like (14) are ambiguous:
besides an anankastic interpretation, the sentence can receive an ‘ordinary’ pur-
pose interpretation where the to-clause expresses a causa finalis : ‘You have to
take the A train, because you want to go to Harlem’. On this latter reading, it is
not the function of the to-clause to restrict the modal.10
Both von Fintel & Iatridou (2005) and von Stechow et al. (2006) propose that
(14) should be taken to be the primitive anankastic construction, and that we
should explain the meaning of the if -clause variant in terms of this sentence. The
main reason to do this is of course that the to-clause doesn’t contain an expression
of intention. As we saw, the if -clause-variant of anankastic conditionals does
contain such an expression, and it seems that this expression needs to be skipped
in the semantics, making the interpretation of such sentences non-compositional.
For (14) though, Sæbø’s proposal works fine: we do not need to look inside the
9Doris Penka (p.c.) suggests that there might be modal concord between want and must in
‘If you want to go to Harlem, you must take the A train’. But the analysis of modal concord I
have defended in chapter 3 clearly does not extend to such examples, because the two modals
are not clause-mates. Anankastics may also cause problems for Zeijlstra’s (2007b) syntactic
agreement theory, given that the expression of intention has to be interpreted.
10Bech only claims this for sentence-final to-clauses (um-clauses in German). About sentence-
initial to-clauses, he says that they express a necessary condition.
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to-clause in order for it to provide a suitable restriction on the ordering source.11
What about the if -clause variant? For these sentences von Fintel & Iatridou
(2005) and von Stechow et al. (2006) propose that they can be treated a ‘ellip-
tical’, such that the underlying form for the standard example is really as in
(15):
(15) If you want to go to Harlem, you must take the A train (to go to Harlem).
The idea is that the anankastic meaning is expressed by the modal in combination
with the to-clause. The if -clause does not make any contribution to it (though it
might raise the salience of the hypothetical goal in order to identify the content
of the to-clause).
While the ‘elliptical’ analysis improves on Sæbø’s original proposal, it cannot
make all compositionality problems disappear. One wonders why one should ever
use the if -clause variant. There are at least two options. First, it could be that
the if -clause restricts the modal base of the teleological modal; just as Kratzer’s
standard analysis would predict (recall section 4.2.1). Because we now also have
the to-clause modifying the ordering source, the modal will still be sensitive to
your hypothetical goal. But this would predict that someone uttering the if -clause
variant is unsure about whether you want to go to Harlem in a way that someone
opting for the to-variant is not, and it is an open question whether this is the
case. Second, it could also be that the if -clause marks some conditional speech
act, an explored by von Stechow et al. (2006).12 Yet the status of this speech
act is unclear. The literature distinguishes between two conditional speech acts,
relevance conditionals and factual conditionals, but anankastic conditionals are
no perfect match with either of these.
Let me explain this. Going back to Iatridou (1991, 50ff), there are three kinds
of conditionals. First, hypothetical conditionals express that the consequent is true
in any circumstance in which the antecedent is true. Besides this gardenvariety,
there are also relevance and factual conditionals. In relevance conditionals, the
if -clause intuitively doesn’t specify the circumstances in which the consequent is
true, but in which it is relevant:
(16) If you’re thirsty, there’s beer in the fridge.
Finally, the if -clause in a factual conditional carries the presupposition that the
circumstances it gives are actual for someone (other than the speaker):
11As we will see in 4.3 neither von Fintel & Iatridou nor von Stechow et al. end up adopting
Sæbø’s proposal. They argue it should be abandoned in order to deal with the problem of
interfering goals.
12Von Fintel & Iatridou (2005) suggest a third option: it could be that anankastic condition-
als are really doubly modalized structures: the if -clause restricts a higher covert modal, and
the elided to-clause restricts the overt modal. To solve the compositionality problem, nesting
alone would suffice (see 4.2.4). However, von Fintel & Iatridou’s solution to the Hoboken and
Ruud van Nistelrooy scenario still requires ‘ellipsis’ (see 4.3.1).
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(17) If you like her so much, you should invite her to tea.
However, anankastic conditionals don’t seem to fit in any of these categories,
as they fail the standard syntactic tests (see Bhatt & Pancheva (2006) for an
overview of tests). For instance, relevance conditionals cannot take conditional
then, but anankastic conditionals can:
(18) a. #If you’re thirsty, then there’s beer in the fridge.13
b. If you want to go to Harlem, then you must take the A train.
This seems to suggest that anankastic conditionals are more like factual condi-
tionals, which can take then. Yet the if -clause of a factual conditional cannot
associate with focus (because the antecedent is presupposed). In contrast, the
if -clause of our construction can:
(19) a. *It is if you like her so much that you should invite her.
b. It is if you want to go to Harlem that you must take the A train.
Therefore, it isn’t clear what kind of conditional speech act (if any) is expressed
by the anankastic if -clause. In the end, von Stechow et al. suggest that the
if -clause reaffirms that the context is appropriate for the elliptic statement that
follows it. They associate the following definedness condition with the if -clause:
4.2.6. Definition (Definedness condition on if )
Let c be a context of use. Then Jif α, βKc is only defined if c ⊆ JαK. If
defined, Jif α, βKc = JβK.
But this is too strong, for it entails that (19) presupposes that you want to go to
Harlem. Intuitively, however, someone who utters (15) need not know whether
you want this or not. It does seem to be the case that (14) is not felicitous in
a context where you don’t want to go to Harlem. To back this up, the authors
offer:
(20) #If you don’t want to go to Harlem, you have to take the A train to go
there.
It would be impolite or pointless to advise the addressee to take the A train to
go to Harlem, if one assumed that the addressee doesn’t have the intention to go
there.14 But not assuming that you don’t want to go to Harlem is not the same
as presuming that you do. The speaker may simply not know. We must conclude
13By using then, one can force a hypothetical conditional interpretation: there is a connection
between your thirst and the appearance (as if by magic) of beer in the fridge. This follows from
the semantics of then proposed by Iatridou (1991).
14It seems that (20) also has an ‘ironic’ reading: the only way to not get to Harlem is to take
the A train (then you can be sure not to end up there).
124 Chapter 4. Anankastic conditionals
that the compositional role of the if -clause remains a mystery on von Stechow et
al.’s analysis. The first option seems preferable.
However, even on that analysis, it is unfortunate that the assumed ‘ellipsis’ is
only motivated in that it helps with the compositionality issues associated with
anankastic conditionals. In more standard examples of ellipsis, the selectional
properties of particular elements require us to posit elided structures:
(21) a. John can play five instruments and Mary can play six.
b. John can play the guitar, and Mary can too.
For instance, because six uniformly takes an N, we assume that (21a) is elliptical
for ‘John can play five instruments and Mary can play six instruments’. Similar
remarks apply to (21b). Clearly, the ellipsis in anankastic conditionals is not
required for similar reasons. Of course, von Fintel & Iatridou and von Stechow
et al. do not claim that (10) is elliptical for (15) in the same sense as (21a) is
elliptical for the sentence just given (hence the scare quotes around ‘elliptical’
in ‘the ‘elliptical analysis”), but it remains to be seen in what sense anankastic
conditionals can be said to be elliptical.
Another worry is that it is completely unclear that the sentences in (6) involve
some sort of ellipsis. Intuitively, however, these conditionals make suppositions
about normative information in the same way as anankastic conditionals do. One
would like to give a uniform analysis of all these sentences, but the ‘elliptical’
approach does not provide this. In fact, von Fintel & Iatridou (2005) recommend
a nested modality analysis of (6b). But then, why not employ nested modality
for anankastic conditionals as well?
Von Fintel & Iatridou (2005) suggest that an appeal to ellipsis may not be
necessary to account for anankastic conditionals. As an alternative, it could be
assumed that the restriction of the ordering source to worlds in which you get
to Harlem is contextually given, because it is precisely this goal that is made
salient by the if -clause. This seems to come very close to the proposal I made
in Huitink (2005a,b). I argued that teleological ordering sources pick out salient
goals and that if -clauses are devices to make goals salient. We will reconsider
this in combination with nested modality below in 4.3.3.
To sum up, the ‘elliptical’ analysis solves the compositionality problem asso-
ciated with Sæbø’s analysis. However, the proposed ellipsis is unmotivated and
doesn’t provide a fully satisfactory answer to the question why one would ever
express the anankastic meaning in terms of an if -clause.
4.2.4 Nested modality
As we saw in 4.2.2, Sæbø’s intuition was that the modal in an anankastic condi-
tional should depend on the goals that you have in worlds in which the antecedent
is true. To ensure this, he proposed that the if -clause combines with the ordering
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source argument of the modal, in a non-compositional way. It seems, however,
that there is a compositional alternative: we could assume the presence of an-
other, covert modal in the representation of anankastic conditionals. This modal
should take us to worlds in which you want to go to Harlem, and the overt tele-
ological modal is then to be evaluated in those worlds with respect to your goals
in those worlds.
In her dissertation, Frank (1997) argues for a doubly modalized analysis of all
deontic conditionals. Her best arguments involve deontic counterfactuals like the
following:
(22) If Jesse had robbed the bank, he should have confessed.
This sentence is a counterfactual as well as a deontic conditional. Intuitively,
it says that in the closest worlds in which Jesse robs the bank, he is obliged to
confess. Therefore, on a single modal analysis, we would have to assume that
the modal in (22) is relative to two ordering sources: a totally realistic ordering
source g and a deontic ordering source g′. A totally realistic ordering source g
assigns to a possible world every fact that is true in it, and thus determines a
similarity order on the modal base worlds: worlds are ranked according to how
close they are to the world of evaluation. This is of course the Kratzerian version
of Lewis’ (1973) semantics for counterfactuals. It is standard to assume an empty
initial modal base next to this totally realistic ordering source, so this is what we
will do. Now, the only plausible analysis of (22) has g ranking the modal base
worlds before g′ comes in. Evaluating (22) then proceeds as follows: first select
the <g(w)-closest modal base worlds in which Jesse robs the bank, then select the
<g′(w)-deontically-best worlds from that set, and see whether he confesses there.
The problem that Frank identifies for this analysis is that it fails to account
for the fact that the following sentences can be simultaneously true:
(23) a. If Jesse had robbed the bank, he would not have confessed.
b. If Jesse had robbed the bank, he (still) should have confessed.
If (23a) is true, then Jesse doesn’t confess in the closest antecedent worlds. It fol-
lows that (23b) comes out false: if Jesse doesn’t confess in the closest antecedent
worlds, then neither does he confess in the closest antecedent worlds that are
deontically best. To overcome this problem, Frank proposes that deontic coun-
terfactuals like (23b) are doubly modalized. That is, the counterfactual part of
their meaning is attributed to a covert modal, which is located above the overtly
realized deontic operator. The if -clause restricts the domain of the higher, covert
modal. Schematically, the structure of deontic counterfactuals is now:
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(24)
modal if . . .f
g
should
. . . . . .
f’
g’
Applied to (23b) we now predict the following truth conditions (to facilitate
comprehension, I give the truth conditions in quite informal language):
(25) Sentence (23b) is true in w iff:
for all worlds v in f(w) which Jesse robbed the bank that are maximally
similar to w according to g(w):
for all worlds u that are compatible with the relevant facts in f ′(v) and
that are deontically best by g′(v):
Jesse confesses in u
(where f(w) = ∅).
In order to figure out whether (24b) is true, we thus have to check whether it is
true that Jesse should have confessed in the closest worlds in which he robbed
the bank. This involves checking for each closest bankrobbing world v, whether
Jesse confesses in all of the deontically best worlds u that are assigned to v by⋂
f ′(v).15 The nested modality analysis allows (23a) and (23b) to be true at the
same time. Recall that the problem with the single modal analysis was that the
deontic ordering source had to pick the best worlds among the closest antecedent
worlds. In the nested modality analysis, however, the deontic ordering source
picks the best worlds among the worlds provided by the embedded modal base.
Considerations of comparative similarity play no role in the selection of these
worlds. That is,
⋂
f ′(v) contains both worlds in which Jesse doesn’t confess
as well as (more remote) worlds in which he does. Assuming that the deontic
ordering source picks the latter worlds as best, (24b) is true.
Frank argues that if we have to assume that some deontic conditionals are
doubly modalized, then, by analogy, we have to make that assumption for all
deontic conditionals. For deontic counterfactuals, she proposes that the covert
15After some discussion, Frank concludes that f ′ must either be circumstantial or be identical/
‘anaphoric’ to the updated f (the complex of f and the if -clause). I will assume the first. To
see why, assume that the deontic context for (i) is given by the following moral code: rich people
who rob the bank must confess, poor people who rob the bank must not. Further suppose that
Jesse is rich. Intuitively, (i) is true:
(i) If Jesse had robbed the bank, he should have confessed.
[f(w),g(w) if Jesse robbed the bank] (f
′(v),g′(v) Jesse confesses)
Yet, if f ′(v) = f(w) ∪ {that Jesse robs the bank}, the sentence comes out false (as for counter-
factual modals, f(w) = ∅, but to get (i) true we need the relevant fact that Jesse is rich).
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modal is a counterfactual necessity operator, and for deontic indicatives, she
proposes that the covert modal expresses epistemic necessity:
These observations lead us to the conclusion that there are in fact no
truly deontically modalized if -conditionals. Instead we assume that
conditionals with a deontic modal operator in the consequent clause
are to be analyzed throughout in terms of an implicit epistemically (or
circumstantially) based modal operator. The deontic modal [. . . ] is
then to be analyzed within the scope of the “higher” epistemic modal
operator. (Frank 1997, 50-51)
I do not care much for the argument that a nested modality analysis for deontic
counterfactuals justifies such an analysis for all deontic conditionals, but it might
be that such an analysis is needed for anankastic conditionals.16 Suppose that
we analyze our standard example as follows, where nec represents an implicit
necessity modal that has scope over the explicit teleological modal:
(26) [nec if you want to go to Harlem] [must (you take the A train)]
This sentence has the following truth conditions (we will leave the kind of modality
expressed by nec underspecified for the moment):
(27) (27) is true in w iff:
for all worlds v such that v is among the g(w)-best worlds of the f(w)-
accessible worlds in which you want to go to Harlem:
for all worlds u that are among the g′(v)-teleologically-best worlds of the
f ′(v)-circumstantially-accessible worlds:
you take the A train in u.
So, we first go to worlds v in which you want to go to Harlem, and then we find
worlds u that satisfy your goals in v. As you want to go to Harlem in these
worlds v, the embedded ordering source g′(v) will contain the proposition that
you go to Harlem, and the explicit modal will range over worlds u in which you
achieve your hypothetical goal. The nested modality approach thus accounts for
anankastic if -clauses in a compositional manner. Interestingly, goal-expressing if -
clauses express hypothetical facts in this framework, but because there is an extra
layer of modality, this affects the content of the ordering source of the embedded
anankastic modal. Note that the same procedure works for the sentences in (6),
so this seems a general account of conditionals making normative suppositions.
But what interpretation should we assign to the implicit modal in anankastic
conditionals? According to von Fintel & Iatridou (2005), we shouldn’t assume
16Geurts (2005) argues that deontic conditionals are generally ambiguous between a reading
where the if -clause restricts the explicit modal, and one where the if -clause restricts an implicit
epistemic modals. This seems to me to be closer to the truth.
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that this is an epistemic modal. This would predict rather strong truth conditions,
as anankastic conditionals then do not just say that it holds in the actual world
that you take the A train in all worlds in which you reach your goal of going to
Harlem, but that this holds in all worlds compatible with what we know in which
you want to go to Harlem. Thus, the nested modality analysis predicts that if
the standard sentence is true, its truth follows from what we know. One reason
to deem this problematic, is that the following two aren’t clearly equivalent:
(28) a. If you want to go to Harlem, you have to take the A train.
b. If you want to go to Harlem, you must have to take the A train.
Yet, if (28a) contains a covert epistemic modal, all that is different in (28b) is
that we made this modal explicit. There shouldn’t be a difference in meaning, but
observationally, (28b) seems to present a deduction carried out by the speaker,
while (28a) lacks this deductive flavor.
Another problem that von Fintel & Iatridou mention was raised by Matt
Weiner (p.c to von Fintel), and revolves around the following scenario:
4.2.1 The Matt Weiner scenario
You and I know that Joe has been considering buying a used car in Harlem,
but we don’t know whether he has bought the car yet. If Joe has already
bought the car then he can get to Harlem either in the car or on the A
train; if he does not have the car, then the A train is the only way for him
to get to Harlem. The only reason why Joe would want to go to Harlem
is to buy the car. If Joe wants to go to Harlem, he has not yet bought the
car.
Now consider the following sentence:
(29) If Joe wants to go to Harlem, he must take the A train.
Suppose that Joe has actually bought a car. It seems that (29) is false in this
case. In the nested modality analysis, however, (29) will come out true, as long
as we don’t know that he bought a car. In that case, it does follow from our
knowledge plus the supposition that Joe wants to go to Harlem that he takes the
A train.
To overcome these problems, von Fintel & Iatridou suggest that the higher
modal is a counterfactual modal in the sense of Lewis (1973) rather than an
epistemic modal. That is, the modal quantifies over worlds that are as similar as
possible to the actual world. They suggest that this accounts for the intuition in
the Matt Weiner scenario because it doesn’t matter for similarity measurements
whether a world agrees with the evaluation world in that Joe only wants to go
to Harlem if he doesn’t yet have a car. However, it is not entirely clear that this
is true. Why shouldn’t the ordering source contain a proposition to this effect?
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Besides, it seems that we still face the problem that the putative modal is hard
to make explicit:
(30) If you want to go to Harlem, you would have to take the A train.
If grammatical at all, this doesn’t mean the same as (28a). Assuming that the
covert modal is counterfactual this doesn’t seem to constitute a great improve-
ment.
On second thought, I am not convinced that the Matt Weiner scenario is all
too problematic. That is, I am not sure that (29) is false in the scenario, because
for all we know, it is the case that Joe takes the A train in all worlds in which
he goes to Harlem. It seems that one could say that while I was wrong about the
circumstances, my epistemic claim was true. See Egan et al. (2005), MacFarlane
(2008) for related discussion. The other two problems raised by von Fintel &
Iatridou do not seem devastating to me either. That the analysis predicts rather
strong truth conditions is only problematic if it can be shown that these are too
strong. The Matt Weiner scenario attempts to do this, but it isn’t clear that it
succeeds. I agree that (28a) and (28b) do not mean the same thing, but the nested
modality analysis does not require that the covert modal has the same semantics
as must. It might be an epistemic modal, which lacks the deductive flavor which
is so typical of must. It has been claimed, e.g. by von Fintel & Gillies (2008b),
that must has an evidential component, which is responsible for its deductive
flavor, and it could be that our covert modal does not have such a component.
This is not to say that there are absolutely no qualms about this analysis.
First, the semantics seems overly complicated, as we have to consider a multitude
of ordering sources for the embedded modal: one for each modal base world v.
Second, we simply have to assume that a teleological ordering source applied to a
world v which is a modal base world in which you want to go to Harlem contains
the proposition that you go there. In the present framework, we cannot make this
process explicit. It seems that these imperfections could be solved by moving to
a dynamic framework. The idea would be that if -clauses contribute to parts of
the context, which in turn determines the range of the modal, but I will have to
leave this for future research.
To sum up, the nested modality analysis provides a pretty attractive treatment
of if -clauses that express hypothetical goals. Yet it isn’t clear to me that we really
need nested modality. In the next section, we will consider an alternative.
4.2.5 Doing away with nested modals?
Intuitively, for our standard example ‘If you want to go to Harlem, you must take
the A train’, we want to let the if -clause take us to worlds in which you want to
go to Harlem, and then evaluate the proposition that you must take the A train
relative to the goals in these worlds. We have just seen that this can be done
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by postulating a covert modal. Here we explore whether we can do it directly,
without mediation of a covert modal.
In the present framework, it seems that we can achieve this by reformulating
Kratzer’s doubly relative semantics in such a way that the ordering source doesn’t
deliver the goals that you have in the world of evaluation, but for each modal base
world the goals that you have in that world. Then, assuming that if -clauses add
their complement to the modal base, the ordering source will include hypothetical
goals. Modal operators then quantify over modal base worlds that obey their own
norms as well as possible. Accordingly, the entries for must and can shouldn’t be
as in definition 4.2.3, but as follows:
4.2.7. Definition (Modal entries)
a. JmustK = λfλgλpλw. for all g(v)-best worlds v in
⋂
f(w) : p is true
in v
b. JcanK = λfλgλpλw. for some g(v)-best worlds in
⋂
f(w) : p is true in
v
Thus, a teleological ordering source g now gives for each modal base world v, the
goals in that world v rather than the goals of the world of evaluation. Quantifi-
cation ranges over the best modal base worlds, which are now those worlds v for
which there is no world u ∈
⋂
f(w) such that u <g(v) v.
When it comes to the semantics of if -clauses, we can simply stick to Kratzer’s
original idea, and treat if -clauses as restrictions on the modal base. Take (31)
again:
(31) If you want to go to Harlem, you must take the A train.
The modal base for must will give worlds in which you want to go to Harlem.
A teleological ordering source applied to such a modal base world will obviously
return the proposition that you go to Harlem, as this is one of your goals in this
world. The modal will thus quantify over worlds in which you both want to go
to Harlem, and manage to satisfy that goal.
What about the to-variant of anankastic conditionals?
(32) To get to Harlem, you must take the A train.
Following Bech (1957), the to-clause in this construction restricts the domain of
quantification of the modal. Its function is thus parallel to that of the if -clause.
In order to model this, we can assume that to ϕ is interpreted in the same way
as want ϕ. This relies on interpreting ‘to get to Harlem’ as ‘you want/aim/plan
to get to Harlem’, which seems correct, as to-clauses do have such a flavor.
In a class handout, von Fintel & Iatridou briefly consider this analysis, and
say that it was brought up by Benjamin Spector in class.17 They are quick to
17See http://semantics-online.org/topics04/semtopics04.class4.pdf.
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dismiss the idea, because they think it doesn’t extend to ordinary modals that
do not occur in anankastic constructions. The problem is that, to get many
non-anankastic examples right, we do not only have to come with a story that
excludes certain facts from the modal base, but also with one that forces certain
facts in there. Here is an example by von Fintel & Iatridou (2005):
4.2.2 The driveway scenario
John, who lives in Cambridge, has obstructed his neighbor’s driveway in
w@. Cambridge traffic regulations require that first time offenders pay a
$25 fine.
The next sentence is true:
(33) John has to pay a $25 fine.
Given the semantics in 4.2.7, (33) is true if John pays a $25 fine in those worlds v
that are compatible with the facts of w@ and that conform to the laws of v. But
if the worlds that are compatible with the facts of w@ might have different laws
than w@, (33) might come out false. Thus, to get the predictions right, we have
to make sure that the fact that the law requires a certain penalty is in the modal
base. Can we do this?
It seems that we can if we assume that a circumstantial modal base for w
contains all the facts of w, except those the inclusion of which would lead to
inconsistencies. In other words, we only throw out the facts that have to be
thrown out to make sense of what the speaker says. This seems a reasonable
assumption and it is enough to settle von Fintel & Iatridou’s worries. We simply
stick to what we know about the actual world, and only choose to temporarily
ignore these facts under specific contextual assumptions. So what we are really
doing is looking at worlds that are like the actual world in as far as the laws
that are in force, but that are unlike the actual world in that they are as ideal as
possible: all laws that can be obeyed are obeyed in them.
Von Fintel & Iatridou also discuss the following more complex example. Imag-
ine again that John has obstructed his neighbor’s driveway. However, we do not
know what the penalty for this is:
(34) A: He has to pay a fine.
B: No. He has to pay restitution to his neighbor.
Because of our uncertainty, in some modal base worlds the bylaws say that anyone
who obstructs a driveway pays a fine, but in other worlds, the bylaws say that
anyone who obstructs a driveway pays restitution to the owner of that driveway.
Von Fintel & Iatridou object that to determine whether A or B is right we care
only about what the bylaws in the actual world say, and the revised semantics
doesn’t deliver this. I do not agree. Sure, as long as we don’t know what the
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bylaws say, we will not be able to tell which statement is true on my analysis.
But I think that this is exactly right. Once we find out what the facts about the
bylaws are, however, one of the statements will be true, and the other will be
false. In that case, the modal base will, for instance, deliver only worlds in which
they say that driveway obstructors pay fines. If so, what A says will come out
true, and what B says will come out false.
To sum up, it seems that we are not forced to assume a nested modality
analysis for anankastic conditionals. But of course, the nested modality analysis
is far more conventional than the alternative analysis in 4.2.7. It is at this point
not clear enough that this doesn’t have unwanted consequences. Therefore, in
what follows, I will stick to the nested modality account.
A general strategy to avoid nested modals?
On ‘Spector’s analysis’, we seem to get at least some of the cases for which nested
modality is recruited in the literature for free. However, somewhat disappoint-
ingly, the theory cannot be viewed as a general strategy to avoid nesting. To see
this, consider an interesting problem revived by Zvolenszky (2002, 2006). The
problem is that under Kratzer’s standard analysis of modalized conditionals (as
presented in 4.2.1), sentences like the following come out vacuously true:18
(35) a. If teenagers drink, then they must drink.
b. If the Dalai Lama is mad, then he should be mad.
On Kratzer’s analysis, if -clauses restrict the modal base, and then, no matter
what is in the ordering source, (35a) and (35b) come out true, as here the con-
sequent is identical to the antecedent (obviously, in worlds in which teenagers
drink, it holds that teenagers drink). Yet intuitively, (35a) is false, and (35b)
is true, though not vacuously. Zvolenszky considers a nested modality analysis
for these sentences, and argues against it, but Geurts (2005) argues that she dis-
misses this analysis too quick. Her argument rests on the idea that if we assume
a nested modal analysis for some deontic conditionals, we must do so for all of
them. But of course this is not true; we might assume this for just a subset of
deontic conditionals. In the end, Geurts argues for a wide-spread ambiguity in
the semantics of deontic conditionals: there is always the possibility of postulat-
ing a covert modal, though for some sentences, this may not correspond to the
preferred reading. According to a nested modality analysis, (35a) says that:
(36) for all worlds v in f(w) which teenagers drink that are best according to
g(w):
for all worlds u that are compatible with the relevant facts in f ′(v) and
that are deontically best by g′(v):
18That ‘it ought to be that ϕ given ψ is vacuously true in case ϕ entails ψ is in fact a
long-standing problem in deontic logic, see for instance Jackson (1985).
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teenagers drink in u
(where g(w) = ∅).
Because f(′v) need not be identical to f(w), (35a) is not vacuously true.
Clearly, though, ‘Spector’s analysis’ does not account for ‘Zvolenszky’s prob-
lem’. For in that analysis the antecedent first takes us to worlds in which teenagers
drink, and then no matter on which ordering source the modal depends, (35a)
comes out true.
In the literature, nested modality is recruited to deal with two kinds of con-
ditionals: (i) conditionals that make a supposition about the content of the law,
and (ii) conditionals in which we conclude that a certain law must be in force on
the basis of a fact. Zvolenszky’s sentences belong to the second category; (35a)
is false because we know that teenagers often do not behave the way they are
supposed to behave, and therefore, we do not conclude from the fact that they
actually drink that there is an obligation for them to drink, while (35b) is true,
because the Dalai Lama has such a gentle character that he wouldn’t become
mad unless he had good reason for it. The analysis in 4.2.7 accounts for the first
kind of conditional, but not for the second.
Summing up, in this section, we have seen that:
• Kratzer’s analysis of modalized conditionals can only deal with hypothetical
facts
• Sæbø’s analysis of hypothetical goals is non-compositional
• the elliptical approach is compositional, but poorly motivated, and leaves
the contribution of the if -clause somewhat mysterious
• of the existing accounts, Frank’s nested modality analysis works best
• nested modalities can perhaps be done away with by modifying the set-up
of Kratzer’s doubly relative semantics
4.3 Demoting other goals
Now that we know how to allow if -clauses to contribute a hypothetical goal to the
semantics of the modal, we can start to think about ways to give precedence to the
hypothetical goal over your other goals. In the literature, we find proposals that
change the semantics ofmust in such a way that only the hypothetical goal counts.
In 4.3.1, we will look at von Fintel & Iatridou’s (2005) ‘designated goal’ approach,
in which the hypothetical goal fills a special designated goal argument of the
modal. Semantically, this goal overrides any other conflicting goals. Combined
with the assumption that must means that there is only one way to achieve the
goal, other non-conflicting goals do no longer interfere either. In 4.3.2, we will
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discuss an alternative analysis due to von Stechow et al. (2006). These authors
combine something similar to the designated goal idea with a similarity ranking
to demote other goals. I will argue that neither of these proposals is satisfactory.
Then, in 4.3.3, I will present my own solution.
4.3.1 The designated goal approach
We have said that an analysis of anankastic conditionals should somehow give
precedence to the goal set in the to- or if -clause, so that this goal both demotes
other conflicting goals, and other goals that happen to interfere with it. We
will first focus on how to get the antecedent goal to override conflicting goals
(the Hoboken problem). To achieve this, von Fintel & Iatridou propose that the
modal in an anankastic conditional takes an additional argument, which they call
the ‘designated goal’. Recall from section 4.2.3 that von Fintel & Iatridou take
the to-clause variant to be the primitive anankastic construction.
(37) To get to Harlem, you must take the A train.
They assume that the to-clause fills the new argument slot. That is, in (37)
the designated goal is that you get to Harlem. Semantically, the designated goal
restricts the domain of the modal after the modal base has done its job, but before
the ordering source comes in to rank the accessible worlds. Because of this, it
overrides any other conflicting goals that you might have.
It seems that on this analysis, the structure for (37) looks something like this
(von Fintel & Iatridou are not explicit on this point):19
(38)
must
you take the A train
f
to go to Harlem
g
Accordingly, the meaning of the modal must be as follows, where d is a metavari-
able over designated goals of type 〈st〉. (This is just a first version, because to
deal with the Ruud van Nistelrooy problem, we must make some more changes):
4.3.1. Definition (new entry for must ; first version)
JmustK = λfλdλgλpλw. for all of the g(w)-best worlds in f(w) where d is
achieved: p is true
19I think this comes closest to how they present their analysis. However, as we will see in
4.3.2, it is possible to give a semantics for anankastic conditionals which makes exactly the same
predictions, but that doesn’t assume an extra argument slot for the modal: assume that the
to-clause restricts the modal base (von Stechow et al. 2006).
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It is now clear how this analysis solves the Hoboken problem. The relevant
scenario is repeated below:
4.3.1 The Hoboken scenario
In the actual world, w@ you want to go to Hoboken, but I don’t know that.
To go to Hoboken, one has to take the PATH train, while to go to Harlem,
one has to take the A train.
Sentence (37) is true in this scenario. On von Fintel & Iatridou’s analysis this
is predicted, because the ordering source only comes in after the modal base
worlds have been restricted by the designated goal, such that the only worlds
that get ordered are worlds in which your goal of going to Harlem is reached.
Therefore, even if the ordering source would contain another one of your goals that
is inconsistent with the designated goal, like going to Hoboken, this will not have
the effect that you do not go to Harlem in some of the best worlds. But note that
in this analysis, though the to-clause is called a goal, it functions much more like a
fact. It seems that one might just as well assume that it modifies the modal base
parameter of the modal. This would not alter the theory’s predictions in any way.
Also note that this theory is intimately tied up with the ‘elliptical’ approach, as
in the if -clause variant, the if -clause could not fill the designated goal argument,
for then want would have to be skipped. However, as we will see below in 4.3.3,
if this theory were combined with nested modality, we might abandon ‘ellipsis’ in
favor of the idea that the designated goal argument is contextually filled in (see
below).
Ruud van Nistelrooy and Sloman’s insight
Of course, this isn’t yet enough to deal with the Ruud van Nistelrooy problem.
It might still be the case that the ordering source contains goals that are not in
conflict with the designated goal, such that the modal ends up quantifying over
the best worlds in which you go to Harlem, leading to the wrong prediction in
the Ruud van Nistelrooy scenario. That is, as the analysis stands, (37) comes out
true, but intuitively it is false.
4.3.2 The Ruud van Nistelrooy scenario
You are a huge fan of the Dutch soccer star Ruud van Nistelrooy, and you
would like nothing more than to meet him. It so happens to be that Ruud is
on the A train. However, the A train is not the only way to get to Harlem.
You can also take the B train there.
According to von Fintel & Iatridou, the Ruud van Nistelrooy problem points out
that we have been mistaken about the meaning of must. In other words, the
entry in 4.3.1 is wrong. What we have missed is what von Fintel & Iatridou call
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‘Sloman’s insight’. This pertains to the intuitive difference in strength between
must and have to on the one hand and ought and should on the other. Indeed,
the following seems to be a coherent thing to say:
(39) You ought to take the A train, but you don’t have to.
In implementing this difference in strength, von Fintel & Iatridou take over a
proposal they trace back to Sloman (1970). In short, while must picks out the
only candidate, ought says what is best, or better than all alternatives. They cite
the following passage, which is tailor-made for anankastic conditionals:
For instance If you want to get to London by noon, then you ought to
go by train picks out the best means without excluding the possibility
of others, whereas If you want to get to London by noon then you
have to (must, will be obliged to etc.) go by train implies that no
other means exist. (Sloman 1970, 391)
Following this idea, it seems that the entries for ought and must should be:
4.3.2. Definition (Entries for ought and must)
a. JoughtK = λfλdλgλpλw. all the g(w)-best worlds in f(w) where d is
achieved verify p
b. JmustK = λfλdλpλw. for all of the worlds in f(w) where d is achieved:
p is true
That is, in contrast to what we have previously assumed, anankastic must does
not take an ordering source as its argument.20 This captures Sloman’s insight
that saying must rather than ought in anankastic constructions just means that
there is only one way to reach your goal.
To illustrate how this solves the Ruud van Nistelrooy problem, recall that in
this scenario, there are two trains going to Harlem, the A and the B train and
your idol, Ruud van Nistelrooy, happens to be on the A train. Intuitively, the
following sentence is false:
(40) To go to Harlem, you must take the A train.
And this is what comes out on von Fintel & Iatridou’s analysis: you do not take
the A train in all worlds in which you go to Harlem. Note that your additional
goal of Ruud van Nistelrooy plays no role in the semantics of (40).
The next sentence, however, seems to be true:
(41) To go to Harlem, you ought to take the A train.
20Of course, in Kratzer’s doubly relative semantics, it is assumed that each modal takes an
ordering source, but it is easy to plug von Fintel & Iatridou’s idea into a uniform analysis of
modality: assume that anankastic must takes a trivial ordering source; i.e. g(w) = ∅.
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This too is predicted on the designated goal analysis: in all the worlds that are
compatible with the circumstances in which you reach your designated goal of
going to Harlem and which count as best given your actual wishes, you take the
A train.
Contextual designation
As pointed out by von Fintel & Iatridou, though the designated goal argument is
explicit in purpose-clause variants of anankastic conditionals, teleological modals
do not require an explicit designated goal argument. An example they give to
back this up, is:
(42) A: I’m going to Harvard Square tomorrow.
B: You have to/ought to have some hot chocolate at Burdick’s.21
As B’s utterance presumes that getting some hot chocolate is something that A
wants, it seems that the context of utterance may supply the designated goal
argument of the modal, just as it may supply values for the modal base and
ordering source pronouns in the Kratzerian analysis. In the have to-variant of
B’s utterance, it is said that there is only one way to achieve the designated goal
(whatever it is), while the ought to-variant implies that there are other means,
but that having hot chocolate at Burdick’s is the optimal way. Formally, this
could be implemented in analogy to the modal base and ordering source: in the
absence of an explicit to-phrase, the argument slot is filled by a silent pronoun
variable which receives its value from the assignment function.
Another question is whether the designated goal argument can be modified.
This seems possible. That is, the interpretation of anankastic conditionals is a
context-sensitive matter. Consider the standard Harlem-sentence in the Ruud
van Nistelrooy scenario:
(43) To go to Harlem, you have to take the A train.
If (43) expresses a necessary condition of some sort, (43) should come out false
in the given scenario: you do not take the A train in all possible worlds in which
you go to Harlem, but in some of these worlds, you take the B train, which also
goes there. However, some speakers can read (43) as a true sentence. Von Fintel
& Iatridou suspect that such speakers make your actual goal of meeting Ruud
van Nistelrooy a part of the designated goal. Support comes from differences
in speaker judgments reported by von Stechow et al. (2006). They discuss the
following scenario (which they attribute to Wolfgang Klein):
21Though the Harlem-sentence is false in the real world, you really should get some hot
Chocolate at Burdick’s if you’re at Havard Square.
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4.3.3 The Vladivostok scenario
In w@ there are two trains to Vladivostok: the Russian train, and the
Chinese train. The Chinese train is much more comfortable.
Now consider the following sentence:
(44) To go to Vladivostok, you have to take the Chinese train.
As von Stechow et al. report, Wolfgang Klein judges this sentence true, but Orin
Percus thinks it is false. He would have to use a weaker modal to obtain a true
statement:
(45) To go to Vladivostok, you ought to take the Chinese train.
It seems that Wolfgang Klein-type speakers can do something that Orin Percus-
type speakers can’t: they can take the additional goal of traveling comfortably
into consideration (which in von Fintel & Iatridou’s analysis comes down to mod-
ifying the designated goal). Orin Percus-type speakers can only allow this goal
into the designated goal if it is made explicit:
(46) To go to Vladivostok comfortably you have to take the Chinese train.
As von Stechow et al. (2006, 15) write: “It is an empirical question whether (44)
means the same as (46) in the given scenario”.
Strictly speaking, though, it is not clear whether Wolfgang Klein-type speakers
support the designated goal analysis. According to von Fintel & Iatridou, such
speakers assign the goal of travelling comfortably designated goal status, but it
could also be that Wolfgang Klein-type speakers do not acknowledge that the
semantics of must differs from the semantics of ought in the way that von Fintel
& Iatridou propose. That is, they could be understanding must in the same way
as ought. If so, then for these speakers must need not pick out the only candidate.
Summing up, von Fintel & Iatridou solve the Hoboken problem by assuming
that anankastic modals have an argument slot for what they call the designated
goal. This is the most prominent hypothetical goal, and therefore it overrides any
conflicting goals you might actually have. The Ruud van Nistelrooy problem, on
the other hand, is solved by assuming that must says that there is only one way to
achieve the antecedent goal. This is formally implemented by assuming that must
is sensitive to the hypothetical goal only. Yet there are some problems left. Most
importantly the analysis is stipulative: both the covert or ‘elliptical’ to-clause
and the argument slot for a designated goal lack independent motivation.
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4.3.2 An analysis in terms of counterfactuals
An alternative analysis is proposed by von Stechow et al. (2006). They follow
von Fintel & Iatridou (2005) in assuming that the purpose-clause variant is prim-
itive, and that if -clause variants of anankastic conditionals contain a covert to-
clause.
(47) a. To go to Harlem, you must take the A train.
b. If you want to go to Harlem, you must take the A train (to do that)
But von Stechow et al. assign a different semantics to the construction in (47a).
The two main ideas are that (i) the to-clause expresses a hypothetical fact and
hence restricts the modal base of must, and (ii) the ordering source of must does
not compare worlds in terms of the goals that are reached, but it ranks worlds in
terms of similarity to the actual world. In other words, (47a) is analyzed as a kind
of counterfactual, in the sense of Lewis (1973). As we are working in Kratzer’s
doubly relative semantics, we will use her formulation of Lewis’ semantics. In this
framework, (48) is analyzed as a modal statement, with an empty initial modal
base, and a totally realistic ordering source. Such an ordering source contains
all propositions that hold in the world of evaluation, and hence determines a
similarity ordering. As before, the if -clause restricts the modal base, such that
(48) says that in all possible worlds in which kangaroos have no tails and that
are closest to the actual world, they topple over.
(48) If kanagaroos had no tails, they would topple over.
Now, if we apply this to anankastic conditionals like (47a), the following truth
conditions are predicted:
(49) (47a) is true in w iff you take the A train in all of the worlds most similar
to w in which you go to Harlem.
This solves the Hoboken problem as follows. The goal of going to Harlem is added
to the modal base. Therefore, all worlds that are ranked by the ordering source
will be worlds in which you go there. Since going to Harlem and going to Hoboken
aren’t compatible, there won’t be any worlds in which you go to Hoboken in the
domain of quantification. Note that by adding the to-clause to the modal base,
which is initially empty, we get exactly the same prediction as by assuming that
there is a slot for a designated goal and that this is filled by the to-clause. In
this respect, then, the analysis is equivalent to the one by von Fintel & Iatridou
(2005), except that no additional argument is posited for the modal.
One may wonder why we need a similarity order instead of a teleological one,
as this move isn’t necessary to solve the Hoboken problem. The reason is that
if must were analyzed with respect to an ordering source containing your goals,
we would make the wrong predictions in the Ruud van Nistelrooy scenario. To
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be explained is that (50) has a false reading in case there are two trains going to
Harlem, the A train and the B train, while your idol, whom you are desperate to
meet, is on the A train.
(50) To go to Harlem, you must take the A train.
Quantification now ranges over worlds in which you go to Harlem that are most
similar to the evaluation world. If this ordering doesn’t chose between worlds in
which you take the A train and worlds in which you take the B train; you do not
take the A train in all worlds in the domain and (50) comes out false. Note that
the following comes out true:
(51) To go to Harlem and meet Ruud van Nistelrooy, you must take the A
train.
Now the modal base is restricted by two propositions: that you go to Harlem and
that you meet Ruud van Nistelrooy. For some speakers, the second goal need
not be made explicit, i.e. they can also read (50) as true in the scenario. In
the designated goal analysis of von Fintel & Iatridou, these speakers contextually
modify the designated goal argument of the modal. In the analysis of von Stechow
et al. however, it seems that these they impose further restrictions on the modal
base.
However, it is a major problem for this theory that it has to require that it
doesn’t matter for similarity measurements that Ruud is on the A train, and that
you would normally take any chance to meet him. It is not clear at all that this is
how similarity measurements work. This predicts that even if it were true, that
if you were going to Harlem, you would take the A train (because you want to
maximize your chances of meeting Ruud), that would not make ‘To go to Harlem,
you must take the A train’ true.22 It seems, then, that anankastic conditionals are
not counterfactuals. To back this up further, I will discuss two more problems:
(i) anankastic conditionals cannot be expressed as would -conditionals and (ii) if
anankastic conditionals are counterfactuals, it follows that they can hardly ever
be true.
Anankastic conditionals vs. would-conditionals
Another apparent problem for the counterfactual analysis is that anankastic con-
ditionals are not necessarily expressible as classic would -conditionals. That is,
the following do not seem to be equivalent:
(52) a. If kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over.
b. For kangaroos to have no tails, they have to topple over.
22Thanks to Kai von Fintel (p.c.) for stressing this point.
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However, von Stechow et al. argue that this isn’t a reason to reject their seman-
tics. The Lewis-style semantics is, according to many researchers though sur-
prisingly not Lewis himself, also suitable for indicative conditionals. Of course,
indicatives and would -conditionals differ in meaning, but Stalnaker (1968) has ar-
gued that this difference arises out of a difference in appropriateness conditions:
the antecedent of an indicative conditional must be compatible with the common
ground. Perhaps the difference between (52a) and (52b) can also be explained in
terms of appropriateness conditions?
In defense of their analysis, von Stechow et al. argue that anankastic condi-
tionals exhibit the logical properties that are standardly associated with coun-
terfactuals. Crucially, counterfactuals are non-monotonic. This means that they
fail inference patterns like Antecedent Strengthening, Transitivity, and Contra-
position. Von Stechow et al. give the following examples to show that anankastic
conditionals fail the same laws. Suppose that it takes three and a half hours to
get to Harlem. Then the following argument is invalid:
(53) Failure of Antecedent Strengthening
To be in Harlem before noon you have to leave at 8 am.
∴ To be in Harlem at 9 am you have to leave at 8 am.
Transitivity also seems to fail. Von Stechow et al. use an example inspired by
Lewis:
(54) Failure of Transitivity
For Otto to come to the party, Anna has to come.
For Anna to come to the party, Waldo has to come.
∴ For Otto to come to the party, Waldo has to come.
Finally, contraposition doesn’t seem to hold either:
(55) Failure of Contraposition
For Boris to come to the party, Olga has to come.
∴ For Olga not to come to the party, Boris must not come.
We can conclude that the meaning that von Stechow et al. propose for anankastic
conditionals is not implausible, as it seems to capture the logical properties of
the construction. However, equating anankastic conditionals with counterfactuals
is not the only way to do so. Non-monotonicity might be achieved within a
strict conditional semantics where the context decides which worlds are accessible;
cf. von Fintel (2001), Gillies (2007). Perhaps an argument in favor of this is
that some people can read (54) as valid. However, a semantics that justifies
Transitivity will also justify Antecedent Strengthening (Lewis 1973), so perhaps
we should go for a semantics that validates these patterns, while attributing
apparent counterexamples to changes in the context.
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Still, anankastic conditionals cannot be paraphrased as would -conditionals.
Von Stechow et al. suggest that this could be due to a difference in temporal
orientation:
If the antecedent and the consequent of a would -conditional are both
about the present, the antecedent will typically be true before the con-
sequent. For an AC [anankastic conditional], the typical temporal re-
lation is exactly the other way round. The internal antecedent, i.e. the
to-clause, will be true after the consequent. This fact suffices to guar-
antee the difference in meaning in many cases. (von Stechow et al.
2006, 13)
On the other hand, many anankastic conditionals seem to express some sort of
law, which makes them ‘timeless’ (not about any particular time t). Consider:
(56) If the water is to boil, its temperature must be 100◦ Celcius.
To deal with such sentences, von Stechow et al. suggest that the relation between
antecedent and consequent needs to be further strengthened. As a first guess,
one might propose that the consequent needs to be a means for achieving the
antecedent. However, even if we knew how to formulate what it means to be a
means for achieving some goal in possible worlds semantics (in section 4.4, we
will see just how hard this is), it isn’t too clear that this is what we want, as the
next German examples show:
(57) a. Um einen Fu¨hrerschein zu haben, musst du 18 Jahre alt sein.
‘To have a driving license, you must be 18 years old.’
b. Um Bundeskanzler zu sein, musst du Deutscher sein.
‘To be the chancellor, you must be German’
In both these sentences, the consequent proposition is simply a precondition for
the truth of the antecedent. In (57a), being 18 years old is not said to be a means
of achieving the possession of a driver’s license. Similar considerations apply,
mutatis mutandis, to (57b). In the end, von Stechow et al. leave it as an open
question how the semantics should be appropriately restricted.
Excursus on backtracking counterfactuals
A potential problem with the thesis that anankastic conditionals are counter-
factuals in which the truth of the antecedent typically follows the truth of the
consequent in time, is that anankastics then fail Lewis’s (1979) general principle
that the way things are later depends counterfactually on the way things are ear-
lier, but not the other way around. For example, it seems plausible to say that
if my parents had never met, that I would not have been born, but it is quite
absurd to ask whether my parents wouldn’t have met, had I not been born. In
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short, Lewis claims that one hardly finds clearly true counterfactuals that make
a hypothesis concerning some time t, and then claim that it follows from that
hypothesis that some time earlier than t would have been different. Obviously, if
anankastic conditionals are like would -conditionals, they seem to contradict this
claim.
There are, however, other ‘backtracking’ counterfactuals that seem incom-
patible with Lewis’ general principle that the past counts for more in similarity
rankings. Here is an example by Arregui (2005, ch:3):
(58) She is a very strict vegetarian. If she had eaten pudding, she would have
broken her diet.
a. No, if she had eaten pudding, it would have been made without
gelatin.
b. No, if she had eaten pudding, it [would [havemod to [haveperf been
made without gelatin]]].
While (58a) seems odd or even false, (58b) seems easier to judge true. Apparently,
this is due to the ‘special syntax’ that is used, i.e. would have to have rather than
plain would. But if Lewis is right about time’s arrow, how can (58b) be true?
Arregui argues that the presence of have to invokes a law (in (58b) that she does
not eat animal products), and that the entire sentence must thus be processed as
a doubly modalized structure. We won’t go over the details here, but she proposes
that (58b) says that in the closest worlds in which she ate the pudding, there is
a law which requires the pudding to have been made without gelatin. Crucially,
there is no need to change the past in this interpretation, and the counterfactual
only appeared to violate Lewis’ principle.
But anankastic conditionals cannot be given a similar analysis. Take (56)
again:
(59) If the water is to boil, its temperature has to be 100◦ Celcius.
If Arregui’s analysis were extended to (59), i.e. if the modal conveyed something
similar as the complex would have to have, then (59) would say that in the most
similar worlds in which the water boils, there is a law according to which water
boils at 100◦ Celcius. But intuitively, this law isn’t in force because there is
water boiling. In sum, the problem with equating anankastic conditionals with
counterfactuals, is that it is not clear how they can ever be true.
Perhaps there is a way around this conclusion, because in anankastic condi-
tionals both the antecedent and the consequent are typically in the future (von
Stechow p.c.). It isn’t relevant for Lewis’ claim whether the if -clause makes a
hypothesis about the future, but it seems that it may make a difference if the
consequent is futurate as well. After all, the future isn’t settled yet, so we are not
really accommodating changes at a time prior to the if -clause when interpreting
anankastic conditionals. But if this is on the right track, would -conditionals like
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(60) should have no problem being true (given that we are still talking about a
very strict vegetarian):
(60) a. If she had eaten pudding two days from now, it would have been
made without gelatin tomorrow.
b. If I became a professor one day, I would have found a postdoc position
in the next couple of months.
Neither strikes me as a meaningful thing to say. We conclude that explaining
the difference between anankastics and counterfactuals in terms of a different
temporal orientation raises more problems than it solves. This comes down to
the claim that anankastic conditionals are backtracking counterfactuals. But
backtracking counterfactuals aren’t meaningful.
Summing up, von Stechow et al. solve the Hoboken problem by assuming that
the to-clause restricts the modal base of the anankastic modal. The Ruud van
Nistelrooy problem is solved by assuming that the ordering source of the modal
ranks worlds in terms of similarity to the actual world rather than in terms of
how many of your goals are reached. The if -clause variant is treated in terms
of the to-clause variant, which ensures that the semantics is compositional. The
problems associated with this analysis are:
• the theory has to make assumptions about the similarity ordering that seem
unreasonable
• anankastic conditonals cannot be expressed as would -conditionals
• the temporal relation between antecedent and consequent in an anankastic
conditional is such that, on a counterfactual semantics, they cannot be true
4.3.3 Solutions given nested modality
We have now seen two solutions for the Hoboken and the Ruud van Nistelrooy
problem. Of these, it seems that we can discard the counterfactual analysis,
as it seems plain that the modal in anankastic conditionals just does not have
counterfactual flavor. The designated goal analysis works better, yet this analysis
presumes that anankastic conditionals are ‘elliptical’, a proposal that we have
abandoned in favor of nested modality. The question now is: how can we solve
the problems with interfering goals on that particular analysis? Recall that the
truth conditions we predict for the standard Harlem-sentence are as follows:
(61) ‘If you want to go to Harlem, you nec must take the A train’ is true in
w iff
for all v such that v is among the g(w)-best worlds of the f(w)-accessible
worlds in which you want to go to Harlem:
for all worlds u that are among the g′(v)-teleologically-best worlds of the
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f ′(v)-circumstantially-accessible worlds:
you take the A train in u
This ensures that must is sensitive to your Harlem-goal (as g′ is applied to worlds
v in which you want to go to Harlem), but it doesn’t yet require that this is the
only goal the modal is sensitive to (it isn’t excluded that you also want to go to
Hoboken/meet Ruud van Nistelrooy in these worlds).
One option is to follow von Fintel & Iatridou’s lead. That is, it is simply a
part of the semantics of must that it cares about one goal only. We call this
goal the designated goal. Plugging in von Fintel & Iatridou’s semantics for must
results in:
(62) ‘If you want to go to Harlem, you nec must take the A train’ is true in
w iff
v such that v is among the g(w)-best worlds of the f(w)-accessible worlds
in which you want to go to Harlem:
for all worlds u that are among the f ′(v)-circumstantially-accessible
worlds in which you satisfy the designated goal:
you take the A train in u.
What ensures that the designated goal is in fact the Harlem-goal? One could
propose, as von Fintel & Iatridou do, that there is some covert to-clause present
in our sentence which fills the designated goal argument slot. But this isn’t
necessary. One could also assume that the designated goal argument is filled by
some salient goal. After all, we saw above that the designated goal argument need
not be made explicit, but may be contextually given. It seems that the if -clause
makes precisely this goal salient.23
In a way, this solution revolves around the idea that must is not really a
teleological modal. Of course, it takes a ‘designated goal’ as its argument, but
this argument is a goal only by name. Semantically, it does not differ from facts.
In principle, the nested modality analysis allows for an alternative solution. If
the outer modal nec is such that it takes us to worlds in which going to Harlem
is the one thing you want (or what you want best), the problems are also avoided.
Something along these lines was suggested by Nissenbaum (2005, fn.12, and p.c.):
Let’s accept that every proposition p in an ordering source g(w) has
a corresponding proposition in a circumstantial modal base ordered
by g(w): e.g. that “the laws of w demand that p” [. . . ] (Such de-
scriptions of the propositions in the ordering source surely count as
‘relevant facts about w’.) Let’s assume further that an if -clause like
23Combining nested modality and the designated goal approach is also considered by von
Fintel & Iatridou in a talk given in Tuebingen.
See http://mit.edu/fintel/www/harlem-tuebingen.pdf.
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“if you want p” can add to the modal base the hypothetical proposi-
tion that ‘what you want in w is that p’. Since the propositions in a
circumstantial modal base must be consistent, adding such a propo-
sition entails that the modal base doesn’t contain descriptions of any
other desires of yours in w. This in turn entails that the ordering
source (if it picks out what you desire in w) contains only p. [. . . ] I
think this option is attractive.
Nissenbaum’s idea is that ‘you want to go to Harlem’ is interpreted as ‘The one
thing you want is to go to Harlem’, which is stronger. If the if -clause is interpreted
in this way, it cannot add its complement proposition to a modal base in which you
want something else than going to Harlem, as this would result in inconsistency.
In general, when interpreting a conditional, we add the antecedent to our stock of
beliefs. If this should lead to inconsistency, we temporarily pretend that certain
things that we know are true are in fact false, just so we can assess the truth
of the conditional (recall the Ramsey rule discussed in chapter 2.) Addition of
the one thing you want is to go to Harlem thus demotes other goals like going to
Hoboken and meeting Ruud,
Combined with the nested modality analysis, we now predict the following
truth conditions for the standard Harlem-sentence:
(63) ‘If you want to go to Harlem, you nec must take the A train’ is true in
w iff
v such that v is among the g(w)-best worlds of the f(w)-accessible worlds
in which the one thing you want is to go to Harlem:
for all worlds u that are among the g′(v)-teleologically-best worlds of the
f ′(v)-circumstantially-accessible worlds:
you take the A train in u.
Because a world v in which the one thing you want is to go to Harlem is such
that you cannot have any other goals, a teleological ordering source g applied to
such a world only contains the proposition that you go to Harlem. It should be
clear that this predicts that the Harlem-sentence is true in the Hoboken scenario,
and false in the Ruud van Nistelrooy scenario.
But why would the if -clause ever be interpreted in such a strong way? In
the Hoboken scenario it might be argued that the stronger interpretation results
from recognizing that you cannot go to Hoboken and Harlem at the same time.
You must prioritize. However, though the analysis works for the Ruud van Nis-
telrooy scenario as well, there the stronger interpretation cannot be due to the
fact that you cannot really want two conflicting things. The ‘strong if -clause
analysis’ is thus stipulative. This is unfortunate, even though the analysis is not
more stipulative than the designated goal analysis. Of course, some speakers (i.e.
Wolfgang Klein-type speakers) can read the Harlem-sentence as true in the Ruud
van Nistelrooy scenario. It could be that these speakers for some reason resist
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the strong interpretation for the if -clause, but at this moment I don’t see what
would cause this reluctance.
To sum up, in the literature about anankastic conditionals there is consensus
about the following: the if -clause in the Harlem sentence makes the modal sen-
sitive to your hypothetical goal, and intuitively this is the only goal that counts.
Opinions differ, however, as to how this should be implemented. Is it becausemust
says that the designated goal is the only important goal (von Fintel & Iatridou
2005), or is must neutral in this respect but comes to have this meaning in case we
interpret the if -clause in a strong way? I will have to leave it to future research
to see which analysis is best.
4.4 Existential anankastics
Kissing Pedro Martinez
Nissenbaum (2005) has pointed out a nasty problem for all of the analyses above:
they make the wrong predictions for so-called existential versions of anankastic
conditionals, in which must is replaced by can. The following sentence intuitively
states that taking the A train is a means of going to Harlem:24
(64) To go to Harlem, you can take the A train.
Presumably, can and must are duals in anankastic constructions, such that the
domain of can is the same as it is for must in the standard example, but now we
existentially quantify over it. The sentence thus says that there is at least one
world in which you go to Harlem (in some domain, restricted according to your
favorite analysis of anankastics) and in which you take the A train. To show that
this causes problems, Nissenbaum comes up with a scenario which is very similar
to my Ruud van Nistelrooy scenario:
4.4.1 The Pedro Martinez scenario
In w@ you would like to kiss Pedro Martinez (the former Red Sox pitching
ace), and he happens to ride on the A train, which goes to Harlem.
While (63) seems true in this scenario, (65) is deviant, or perhaps even false:
(65) #To go to Harlem, you can kiss Pedro Martinez.
This sentence seems to state something rather nonsensical: that kissing Pedro
Martinez is a means of going to Harlem. But all of the proposals considered thus
far predict that this sentence is true. All analyses, no matter how they arrive at
the truth conditions, say that (65) is true if in one of the best worlds in which you
24To keep the discussion simple, we will confine attention to the to-clause variant.
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go to Harlem you kiss Pedro Martinez, and it seems that you do. To summarize,
the Pedro Martinez problem is this:
• Why is (65) infelicitous, while (64) is perfectly fine?
Proposed solutions
Intuitively, (64) is fine, because taking the A train is a means of going to Harlem,
and (65) is odd because kissing Pedro Martinez is not. It thus seems that we have
to pose an additional requirement in the semantics of anankastic conditionals: the
consequent must be a means to realize the goal set in the antecedent.25 Several
ways of formulating this have been proposed. First, Nissenbaum himself proposes
that the to-clause in anankastic conditionals is not an argument of the modal,
but modifies the VP instead. It is a given that we have to-clauses that appear
with ordinary, non-modal VPs, and it seems that in such an environment they
still pick out the goals of the subject:
(66) Varitek took the A train to go to Harlem.
Here we have a to-clause that combines with a VP that is not in the scope of
a modal. Nevertheless, we detect a teleological flavor. If (66) is true, Varitek
must have had the goal of going to Harlem, and he must have believed that
the A train was sufficient for getting there. Nissenbaum concludes that such to-
clauses themselves already carry modal meaning, describing the wishes/intentions
of agents. Informally, he proposes that (66) says that Varitek is the agent of an
A-train-taking event e whose goal it is that he goes there.26
It follows that the teleological flavor in the meaning of an anankastic con-
ditional need not be due to the modal auxiliary, but might be supplied by the
to-clause. I won’t go over the technicalities of the proposal, but I will give an
informal rendition. Our standard example is now to be treated as a modal with
a teleological VP in its complement:
(67) must [you take the A train to go to Harlem]
This is true iff in all of the best modal base worlds you are the agent of an A-train-
taking event e whose goal it is that you go to Harlem. As Nissenbaum notes, to
get the predictions right, we still have to build in some ban on conflicting goals
interfering, but we can simply combine this theory with any of the above.
25As we saw in 4.3.2, von Stechow et al. (2006) do not think that it is part of the semantics
of universal anankastics that the consequent is a means of achieving the antecedent goal. So
perhaps we should restrict our claim to the statement that this is needed for the existential
version only; see below.
26Thus, the goal described by the to-clause is relative to an event, parallel to the way that
accessible worlds are defined relative to a world evaluation.
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We can now see how Nissenbaum solves the Pedro Martinez problem. Sentence
(64) and (65) are assigned the following truth conditions:
(68) a. Sentence (64) is true iff you are the agent of an A-train taking event
e whose goal it is that you go to Harlem in at least one of the best
modal base worlds.
b. Sentence (65) is true iff you are the agent of an Pedro-Martinez-
kissing event e whose goal it is that you go to Harlem in at least one
of the best modal base worlds.
It seems that (68a) is true, but (68b) is false, for the same reason that (69) is
false (or at any rate deviant):
(69) #Varitek kissed Pedro Martinez to go to Harlem.
The idea seems to be that no one would ever kiss Pedro Martinez in order to get
to Harlem, because no one would believe that kissing him would help.
This proposal has been criticized by von Fintel & Iatridou (2005). They point
out that Nissenbaum seems to incorrectly treat two different kinds of to-clauses
on a par. First, to-clauses in a construction with a teleological modal, and second
the ones that modify the VP. As said in the introduction, Bech (1957) already
distinguished these two kinds, but here are von Fintel & Iatridou’s examples to
pinpoint the difference:
(70) a. To get this job, you have to be fluent in Spanish.
b. #I am fluent in Spanish to get this job.
In short, von Fintel & Iatridou’s complaint is that Nissenbaum doesn’t get the
meaning of anankastic conditionals right. He predicts that for the Harlem-
sentence to be true, you have to take the A train with the goal of going to Harlem,
but intuitively this doesn’t matter: you just have to take the A train. A similar
critique is voiced in Werner (2006). It makes no difference for the truth conditions
if you believe that the A train goes to Harlem. All that matters are your location,
and facts about the New York subway system. Nissenbaum (2005) responds to
this objection by arguing that his VP-level analysis need not be taken over for
universal variants of anankastic conditionals. He only considers it necessary for
existential anankastics. Indeed, it is difficult if not impossible to reduplicate the
contrast in (70) with existentials. This suggests that can in our construction isn’t
the dual of must after all, which makes the problem that Nissenbaum discovered
a bit less nasty.
As said, von Fintel & Iatridou don’t think that Nissenbaum’s solution works.
What is their alternative? They propose that the teleological modal also signals
that the consequent is an essential part of a way of achieving the antecedent goal,
defined as follows, where p and q are metavariables over propositions:
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4.4.1. Definition (Essential parts)27
q is an essential part of a way of achieving p
iff there is a set of propositions P such that⋂
(f(w) ∪ P ∪ {q}) ⊆ p, but
⋂
(f(w) ∪ P ) 6⊆ p
The idea is that whereas taking the A train may be an essential part of a way
to Harlem, kissing Pedro Martinez is not. Therefore, (64) can be true, but (65)
is false or at least deviant. It could be that the above condition is part of the
semantics of anankastic modals, but it could also be that this is just a natural
pragmatic assumption. In that case, (65) comes out true, but absurd. It is not
false that to get to Harlem you can kiss Pedro Martinez, but it is bad advice.
However, this solution has been criticized in turn by Fernando (2005). He
points out that, in general, if (70) holds for a proposition q, it also holds for q∩ r,
for any r. This leads to wrong predictions. For instance, the following sentence
is predicted to be perfectly felicitous:
(71) To go to Harlem, you can take the A train and kiss Pedro Martinez.
But this sounds just about as weird as (65). Nevertheless, perhaps this isn’t too
problematic, as taking the A train and kissing Pedro will get you to Harlem. At
any rate, Fernando concludes that possible worlds semantics isn’t fine-grained
enough to deal with anankastic conditionals. In other words, we shouldn’t define
‘means’ in terms of propositions but in terms of actions. He thinks of actions as
programs. A program pi for a person who wants to go to Harlem might look the
following:
(72) pi = walk to platform 2; board the A train; ride the A train; get off at the
4th stop
Of course, the program can be made much more detailed, and we might add
steps such as wait at the platform or even breathe, but for now the program in
(72) suffices to get the main idea across. We can ask: can pi be carried out (i.e.
does the A train indeed stop at platform 2?), and if we carry out pi, does it have
the desired effect (i.e. is Harlem the 4th stop?).
In order to figure out whether the Harlem-sentence is true, we are interested
in a complete run of pi. We can picture such a run as a string of temporal
propositions (fluents):
(73)
s = walk-to-platform-2 board-A-train ride-A-train get-off-at-4th-stop
Clearly this contains a substring that describes an event of taking the A train:
27Note that this notion of an ‘essential part of a way of achieving’ is close to Mackie’s INUS
condition. See for instance Mackie (1973).
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(74)
s′ = board-A-train ride-A-train
Strings can thus subsume one another, see also Fernando (2004), and Fernando
exploits this in the truth conditions for anankastic conditionals. The universal
Harlem-sentence is true iff every way of going to Harlem includes the event of
taking the A train. The existential variant is true iff some way of going to Harlem
does. Fernando assumes that kissing Pedro Martinez will not appear in any of
the ways to Harlem. If so, (64) will come out fine, but (65) is predicted to be
false. It isn’t completely clear to me though what on his analysis excludes the
action of kissing Pedro from ways to get to Harlem.
But there is a disadvantage to taking this approach. If the meaning of cer-
tain modals essentially makes reference to events, we lose a uniform treatment of
modality, as this isn’t plausible for all types of modality. Especially, epistemic
modality seems to have nothing to do with actions, but rather with which propo-
sitions follow or are compatible with some body of background knowledge. As
argued in chapter 1 we have good reason to want to treat epistemic and non
epistemic modality in the same way: it is a cross-linguistic trend that we may
use the same modal item for various modal meanings. This suggests that the
different modal meanings are related. It is unclear how this can be explained on
Fernando’s theory.
Finally, yet another proposal is made by Werner (2006). He proposes that an
existential anankastic is true iff the consequent is one of several means to reach
the goal set in the antecedent. To model this, he uses the notion of a supercover,
see also Simons (2005). A supercover S of a set A is a set of sets whose union is
a superset of A, and whose every member has a non-empty intersection with A.
In Werner’s semantics, two ordering sources play a role: a teleological ordering
source which ranks the modal base worlds in terms of how well they reach some
goal, and what he calls a ‘circumstantial’ ordering source which determines an
order on the modal base worlds in terms of how well they conform to basic
physical laws. Now, Werner assigns the following truth conditions to existential
anankastics:
(75) An existential anankastic is true, iff there is a supercover S such that:
(i) S is a supercover of the set of worlds in the modal base in which the
antecedent goal is reached that are best according to the teleological
ordering source such that the consequent is a member of S
(ii) S is not a supercover of the circumstantially best modal base worlds
in which the antecedent goal is reached
(iii) the consequent is not superfluous in S
(iv) S is a contextually salient alternative set.
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How does this solve the Pedro Martinez problem? The claim is that there is a
supercover that satisfies the above conditions (i)-(iv) for (64), but that we cannot
find one for (65), repeated here as (76):
(76) To go to Harlem, you can kiss Pedro Martinez.
Werner considers three candidate sets of propositions. Suppose that S1 = {that
you kiss Pedro Martinez, that you do not kiss Pedro Martinez}. This is a super-
cover for the teleologically best worlds in the modal base where you reach your
goal of going to Harlem. But it is also a supercover for the circumstantially best
worlds of this set. Thus, S1 fails condition (ii). Suppose that S2 = {that you take
the A train, that you take the B train, that you kiss Pedro Martinez}. Clearly,
S2 satisfies condition (i) and (ii), however, if we remove the proposition that you
kiss Pedro Martinez from S2, it still supercovers the teleologically best modal
base worlds where you go to Harlem. Hence, S2 fails condition (iii). Finally, it
seems that S3 = {that you kiss Pedro Martinez, {w ∈ W : w is a teleologically
best world in the modal base and you go to Harlem in w and you don’t kiss
Pedro Martinez in w}} meets the first three conditions. But it fails condition
(iv), because, as Werner puts it, S3 “is an odd set because its second member is
odd”. Conclusion: we cannot find a supercover that meets our criteria, and so
(76) comes out false.
However, it seems that condition (ii) is too strong to account for all examples
of anankastic conditionals. Take an existential variant of (56):
(77) To get this water to boil, you can heat it to 100◦ Celcius.
It seems that any supercover that satisfies condition (i), i.e. that contains the
proposition that you heat this water to 100◦ Celcius, will fail condition (ii), as
the circumstantial ordering source picks out accessible worlds that obey the basic
physical laws of the world of evaluation.28
To summarize, it seems to me that there two options open to deal with ex-
istential anankastics. First, one might adopt Nissenbaum’s analysis of to-clauses
as VP-level rationale clauses just for the existential variant. If so, however, the
Pedro Martinez problem is far less devastating than previously assumed, for it
means that can in these constructions is not the dual of must. On the other hand,
I think that von Fintel & Iatridou’s proposal is also viable. The idea here is that
in anankastic conditionals of any modal force, the consequent must describe some
28If I understand Werner’s paper correctly, he introduced condition (ii) to eliminate the truth
of sentences like ‘To go to Harlem, you have to breathe’, as you have to breathe anyway just to
stay alive. To be sure, the semantics that Werner gives for universal anankastic doesn’t employ
supercovers, but does demand that the consequent holds in the teleologically best worlds in
which the antecedent goal is reached, but not in the circumstantially best worlds where this goal
is reached. But see von Fintel & Iatridou (2005) for an argument that it isn’t that problematic
for such sentences to come out true.
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action which ‘causes’ the achievement of the antecedent goal. Sure, this will still
include odd sentences like (78):
(78) If you want to go to Harlem, you must breathe.
But, in a way, this is a true sentence. This sentence just doesn’t constitute good
advice on how to reach Harlem, as just breathing won’t get you there.
4.5 Conclusions
In this chapter I have summarized the literature on anankastic conditionals. In
section 4.2, I have reviewed the proposals with respect to if -clauses that con-
tribute hypothetical goals. There are two compositional analyses on the market,
the ‘elliptical’ approach and the nested modality approach, and I have argued in
favor of the second, as this provides the more general account.
In section 4.3, we have discussed ways to solve the Hoboken and Ruud van
Nistelrooy problem. The theories of von Fintel & Iatridou and von Stechow et al.
conclude on the basis of these problems that anankastic must is not dependent
on a teleological ordering source. In 4.3.3, I have explored the possibility that our
judgments in the relevant scenarios result from strengthening the interpretation
of the if -clause: if you want to go to Harlem is taken to mean if the one thing
you want is to go to Harlem. On such an analysis, must can be treated as an
ordinary telelogical modal.
At the end of the chapter, we have looked at existential anankastic condition-
als. I have compared the various proposals in the literature, and have concluded
that we can either adopt Nissenbaum’s proposal, which just means that there is
no real problem about existential anankastics, or we take anankastic conditionals
to be associated with the presumption that if the antecedent goal is achieved,
this is because of the consequent. One way of formulating this is von Fintel &
Iatridou’s essential part condition in 4.4.1. Both options seem equally viable to
me.
Chapter 5
Domain restriction by if -clauses
The interpretation of if -clauses in the scope of quantifiers has led linguists to
propose that if has no meaning (Lewis 1975, Kratzer 1981, 1991). In this chapter,
however, we will investigate an alternative along the lines of Belnap (1970, 1973):
if corresponds to a conditional connective which has partial truth conditions. The
idea is that conditionals only have a truth value in case their antecedent is true,
and that their truth value in that case equals the truth value of the consequent.
Together with the assumption that quantifiers only select worlds in which their
scope is defined, this predicts that if -clauses in the scope of a quantificational
operator restrict the domain of that operator.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.1 explains how linguists came
to think that if does not correspond to a conditional connective. After that,
5.2 presents Belnap’s partial semantics for conditionals. Then, 5.3 argues that
although abandoning bivalence comes at the cost of losing the validity of certain
laws of logic, Belnap’s truth conditions are plausible enough. After that, 5.4
presents three reasons to believe that Belnap’s alternative is better than the
traditional analyis: we want to have conditional connectives in the logical forms
of natural language. Finally, 5.5 discusses the interaction between conditionals
and nominal quantifiers.
5.1 The decline of the conditional connective
In this chapter we will concern ourselves with the following question:
• Do all occurrences of if correspond to a conditional connective?
Linguists1 have come to think that this is not the case. The main motivation
behind this is that if -clauses in the scope of a quantificational operator are inter-
1I hope the reader will forgive me for generalizing over linguists. Of course, it is not the case
that the Lewis/Kratzer approach is universally accepted, see for instance Crevels (2000). Yet
the theory is dominant in most if not all of the current semantic work on modalized conditionals.
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preted as contributing an additional restriction on the domain of that operator.
Going back to Lewis (1975), it is thought that this is best accounted for by giv-
ing up the assumption that these occurrences of if correspond to a conditional
connective.2 We will present his arguments in 5.1.1. Then, in 5.1.2 we will look
at Kratzer’s (1981, 1991) generalization of the proposal to the effect that no oc-
currence of if corresponds to a conditional connective anymore. Thus, somewhat
surprisingly perhaps, the linguists’ theory of if is that it lacks any conditional
meaning. Nevertheless, this theory has nowadays become the standard semantics
for natural language conditionals. Indeed, von Fintel & Iatridou (2002) ascribe it
folkloric status (at least as far as the interpretation of if -clauses under adverbial
and modal quantifiers is concerned; see 5.5 for their analysis of if -clauses in the
scope of nominal quantifiers). To be sure, although the folkloric theory concerns
indicatives as well as counterfactuals, in this chapter we will deal exclusively with
indicative conditionals. We will have nothing to say about counterfactuals.
5.1.1 Lewis on adverbial quantification
Lewis (1975) observed that if -clauses in the scope of adverbial quantifiers seem
to supply the domains for these quantifiers. Consider:
(1) Harry always/usually/seldom/never drinks Butterbeer if he is happy.
Intuitively, these sentences say that Harry drinks Butterbeer in all/most/few/no
cases in which he is happy, i.e. the adverb quantifies over cases which satisfy the
if -clause. Lewis argued that we cannot give a uniform analysis of all sentences
in (1) if we take if to correspond to a conditional connective. He concluded that
the if -clauses in (1) merely function as domain restrictors.
Before we delve into the details of Lewis’ argument, I would like to introduce
some background assumptions. First, I assume that adverbs like always, usually,
and seldom quantify over events. This is not Lewis’ view, but nothing hinges on
that.3 Lewis did hold that the range of quantification for these adverbs is often
restricted. Sentence (2), for instance, is not true just because few of all events
are events in which Caesar was even alive, from which it follows that fewer still
are events in which he awoke before dawn. Rather, (2) means something like the
following: few events in which Caesar awoke are events in which he awoke before
dawn:
(2) Caesar seldom awoke before dawn.
2To be sure, although what I consider to be the linguist’s favorite theory of conditionals has
its roots in work by Lewis, I am not suggesting that he himself was a linguist.
3Lewis took these adverbs to be unselective binders, i.e. operators that bind every free
variable in their scope. This idea, especially as developed by Kamp (1981) and Heim (1982),
has been very successful in accounting for quantificational variability effects and for donkey
anaphora. In the present chapter, however, these issues are of no concern.
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In general, domain selection is influenced by information structure: back-
grounded material (whether topical or presupposed) is typically understood as
part of the quantifier’s restrictor, see von Fintel (1994, ch.2) for an overview. As
for (2), it seems that this sentence is likely to be interpreted with before dawn in
focus, and awoke as part of the topic; hence quantification ranges over events in
which Caesar awoke.
To represent restricted quantification, I will make use of logical forms that
combine quantifiers both with a restrictor and a nuclear scope. The restrictor
determines the domain of the quantifier, while the nuclear scope constitutes the
main predication that is made about the (relevant quantity) of members of the
domain. Let us represent the meaning of (2) as follows:
(3) (few e: Caesar awoke in e)(Caesar awoke before dawn in e)
Logical forms of this type go back to McCawley (1981), and are adopted here
mainly because they are easy to read. (3) is true in a world w iff few values of
e that satisfy the restrictor in w also satisfy the nuclear scope in w, i.e. iff few
events in w in which Caesar awoke are events in which he awoke before dawn.
We now have everything in place to consider Lewis’ reasons for claiming that
(some) if -clauses do not correspond to conditional connectives. It is easy to see,
for instance, that material implication is not up to the task. Universal adverbs,
like always, are not yet problematic: conditionals in their scope can easily be
interpreted in terms of this connective, as witnessed by the following representa-
tion for (4). Note that I abstract away from any contextual restrictions on the
domain, i.e. the restrictor is empty. We will see below that this doesn’t affect
the force of Lewis’ argument.
(4) Harry always drinks Butterbeer if he is happy.
(all e:)(Harry is happy in e → he drinks Butterbeer in e)
This logical form is true in a world w iff all values of e that satisfy the restrictor
in w also satisfy the nuclear scope in w, i.e. iff for each event in w: either it isn’t
an event in which Harry is happy, or it is an event in which he drinks Butterbeer.
In effect, then, (4) is true iff each event in w in which Harry is happy is an event
in which he drinks Butterbeer.
But under usually, the same analysis of conditionals fails. Consider (5) and
its logical representation:
(5) Harry usually drinks Butterbeer if he is happy.
(most e:)(Harry is happy in e → he drinks Butterbeer in e)
The representation in (5) is too weak: it is satisfied iff Harry is usually unhappy.
To see this, suppose that there are 1000 events in w, and that Harry is happy in
only 300 of them. Of these 300 events, 100 involve Harry drinking Butterbeer.
Intuitively, (5) is false, but the analysis predicts it to be true. Dekker (2001,
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7), one of the advocates of material implication, is not too worried about this
problem. He acknowledges that material implication makes the wrong predictions,
but writes: “I leave it to the general public to judge the issue”. For me, however,
the logical form above is simply not a good enough approximation of the meaning
of (5), nor was it for Lewis, and I believe that the general public agrees. Lewis
concluded:
the if of our restrictive if -clauses should not be regarded as a senten-
tial connective. It has no meaning from the adverb it restricts. [. . . ] It
serves merely to mark an argument-place in a polyadic construction.
(Lewis 1975, 11)
This leads to the following improved logical form for (5), in which the if -clause
is part of the adverb’s restrictor:
(6) (most e: Harry is happy in e)(Harry drinks Butterbeer in e)
This is true in a world w iff most events of w in which Harry is happy are events
in which he drinks Butterbeer.
Regardless of how representations like (6) relate to the grammar of English,
it is clear that on Lewis’ theory, the if in sentences like (5) doesn’t contribute its
usual conditional meaning. In fact, logical forms like (6) do not contain anything
that corresponds to if, but opinions diverge on whether this means that if is
semantically vacuous. Some compositional implementations of Lewis’ proposal,
e.g. von Stechow (2004a), do make this assumption, but others, e.g. von Fintel
(1994), still endow the element with some meaning; see section 5.4.2 below.
It should be noted that the representation in (5) cannot easily be saved by ap-
pealing to appropriate contextual restrictions on the domain. It is true that if the
context somehow supplied a restrictor that matched the if -clause, the observed
interpretation would be predicted:
(7) (most e: Harry is happy in e)(he is happy in e → he drinks B-beer in e)
This representation has the same truth conditions as (6). But this analysis can
only succeed if we can come up with a good story about why and how the context
would supply exactly this restriction, and this turns out to be quite difficult. My
best bet is the following. If -clauses introduce topics, cf. Haiman (1978), and
domain selection is sensitive to topical information. We have already noted this
in connection to (2), but further prima facie evidence for the latter claim comes
from the following example by Beaver (2004), who traces back the leading idea
to Partee (1991); see also Eckardt (1999):
(8) Whatever other options are available, it is by PUBlic TRANsport that
most BRItish go to work. In contrast, all iTALians use their CARS to go
to work.
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It is natural to interpret the first sentence as meaning that most British who go to
work do so by public transport, and the second as meaning that all Italians who
go to work do so by car. Beaver argues that the stress-pattern leads the hearer
to infer that going-to-work is the topic of the discourse, and that this licenses
domain restriction with the set of work-goers.
Could it be that in our sentence (5) the domain of the adverb is restricted in
a similar indirect fashion? In that case, the if -clause signals that Harry’s habits
when he is happy are under discussion in the present discourse. When evaluating
the restrictor of the quantifier, people take into account what the discourse is
about, and thus the domain of usually gets restricted to events in which Harry is
happy. This sounds promising, but it is ultimately not tenable. As pointed out
by von Fintel (1994), if -clauses may be foregrounded:
(9) A: Are you going to play soccer on Sunday?
B: We’ll play [if the SUN shines]F.
B communicates that we will play soccer in all events in which the sun shines. Yet
the if -clause is in focus. Crucially, it is not the topic. Now note that if -clauses
in the scope of adverbial quantifiers need not be topical either:
(10) A: When do you play soccer?
B: We usually play [if the SUN shines]F
Summing up, some if -clauses are used as devices for restricting the domain of
some higher operator. This is difficult to account for if if corresponds to a
classical conditional connective, so Lewis proposed that some if -clauses are mere
domain restrictors. He did not think of this theory as universally applicable; in
fact, in Lewis (1976) he championed material implication as the best analysis
for ordinary indicative conditionals.4 This suggests that he thought of if as an
ambiguous item, sometimes acting like a mere domain restrictor, in other cases
behaving like a conditional connective. But it turns out that it is not necessary
to postulate such an ambiguity: Angelika Kratzer has extended Lewis’ proposal
to a unified analysis for if. We turn to her contribution next.
5.1.2 Kratzer’s generalization
Already in his 1975 paper, Lewis remarked that the adverb of quantification may
be left unpronounced in some cases. An example is (11a), which, according to
Lewis, is to be interpreted as (11b):
(11) a. If it rains, it pours.
b. Always if it rains, it pours.
4And as we have seen in chapter 2, he assigns yet a different semantics to counterfactual if.
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As will become clear below, this observation is key to generalizing Lewis’ theory
to all kinds of if -clauses.
In various contributions, Kratzer (1978, 1979, 1981, 1986, 1991) proposes to
treat every if -clause as restricting the domain of some operator or other. This
includes if -clauses in so-called ‘bare’ conditionals that do not contain any overt
quantifier. For such if -clauses, we must assume that a covert operator is present:
The history of the conditional is the story of a syntactic mistake.
There is no two-place if . . . then connective in the logical forms of
natural languages. If -clauses are devices for restricting the domains
of various operators. Whenever there is no explicit operator, we have
to posit one. (Kratzer 1991, 656)
Kratzer argues that the covert operator is usually an epistemic necessity modal.
As we saw in 2.1.2, many researchers believe that indicative conditionals have
some epistemic modal flavor. Consider for instance (12a), and note that this
sentence is more or less equivalent to (12b):
(12) a. If Harry is not in the library, he is in the common room.
b. If Harry is not in the library, he must be in the common room.
In Kratzer’s analysis, both sentences receive the following logical form:
(13) (all w: w is compatible with the evidence and Harry is not in the library in
w)(he is in the common room in w)
Thus, the domain of the modal is contextually restricted to epistemic alternatives,
and the if -clauses in (12) supply an additional restriction on this domain. (13) is
true in a world w iff Harry is in the common room in all worlds that are compatible
with the available evidence in w and in which Harry is not in the library.
For some sentences it seems better to posit a universal frequency adverb rather
than a covert epistemic modal. An example might be (11a). Further examples
include habitual sentences like (14a). This sentence seems equivalent to (14b):
(14) a. My cat purrs if she is fed.
b. My cat always purrs if she is fed.
The main point, however, remains the same: every occurrence of if is meaningless.
Whenever it seems to contribute a conditional meaning, this meaning must be
located in a covert operator.
It has been argued that if -clauses may also be used to restrict the domains of
nominal quantifiers. For instance, von Fintel (1998) gives the following examples
which he attributes to Heim and/or Kratzer:
(15) a. Most letters are answered if they are shorter than 5 pages.
b. Few people like New York if they didn’t grow up there.
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Intuitively, in these examples quantification ranges over letters that are shorter
than 5 pages and people that didn’t grow up in New York respectively. Clearly, the
Lewis/Kratzer approach predicts these interpretations, cf. the following logical
forms:
(16) a. (most x: x is a letter ∧ x is shorter than 5 pages)(x is answered)
b. (few x: x is a person ∧ x didn’t grow up in NY)(x likes it there)
In 5.5, we will see that if -clauses in the scope of a nominal quantifier do not gen-
erally restrict the domain of that operator and this has led von Fintel & Iatridou
(2002) to claim that no nominal quantifier is ever restricted by a conditional. In
5.5.1 we will discuss how they explain that the quantifiers in (15a) and (15b) do
seem to be restricted to individuals that satisfy the if -clause.
Summing up, if -clauses in the scope of quantifiers tend to be interpreted as
part of the quantifier’s restrictor. The present section has outlined how this led
to the decline of the conditional connective in natural language semantics. The
point I want to make in this chapter is that it is not necessary at all to ban
conditional connectives from our logical forms. That is, not if one assigns the
right truth conditions to this connective. The next section makes clear what I
mean by the right truth conditions.
5.2 Belnap’s conditional connective
In a footnote, Lewis concedes that there is an alternative way of looking at domain
restricting if -clauses:
What is the price of forcing the restriction-marking if to be a sen-
tential connective after all? Exorbitant: it can be done if (1) we use
a third truth value, (2) we adopt a far-fetched interpretation of the
connective if, and (3) we impose an additional permanent restriction
on the admissible cases. Let If Ψ, Φ have the same truth value as Φ if
Ψ is true, and let it be third-valued if Ψ is false or third-valued. Let a
case be admissible only if it makes the modified sentence either true
or false, rather than third-valued. [. . . ] A treatment along similar
lines of if-clauses used to restrict ordinary, selective quantifiers may
be found in Belnap (1970). (Lewis 1975, 11, fn.1)
Lewis clearly didn’t think much of Belnap’s proposal, but in this chapter I will
argue that he was too quick to dismiss it. Still, it turns out to be somewhat of a
challenge to figure out what Belnap’s proposal really is. We will first settle this
matter in 5.2.1. After that, in 5.2.2, we will show that the conditional connective
that we have settled for accounts for domain restricting uses of if.
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5.2.1 How to understand Belnap’s proposal
Belnap (1970, 1973) presents his conditional semantics as a formalization of the
idea that conditionals make conditional assertions. He traces this idea back to
Quine:5
Now under what circumstances is a conditional true? Even to raise
this question is to depart from everyday attitudes. An affirmation
of the form ‘if p then q ’ is commonly felt less as an affirmation of a
conditional than as a conditional affirmation of the consequent. [At
this point, Quine credits Dr. Philip Rhinelander6 in a footnote - JH]
If, after we have made such an affirmation, the antecedent turns out
true, then we consider ourselves committed to the consequent, and are
ready to acknowledge error if it proves false. If on the other hand the
antecedent turns out to have been false, our conditional affirmation is
as if it had never been made.
Departing from this usual attitude, however, let us think of condi-
tionals simply as compound statements which, like conjunctions and
alternations, admit as wholes of truth and falsity. (Quine 1950, 12)
Although Quine says that he considers conditional assertion to reflect our common
attitude towards conditionals, he doesn’t adopt it in the logic book from which
this quote is taken. In fact, he goes on to introduce material implication. Yet this
doesn’t mean that he thought natural language conditionals do not correspond to
conditional assertion; DeRose & Grandy (1999, fn.2) draw the same conclusion.
For instance, in Quine (1960, 226) he also mentions the theory rather favorably.
Belnap (1970, 1) remarks that “the idea has not been taken with the high seri-
ousness it might deserve”, and proposes the following (somewhat vague) semantic
version of conditional assertion (we will make Belnap’s conditional semantics more
precise below):7
5Other early sources besides Quine include Sellars (1953), von Wright (1957), and Dummett
(1959). Yet, like Quine, these authors merely mention the idea (and Dummett rejects it; see
below). First attempts to develop an accompanying logic were, as far as I know, made by
Jeffrey (1963) and Adams (1965, 1975). Milne (1997) draws a parallel with Bruno de Finetti’s
(1935) logic of conditional events. In spite of these many predecessors, I will continue to speak
of ‘Belnap’s alternative’, as Belnap seems to have been the first to discover this semantics’
potential to account for domain restricting uses of if.
6Lycan (2006, fn. 2) notes that Rhinelander’s influence extends outside the field and into
the military and political history of the United States: vice admiral James Bond Stockdale
credits his teaching with enabling him to survive seven and one-half years in Hanoi prison, see
Stockdale on Stoicism II: master of my fate,
www.usna.edu/ethics/Publications/Stoicism2.pdf.
7Quite paradoxically, at the end of the paper Belnap (1970, 11) says that he doesn’t know
“if there are in English any clear cases of if-thens used as conditional assertions [. . . ] But I do
know that “There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want some” is not generally used as a
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5.2.1. Definition (Conditional assertion)
(17) If ϕ is true in w, then what ϕ ⇒ ψ asserts in w is what ψ asserts in w.
If ϕ is false or nonassertive in w, then ϕ⇒ ψ is nonassertive in w.8
This definition follows Belnap (1970). In Belnap (1973), he proposes that ϕ⇒ ψ
makes an assertion iff ϕ is not false, i.e. iff ϕ is either true or nonassertive. But
if the semantics is revised in this way, embedding Belnap’s conditional in the
scope of a quantifier doesn’t (automatically) lead to domain restriction with the
if -clause. For this reason, we opt for the older definition.9
As Belnap points out, the definition in 5.2.1 can be understood in two ways.
First, it could be that conditionals with a false (non-true) antecedent fail to
express a proposition (let’s call this the interesting reading). Second, it could
be that such a conditionals do express a proposition, but one that lacks a truth
value (we’ll call this the boring reading).10 Somewhat surprisingly, Belnap claims
that the second, boring reading doesn’t provide a satisfactory formalization of
conditional assertion (unfortunately, he does not qualify this remark). That is,
he claims that in definition 5.2.1, the statement that what ϕ ⇒ ψ asserts in w
is identical to what ψ asserts in w “does not boringly mean an identity of truth-
values but an identity of propositional content” (Belnap 1970, 4). In 5.2.1 w is
then a part of the context rather than an index of evaluation.
However, I think that the interesting semantics is not at all what we want for
conditionals. To see the problem, consider the following example by Edgington
(1995, 289):
(18) If you press that switch, there will be an explosion.
Clearly, my saying (18) might well save your life, especially when the antecedent
is false. But how is this possible if (18) fails to assert a proposition? How can
(18) ever be used to persuade you to not press that switch, if my utterance of it
fails to communicate something for you to grasp? Similarly, I might promise to
take care of your children if you die. Intuitively, this promise has consequences
conditional assertion; for if there are no biscuits, even if you don’t want any, it is plain false,
not nonassertive”.
8Belnap himself uses the slash / as the conditional connective, but as it is customary to
present conditionals in terms of arrows, I prefer ⇒.
9The newer definition is closer to Jeffrey (1963). Belnap suggests that Jeffrey purposively
set up his semantics thus in order to preserve the validity of important logical laws like Contra-
position. However, Jeffrey also needs to adopt a non-standard semantics for negation to get this
right, so these laws do not come for free on the newer definition. Obviously, on the semantics
in definition 5.2.1, we do not get Contraposition and other laws valid. But I will argue in 5.3
that this is not a problem.
10These are not really the terms that Belnap uses. He asks what sentences assert, and then
discusses two possible answers: they assert propositions or they assert truth values. It sounds
somewhat strange to say that a sentence asserts a truth value. As I understand it, the crucial
point is whether conditionals with a false antecedent express a proposition or not.
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for you and me, even if you don’t die, but again it is unclear how this is possible
if I didn’t even succeed in expressing a proposition while making my promise.
Thus, the interesting semantics is plain absurd. Quine was wrong when he said
that if the antecedent is false, the conditional assertion is as if it had never been
made.11
The boring semantics seems to fare better in this respect. On this view,
a conditional with a false (non-true) antecedent does succeed in expressing a
proposition, but this proposition lacks a truth value, or at least lacks one of the
classic truth values true and false. We might formulate this as follows, where #
is the third truth value corresponding to undefinedness:12
5.2.2. Definition (Conditional assertion in terms of truth values)
Jϕ⇒ ψKM,h(w) = 1, iff JψKM,h(w) = 1 if JϕKM,h(w) = 1; otherwise
Jϕ⇒ ψKM,h(w) = #
Thus, ϕ ⇒ ψ only has a truth value in case the antecedent is true. And if the
antecedent is true, the truth value of the entire conditional is the truth value of
the consequent.13
Given this definition, I have asserted something by uttering (18). What I
asserted is neither true nor false, but at least I managed to get something across:
that I believe (18). Of course, that I believe (18) does not mean that I believe
that it is true. Instead, what I have communicated is that I believe that (18) is
true, given that it has a truth value, cf. (Edgington 1995, 290). If you take me
to be reliable, you will also come to believe that (18) is true, provided that it has
a truth value, i.e. that an explosion will occur on the supposition that you press
that switch. Hence, you do not press it.
This account of the effect of uttering (18) presupposes a different norm for
assertion than is normally assumed. It is in fact crucial that we adjust this norm
now that we allow conditionals to be neither true nor false. If not, it seems that
conditionals like (18) could never be felicitously uttered. In fact, Stalnaker (1975,
137, fn.2) saw this as a problem for an analysis of conditionals along the lines
11To be sure, Belnap seems to have seen the problem, writing that to say that a sentence A
is nonassertive is “not to say that A is “meaningless” in any sensible sense; to say so would be
a bad joke, for certainly it continues to have determinate semantic relations” (Belnap 1970, 2).
Yet I don’t quite understand in which sense of meaning (18) has meaning in a context in which
you don’t press that switch.
12If # stands for undefinedness, it doesn’t seem to matter much whether we choose the
option that conditionals express total functions from worlds to {0,#, 1} and the option that
they express propositions that are partial functions, i.e. functions from worlds to {0, 1}. Strictly
speaking, however, the two options need not amount to the same thing.
13Note that on this version, the semantics doesn’t straightforwardly extend to other condi-
tional speech acts. Take a conditional question ‘If you went to Nijmegen, how did you like the
university?’. It would be strange to say that the if -clause specifies the condition under which
the question has a truth value. Questions never have a truth value.
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of definition 5.2.2. The traditional norm for assertion says that one should not
make an assertion unless one has good reason to think that it is true. Clearly,
(18) doesn’t meet this norm, for when I say this, I expect that my utterance will
keep you from pressing that switch, and so I believe that (18) is truth value less.
Why would anyone ever be willing to assert a proposition that has a very low
probability of being true?
However, it seems reasonable that once we abandon bivalence, the norm for
assertion shouldn’t be belief that the proposition expressed is true, but rather that
the proposition expressed is true if it has a truth value. Thus, a conditional can be
felicitously asserted, if its assertibility, defined as follows is high, cf. McDermott
(1996):
5.2.3. Definition (Conditional assertability)
A conditional’s assertability is the probability that it is true, given that it
has a truth value.
It is now clear how I could be prompted to assert (18). As only the semantics in
definition 5.2.2 seems to work for this example, I will take this to be ‘Belnap’s
conditional semantics’. Thus, conditionals do express propositions, even if their
antecedent is not true (Without further discussion, McDermott also assumes that
Belnap intended to make this proposal (not the more complex one)).
It is sometimes objected that conditional assertions can be true or false just
by chance. Suppose a father says to his child in the zoo while standing in front
of the gorilla’s cage: ‘if you put your finger through the bar, it will be bitten off’,
and that the child puts his finger through the bar nevertheless. Now imagine that
the gorilla doesn’t do anything, but that a bird sweeps down and bites off the
finger (the example is by Mackie (1973), but the objection goes back at least to
Jeffrey (1963)). The conditional assertion is true, but just by chance. Or imagine
that the gorilla is about to bite, but is smashed by a giant rock just that moment.
The conditional is then false, for an unexpected reason. However, as Edgington
points out, unconditional assertions can also be true or false by chance. I can
have good reasons for thinking that John is in London, yet be wrong. Or I can
have no reasons at all, and simply guess or have a hunch, and be right by luck.
For this reason, I do not consider this objection to be fatal.
Having disposed with the objection that Belnap’s semantics is implausible in
light of examples like (18), let’s now ask whether there are any positive reasons
for adopting it. Some people feel that the main appeal of Belnap’s conditional is
that it comes close to how ordinary people understand conditionals. For instance,
McDermott (1996) discusses the following example, which concerns the result of
the next roll of an ordinary, six-sided dice:
(19) If it is even, it will be a six.
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Suppose that you had bet on (19). It seems clear that the bet is won when the
result of the next roll is six, and lost when the result is four. But what if it is
five? McDermott reports that most people assume that the bet is called off in this
case. See also DeRose & Grandy (1999, fn.9) who received strong results in a poll
taken among students in an introductory philosophy class. Unsurprisingly, the
effect was strongest with students that had not yet been introduced to material
implication.
However, it could be argued that truth value gap intuitions never provide a
strong argument in favor of a partial semantics. For presuppositions, for instance,
it has been argued that such intuitions are not reliable enough to serve as evidence
for one theory or another: there is just no neat correlation between sentences
whose presuppositions are unfulfilled and sentences that are judged to lack a
truth value (Gazdar 1979, van der Sandt 1982, van der Sandt 1988, von Fintel
2004). It is an open question whether the same holds for truth value gap intuitions
about conditionals. Are there conditionals which speakers judge to have a truth
value, but which should lack a truth value given Belnap’s semantics? It appears
that (20) is a case in point:
(20) If Mary and John are both in Paris, then Mary is in Paris.
Suppose that Mary and John are not both in Paris. Belnap would predict that
(20) has no truth value, but I expect that most people would feel that (20) is true
in this case. To be sure, we can give an explanation for this judgment. Given
our definition of conditional assertability, (20) clearly has maximal assertability.
On a probability scale ranging from 0 to 1, the probability that (20) is true given
that it has a truth value is 1. But the main point is that there is no one-to-
one correspondence between speaker’s intuitions about truth values and Belnap’s
semantics. Importantly, one shouldn’t conclude that Belnap’s semantics is there-
fore on the wrong track. It may well work fine as a semantics for conditionals.
In fact, the main point of this chapter is that Belnap’s conditional gives the best
explanation for the domain restricting uses of if.
To sum up, the alternative Belnap semantics that will be investigated in this
chapter is the one in definition 5.2.2. We have seen that Belnaps own gloss
of his connective suggests a somewhat different semantics, but as this seems
implausible from the get-go, we opt for the semantics that he found more boring.
An additional reason for doing so, is the implications the other analysis would
have for embedding operators, to which we turn next.
5.2.2 Domain restriction
Inserting Belnap’s conditional in the scope of a quantifier leads to domain re-
striction of that quantifier provided that quantifiers are restricted to quantify
over worlds in which their scope is defined. Entries for usually and must that
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correspond to this idea are (as is common, h[x/a] is that assignment function
which assigns individual a to variable x and is otherwise the same as h):
5.2.4. Definition (Quantifiers)
a. J(most e: ϕ)(ψ)KM,h(w) = 1 iff JψKM,h[e/a](w) = 1 for most events a
for which JϕKM,h[e/a](w) = 1 and for which JψKM,h[e/a](w) = 0/1; 0
otherwise
b. J(all w: ϕ)(ψ)KM,h(w) = 1, iff JψKM,h[w/a](w) = 1 for all worlds a
for which JϕKM,h[w/a](w) = 1 and for which JψKM,h[w/a](w) = 0/1; 0
otherwise
What does the ‘for which JψKw = 0/1’-part of the definition do? Take (20a).
Intuitively, something of the form (most e: ϕ)(ψ) says something about the pro-
portions between two sets, i.e. the set of events for which ϕ is true and the set
of events for which ψ is true. To evaluate such a statement, one has to consider
those events for which ϕ and ψ are true, and those for which ϕ and ψ are false.
For some events, however, it may not be clear whether ϕ and ψ hold or do not
hold. More precisely, for some events a, JψKw,g[e/a] may be #. The above defini-
tion says that such events simply do not count, when evaluating (most e: ϕ)(ψ).
This seems to be exactly what we want. Counting those events among either the
true instances or among the false messes up the predictions.
To see that the above definitions give us domain restriction, have a look at the
representation for (20). Within Belnap’s system, sentences like (20) wear their
logical forms on their sleeve: the entire conditional constitutes the scope of the
quantifier:
(21) (most e:)(Harry is happy in e ⇒ he drinks Butterbeer in e)
This says that Harry drinks Butterbeer in most events in which the embedded
conditional has a truth value, i.e. in most events in which Harry is happy.
We likewise predict that (22) is true iff Neville is the chosen one in all (epis-
temically accessible) worlds v in which Harry isn’t:
(22) If Harry isn’t the Chosen One, it must be Neville.
(all w: w is compatible with the evidence)(Harry isn’t the Chosen One in w
⇒ Neville is in w)
We now see that it isn’t necessary at all to postulate that if lacks conditional
meaning if we want to account for its domain restricting effect. We just need to
assign the right semantics to if.14
14Now note that had we opted for the non-boring Belnap-semantics, we would have to mod-
ify the definitions of our quantifiers in a much more fundamental way in order to get domain
restriction. For example, must should then be restricted to contexts in which the conditional
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While it is now clear that Belnap’s connective accounts for the domain restrict-
ing potential of if, it is not that clear why this is so. Aren’t we semanticizing
something here that is actually pragmatic? But what? Truth value gaps have
often been used to model presuppositions, but the partiality we have written into
the semantics of if must obviously be distinguished from presupposition. This
was already observed by Belnap:
Suppose we say that A S-“presupposes” B if whenever A is assertivew ,
B is truew. This is, I take it, a semantic rendering in the present
context of Strawsonian presupposition, for then to say that A S-
“presupposes” B is to say that the truth of B is a necessary condition
for the assertiveness of A. But then it turns out for categorial A that
(A/B) S-“presupposes” A, for the truth of the antecedent, A, is a
necessary condition for the assertiveness of the conditional, (A/B),
and indeed is the paradigm case of such. But it would be mad to
suggest that “If Sam is a crow, then Sam is black” presupposes “Sam
is a crow”, a madness which accounts for the shudder quotes in ‘S-
“presupposes”’. For A to presuppose B in the pragmatic sense, it
should be the case that one who utters A somehow commits himself
to the truth of B. It should be that he has done something pragmat-
ically unacceptable if he utters A when B is false. Something like
this surely obtains when one utters “The present king of France is
bald”. But of course the whole point of conditional assertion is to be
able to avoid any commitment whatsoever when the antecedent turns
out false. Thus, although definable, S-“presupposition” should not be
taken as a semantic analogue of pragmatic presupposition. (Belnap
1973, 70)
Someone who utters ‘All John’s children are bald’ in case John has no children,
counts as having misled her audience. But this does not hold for a speaker who
uttered a conditional with a false antecedent. In fact, if conditionals presupposed
their antecedent, one would expect that natural language didn’t contain any
conditionals. On Gricean assumptions, if it were given that John has children,
one shouldn’t say ‘If John has children, they are bald’, but just ‘His children
are bald’.15 Perhaps we should assume that the presupposition of conditionals is
of the kind that always has to be accommodated? This won’t work. Following
in its scope has an intension. But this implies that must is a Kaplanian monster, for it should
then shift the context to worlds where the conditional expresses a proposition. There is, how-
ever, little evidence that there is anything monstrous about quantifiers like must and usually.
For instance, to the best of my knowledge indexicals like I do not shift their reference when
embedded under these operators. I consider this an additional reason to opt for the boring
version of Belnap’s semantics.
15Ordinarily, that is. In some situations, for instance in an argument via modus ponens it is
allowed to assert a conditional whose antecedent is already given.
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Gazdar (1979), it is usually assumed that conditionals ‘If ϕ, ψ’ give rise to the
clausal implicatures ♦ϕ and ♦¬ϕ, and that if a presupposition clashes with a
clausal implicature, the implicature wins, i.e. the presupposition is canceled.
It follows that if conditionals presupposed their antecedent, this presupposition
would automatically be canceled.16 To sum up, the Belnap-partiality must be
concluded to have nothing to do with presupposition.17
Given some presupposition theories, this is problematic. For instance, Heim’s
(1983) context change potentials are essentially based on a partial semantics. If
we were to combine this theory with our Belnap-semantics, we would thus be
assuming two distinct kinds of partiality. But this seems impossible in as far as
undefinedness comes down to a lack of semantic value; how can we distinguish
between two non-existing values? On the other hand, other presupposition theo-
ries, most notably the anaphoric binding theory of van der Sandt (1992), Geurts
(1999), are fully independent of truth value gaps. Adopting Belnap’s semantics
thus does not automatically commit us to there being different kinds of undefined-
ness. At any rate, it is clear that Belnap-gaps just are not presupposition-gaps.
That is, we are dealing with pre-conditions that are not (or not necessarily) of a
presuppositional nature.
Note that the difference between presupposition and conditional assertion just
alluded to implies that we shouldn’t recruit Belnap’s conditional for all kinds of
domain restriction. That is, we might construe every as a one-place quantifier
over individuals and translate (23) in the following way (i.e. we need no longer
assume that quantifiers take a restrictor argument):
(23) Every crow is black.
(every x:)(x is a crow ⇒ x is black)
In fact, this was Belnap’s orginal intent: to provide a uniform analysis of every
crow and some crow as ‘for every x, if x is a crow’ and ‘for some x, if x is a
crow’, respectively.18 However, for ordinary restricted quantification, as supplied
16See also Stalnaker (1975) and van der Sandt (1982), van der Sandt (1988), though these
authors do not work in Gazdar’s framework. For instance, in van der Sandt’s system, the
presupposition is canceled because it clashes with the fact that the conditional was uttered. Of
course, the underlying intuition is similar to Gazdar’s.
17Soames (1989) distinguishes so-called ‘expressive presuppositions’:
(i) Sentence S expressively presupposes proposition A relative to a context of utterance C
iff the truth of A is necessary for S to semantically express a proposition in C.
So perhaps, had we opted for the less boring version of Belnap’s semantics, we would have been
able to link Belnap-partiality to (a very specific kind of) presupposition. But of course, we have
good reason not to have opted for this semantics.
18He suggests that this may also be seen as a solution to Hempel’s (1945a, 1945b) Raven
paradox: everything that is both a non-raven and a non-black thing (say a green apple) confirms
that ‘Every raven is black’ is true. On Belnap’s view, such things are obviously irrelevant. But
see Cohen (1987) for a presuppositional solution.
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by common nouns, this is unattractive. First, no one believes that quantifiers
are unary operators. Second, this involves postulating an inaudible if. Third, it
suggests that (23) is felicitous if there are no crows. But quantifiers are normally
felt to presuppose their domain (Strawson 1952, Geurts & van der Sandt 1999),
precisely because uttering (23) in case there are no crows is misleading.
Given Belnap’s semantics, the following question immediately arises. What
about bare conditionals like (24)?
(24) If Harry is not in the library, he is in the common room.
We actually have two options for analyzing this sentence. Given that we now have
conditional connectives, one would expect that (24) is to be analyzed as (25a). In
principle, however, we could also follow Kratzer and stipulate that conditionals
can only occur in the scope of quantifiers as in (25b). If so, there is a covert
modal present in the representation for (24). But it seems clear that this is not
the default analysis:
(25) a. Harry is not in the library ⇒ he is in the common room
b. (all w: w is compatible with the evidence)(Harry is not in the library in
w ⇒ he is in the common room in w)
On the Lewis/Kratzer analysis, which has it that if is a meaningless device for
domain restriction, it is obvious that a covert operator must be assumed that is
responsible for the observed conditional meaning. But if we adopt Belnap’s se-
mantics, it seems superfluous to resort to a covert operator, when our conditional
has a meaning of its own. In fact, it is part of the attraction of the semantics that
this is so. It would be very strange not to use this fact in the analysis of (24).
Yet, if (24) is to be treated as (25a), one wonders why conditionals are often
felt to have an epistemic modal flavor. In other words, why does (24) appear to
be equivalent to (26)?
(26) If Harry is not in the library, he must be in the common room.
The explanation runs as follows. By uttering (24), one expresses a proposition,
which is a function from possible worlds to truth values, and the truth value may
be #. Yet for indicative conditionals, the default is that there are some worlds in
the common ground in which the conditional has the value 1. If not, that is, if it
were given that Harry in fact is in the library, an utterance of (24) would not be
felicitous. If this is indeed the normal use of indicatives (and I think it is fairly
uncontroversial that this is so), the epistemic flavor is expected, for the epistemic
alternatives to the actual world are exactly those worlds that are in the common
ground (i.e. the worlds we consider live-options).
On empirical grounds, it is hard to choose between the analyses in (25a) and
(25b). Theoretically, however, it is simplest to assume that the analysis in (25a)
is right. If it is not possible for⇒ to stand on its own, this has to be additionally
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stipulated, for it doesn’t follow from the semantics. One would have to come up
with a motivation behind this restriction. In what follows, I will therefore assume
that ⇒ may occur unembedded.
To sum up, we have that Belnap’s conditional semantics predicts that if -
clauses in the scope of a quantificational operator are interpreted as supplying
an additional restriction on the domain of that operator. We assume that the
conditional may occur on its own, i.e. that conditionals may have truth value
gaps. Obviously, this has implications for the logic of conditionals, to which we
turn next.
5.3 Implications for the logic of conditionals
By adopting a partial semantics for if, we loose the validity of certain laws which
“warm the cockles of a logician’s heart”, as (Belnap 1973, 51) nicely puts it.
Indeed, Lycan (2006) sees this this as the main objection against conditional
assertion theories. Entailment is defined as follows:
5.3.1. Definition (Semantic entailment)
ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . ϕn |= ψ iff for all worlds w ∈ M s.t. M, w |= ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . ϕn:
M, w |= ψ
It is now clear that in Belnap’s semantics, the following do no longer hold:19
(27) a. Contraposition:
ϕ⇒ ψ ≡ ¬ψ ⇒ ¬ϕ
(i.e. ϕ⇒ ψ |= ¬ψ ⇒ ¬ϕ and ¬ψ ⇒ ¬ϕ |= ϕ⇒ ψ)
b. Or-to-if-inference:
ϕ ∨ ψ |= ¬ϕ⇒ ψ
Any world in which ϕ ⇒ ψ is true, is a world in which ψ is true, and therefore
a world in which ¬ψ ⇒ ¬ϕ lacks a truth value. It is easy to see that the reverse
direction doesn’t hold either. Contraposition is thus ruled out. As for Or-to-if-
inference, some worlds in which ϕ ∨ ψ is true will make ϕ is true. These worlds
will clearly not make ¬ϕ⇒ ψ true.2021
19It is very likely that even more laws do no longer hold. We restrict attention to Contrapo-
sition and Or-to-if-inference, because the invalidity of these particular two is often used as an
argument against conditional assertion theories, see for instance Lycan (2006).
20The reverse direction ‘If-to-or-inference’ of course does come out: any world in which ¬ϕ⇒
ψ is true, is a world in which ϕ ∨ ψ is true in all worlds.
21All I am presuming here about the meaning of ¬ and ∨ is that ¬ψ is not true if ψ is, and
that ϕ ∨ ψ is true if ϕ is. I consider this uncontroversial. Yet the reader may wonder about
the semantics of connectives other than ⇒, now that we are working in a partial system. The
semantics that Belnap assumes comes down to strong Kleene, except of course his definitions
for ⇒.
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This is a problem, for Contraposition and Or-to-if-inference do seem to hold
for natural language indicative conditionals, as (28) and (29) respectively show:
(28) If it is raining, we won’t play.
Therefore, if we play, it isn’t raining.
(29) Either Oswald killed Kennedy, or someone else did.
Therefore, if Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did.
Is there a way out? It seems that there is. It has been argued that, despite first
appearances, Contraposition and Or-to-if-inference are invalid. Two counterex-
amples to Contraposition are:
(30) a. If he doesn’t live in Paris, he lives in France.
6≡ If he doesn’t live in France, he lives in Paris.
b. Even if the Bible is divinely inspired, it is still not literally true.
6≡ If the Bible is literally true, it is not divinely inspired.
These examples are sometimes objected to. For instance, (30a) seems to really
mean ‘If he doesn’t live in Paris, he lives elsewhere in France’, and (30b) rests
on the presence of even. On the other hand, even is generally thought not to
make any truth conditional contribution to the sentence in which it occurs, but
to only make a pragmatic contribution (for (30b) perhaps that it isn’t likely that
the Bible is divinely inspired). If so, (30b) does present a problem, cf. Stalnaker
(1984, 124).
Here is a counterexample to Or-to-if-inference;
(31) The North Koreans started the Korean war or some Martians started the
American civil war.
Therefore, if the North Koreans didn’t start the Korean war, some Mar-
tians started the American civil war.
According to Bennett (2003), this is not valid. The reason for this seems to be
that the speaker’s only ground for accepting the premise is that she is convinced
of the first disjunct.
But if Contraposition and Or-to-if-inference are not valid, then why are (28)
and (29) such compelling arguments? As it turns out, in our framework there are
two answers to this question; which both seem equally good to me. First, it could
be that our judgments about the validity of (28) and (29) come about by the
tacit assumption that the premise and conclusion have a truth value (Strawson
1952).22 This will be explained in 5.3.1. Second, following Stalnaker (1975), the
reasonableness of (28) and (29) could also be due to the assumption that we are
in a context in which the premise was felicitously uttered. This will be shown in
22I am grateful to Kai von Fintel (p.c.) for pointing out the relevance of Strawson-entailment
to Belnap’s conditional semantics.
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5.3.2.
5.3.1 Strawson-entailment
Strawson (1952) considers ways to make the inference from the Aristotelean A-
form to the Aristotelean I-form valid:
(32) Every crow is black.
Therefore, some crows are black.
Traditionally, the inference in (32) is not justified, for its premise is true in models
in which there are no crows, yet its conclusion is clearly false in such a model.
However, most English speakers find (32) valid.
Strawson sought to solve this puzzle by (i) abandoning the assumption that
all sentences necessarily have a truth value, and (ii) redefining the notion of
entailment. He assumes that A-forms are neither true nor false in case their
subject term is empty:
Suppose someone says ‘All John’s children are asleep’. Obviously he
will not normally, or properly, say this, unless he believes that John
has children (who are asleep). But suppose he is mistaken. Suppose
John has no children. Then is it true or false that all John’s children
are asleep? Either answer would seem to be misleading. But we are
not compelled to give either answer. We can, and normally should,
say that, since John has no children, the question does not arise.
(Strawson 1952, 173-174).
In addition, Strawson assumes that cases in which the subject term is empty are
irrelevant as far as entailment is concerned:
The rule that A entails I states that, if corresponding statements of
these forms have truth values, then if the statement of the A form is
true, the statement of the I form must be true; and so on. (Strawson
1952, 177)
Let |=s be the kind of entailment that Strawson had in mind. This can be defined
as follows:
5.3.2. Definition (Strawson-entailment)
ϕ |=S ψ iff
ϕ, χ |= ψ (i.e. ϕ, χ classically entails ψ )
where χ is a premise stating that the definedness conditions of all state-
ments involved are satisfied
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It is easy to see that (32) is Strawson-valid. The premise presupposes that there
are crows. Strawson thought of this as a precondition for the premise to have a
truth value: only if there are crows, can ‘Every crow is black’ be true or false. It
follows that provided that the premise of (32) has a truth value, we are justified
to conclude that some crows are black.
We have argued above that presupposition should not be handled in terms of
truth value gaps, but this doesn’t mean that Strawson-entailment is not relevant
for conditional reasoning. In fact, Belnap (1973) himself refers to this notion of
entailment as a useful one for conditional assertion. Of course, both Or-to-if-
inference and Contraposition turn out to be Strawson valid:
(33) a. Contraposition:
ϕ⇒ ψ ≡S ¬ψ ⇒ ¬ϕ
b. Or-to-if-inference:
ϕ ∨ ψ |=S ¬ϕ⇒ ψ
Contraposition follows, i.e. ϕ ⇒ ψ,¬ψ |= ¬ψ ⇒ ¬ϕ because there is no world
which makes ϕ⇒ ψ and ¬ψ true. The same holds for the other direction. Clearly,
Or-to-if-inference is also Strawson-valid: any worlds in which ϕ ∨ ψ is true and
in which ¬ϕ ⇒ ψ has a truth value, is a world in which ¬ϕ ⇒ ψ is true. Thus,
assuming that the statements are either true or false, we get the inferences we
want.
What does this mean for our inferences in (28) and (29)? In as far as these are
valid, they are enthymematic inferences, i.e. inferences that rely on an additional
tacit premise: that the statements involved have a (classical) truth value. It
could well be that Strawson-entailment describes the way that human reasoning
naturally works. Moreover, it seems that other linguistic phenomena are also
sensitive to Strawson-entailment: von Fintel (1999) argues that NPI licensing is
sensitive to Strawson-downward entailment.
To me, this explanation seems attractive enough. Yet there is an alternative
explanation available. Thus, even if you, for some reason, do not accept that
Strawson-entailment underlies our judgments of validity, this still doesn’t mean
that Belnap’s conditional semantics is wrong. We can also explain the reason-
ableness of (28) and (29) in terms of Stalnaker’s reasonable inference (plus some
additional assumptions). To this we turn next.
5.3.2 Reasonable inference
Stalnaker (1975) points out that while there are many instances of Or-to-if-
inference that seem intuitively valid, there are also quite a few absurd instances.
Compare his (34a) to (34b):
(34) a. Either the butler or the gardener did it.
Therefore, if the butler didn’t do it, the gardener did.
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b. The butler did it.
Therefore, if he didn’t, the gardener did.
Intuitively, the argument in (34a) is justified, but the argument in (34b) is not.
But the premise of (34b) entails the premise of (34a), therefore it follows that if
(34a) is valid, so is (34b).
To solve this puzzle, Stalnaker proposes that examples like (34b) indicate
that Or-to-if-inference is not generally valid. This raises the question why (34a)
seems so compelling. Stalnaker argues that though the conclusion of (34a) is not
semantically entailed by the premise, it is nevertheless a reasonable inference.
Reasonable inference is essentially a pragmatic relation, defined as follows:
5.3.3. Definition (Reasonable inference (Stalnaker’s version))
An inference of ψ from ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . ϕn is reasonable iff every context in which
the premises ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . ϕn can be appropriately asserted and in which they
are accepted entails ψ.
Here the context is the set of possible worlds that the participants think likely
candidates to be the actual world. Given Stalnaker’s semantics for conditionals
(which I will not restate here, but see chapter 2), both Or-to-if-inference and
Contraposition come out as reasonable inferences on the assumption that (i)
disjunctions are only assertible in a context which allows either disjunct to be true
without the other, and that (ii) conditionals are only assertible if the antecedent
and consequent are both compatible with the context. These are of course exactly
the implicatures that are traditionally thought to be associated with disjunctions
and conditionals (Grice 1975, 1989, Gazdar 1979).
It is clear, however, that on Belnap’s conditional semantics, Or-to-if-inference
and Contraposition will not come out as reasonable, given definition 5.3.3. A
context in which ϕ ∨ ψ is felicitously uttered and accepted will not (classically)
entail ¬ϕ ⇒ ψ, as it does not entail ¬ϕ. But for Belnap, the truth of ¬ϕ is
required for ¬ϕ ⇒ ψ to be true. Suppose though that we replace Stalnaker’s
definition by the following:
5.3.4. Definition (Reasonable inference (revised version))
An inference of ψ from ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . ϕn is reasonable iff every context in which
the premises ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . ϕn can be appropriately asserted and in which they
are accepted is such that ψ has maximal conditional assertability.23
As noted briefly above, inferences with a conclusion that has maximal assertability
are intuitively judged valid, cf. McDermott (1996). For example, although not
valid on Belnap’s semantics, (35) seems reasonable:
23One may wonder why I am not plugging in Strawson-entailment. But this would locate
the validity totally in this entailment; the implicatures would not matter anymore. I therefore
think that this is more Stalnakerian.
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(35) If the butler did it, then the butler did it.
In definition 5.2.3, we have equated a conditional’s assertability with the proba-
bility that it is true given that it has a truth value. It is clear that ϕ ⇒ ϕ has
probability 1. The feeling that such conditionals are tautological, McDermott
argues, is due to a confusion between maximal assertability and necessary truth.
It is thus no problem that our semantics doesn’t predict that such sentences are
always true.
We now have everything in place to explain why Or-to-if-inference, although
not valid, does seem acceptable. As said, disjunctions are only assertible in a
context which allows either disjunct to be true without the other, i.e. ϕ∧¬ψ and
¬ϕ∧ψ are both open possibilities. It is clear that in such a context, the following
has maximal assertibility: ¬ϕ ⇒ ψ. For contraposition we get that ϕ ⇒ ψ is
assertible if the context leaves open both the antecedent and the consequent.
That is, there are ¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ worlds (though no ϕ ∧ ¬ψ-worlds). But this means
that ¬ψ ⇒ ¬ϕ has probability 1.24
To sum up, just as we assumed with Strawson in 5.3.1, according to the
revised Stalnakerian analysis, the apparent validity of Contraposition and Or-to-
if-inference rests on an additional tacit premise. But for Stalnaker this premise
is not that the statements involved have a truth value, but that the statements
involved are felicitously uttered. This seems another good defense to me against
the objection that Belnap’s semantics makes these laws invalid.
Another puzzle
Frank Veltman (p.c.) objects that sentences like (36) are true, but given Belnap’s
semantics they come out undefined (this is of course the kind of example on which
defenses of material implication are usually based):
(36) If she is sick, then I’m the queen of England.
What matters here is not the intuition that (36) is true, but that we can infer
from it that the referent of she is not sick. If indicative conditionals correspond
to material implication, this is explained. For we may assume that the speaker is
not the queen of England, and the only way a material implication with a false
consequent can be true is if the antecedent is also false.
Within Belnap’s semantics, however, the same conclusion is warranted: ϕ⇒
ψ,¬ψ |= ¬ϕ, for there is no model in which the premises are both true, hence
there is no countermodel. Of course, someone who utters (36) thinks that (36)
is not true, as uttering (36) is typically a way to convey your disbelief that she
is really sick. But as argued at length, Belnap’s semantics does not imply that
24Crucially, I am assuming here that acceptance of a conditional by a group of conversation-
alists does not mean that they accept it as true. If so, ϕ⇒ ψ could never be both felicitously
asserted and accepted. Rather: they accept that it is true, if it has a truth value.
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this is reason not to utter (36), or that this makes (36) meaningless. Even if
(36) is undefined, it still expresses a proposition, and a speaker may utter (36)
felicitously, if she believes that if (36) has a truth value, it is true. I see no reason
not to assume that the speaker of (36) believes this.
5.4 Why we want conditional connectives
We have now established the following: (i) a partial semantics of if accounts for
domain restricting uses of if, and (ii) can be made to yield a plausible logic for
conditionals. At this point then, Belnap’s semantics does not seem less viable
than the folkloric Lewis/Kratzer semantics. This raises the question whether
there is anything to gain by adopting Belnap’s conditional. In other words:
• Is there any reason to think that if indeed corresponds to a conditional
connective?
The present section provides three such reasons. First, in 5.4.1, we will argue that
we need conditional propositions in discourse, in order to explain how anaphors
can pick them up. Second, in 5.4.2, we will see that Belnap’s semantics allows
for a more straightforward compositional implementation than the Lewis/Kratzer
theory does. Finally, 5.4.3 argues that we need conditional connectives to account
for iterated if -clauses.
5.4.1 Conditionals in dialogue
The first reason to want to have conditional connectives in the logical forms of
natural language sentences has to do with the interpersonal traffic with condi-
tionals in dialogues. This argument comes from von Fintel (2007) (in turn, he
credits Weatherson). Consider the following dialogue:25
(37) A: If this cat isn’t male, it is female.
B: Necessarily so.
B′: That’s very unlikely.
The problem is this. Assuming that so and that are sentence anaphors, they have
to refer back to some sentence in A’s utterance. But under the Lewis/Kratzer
analysis, there is no sentence in A’s utterance which could be substituted for so or
that such that the result corresponds to the intuitive meaning of the utterances
by B and B′. Let’s focus on B’s statement. It seems that this sentence must
be interpreted as if necessarily embeds a conditional with a restrictive if -clause.
That is, (assuming that we are working in the Lewis/Kratzer framework), we
would like to derive the following logical form:
25This is not von Fintel’s original example. I changed it slightly to bring out the point more
clearly. I thank Regine Eckardt (p.c.) for suggesting this change.
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(38) (all w: w is compatible with the evidence and this cat isn’t male in w)(this
cat is female in w)
In other words: B says that in all epistemic alternatives in which this cat is not
male, it is female. Similar remarks apply to B′’s utterance, i.e. quantification
ranges over worlds which satisfy the if -clause. B′ thus says here that in hardly
any of the alternatives in which this cat isn’t male, it is female (never mind that
it follows that B′ is thus confused about the gender possibilities for cats).
It seems, however, that there is no way to derive these meanings, if if doesn’t
correspond to a conditional connective. Given the Lewis/Kratzer analysis, A’s
utterance contains two sentences that are candidate referents for so and that.
First, these anaphors could refer back to the matrix sentence, which is in this
analysis a modal complex. Second, they could refer back to the embedded con-
sequent (assuming that this proposition is accessible to the anaphors). Neither
option gives us what we want. To see this, suppose that in B’s utterance, so refers
back to the matrix sentence in A’s utterance. This would lead to the following
representation:
(39) (all w: w is compatible with the evidence)((all v: v is compatible with the
evidence in w and this cat isn’t male in v)(it is female in v))
This expresses a doubly modalized proposition: that it is necessary that it is
necessary that this cat is female in those worlds in which it is not male. This
is not the reading we want, as we want just one layer of modality as in (38).26
The propositional anaphors must thus be concluded not to pick up the matrix
sentence.
The alternative is that the anaphors pick up the embedded consequent, i.e.
that this cat is female. The problem with this option is that we still need to have
the domains of the modals in the statements by B and B′ restricted to worlds in
which this cat is not male. Simply plugging in the consequent leads to (40) (for
B):
(40) (all w: w is compatible with the evidence)(this cat is female in w)
Again, this is not the same as (38). In other words, the alternative analysis falsely
predicts that B’s statement means that it is necessary simpliciter that this cat is
female (independent of this cat not being male).
Can we, to save the idea that so refers back to the consequent, assume that B’s
statement is implicitly conditionalized? As argued by von Fintel (2007), it seems
that we cannot. That is, implicit conditionalization is not generally available as
26Note that it won’t do to plead modal concord. As we saw in chapter 3, modal concord is
only possible between modals of equivalent force and flavor. The modal in B’s utterance may
be similar to the covert modal in A’s utterance in these two respect, but the modals in B′’s
utterance are definitely not. Thus, modal concord will not save all the problematic examples.
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an interpretation strategy for modal expressions. For the following dialogue we
don’t want to say that the overt modals are restricted to worlds in which this cat
isn’t male:
(41) A: If this cat isn’t male, it is female.
B: This cat is necessarily female.
B′: It’s very unlikely that this cat is female.
In this dialogue, B’s utterance corresponds to the representation in (40) rather
than to the one in (38). That is, B is saying that she has evidence to conclude that
this cat is female. Similar for B′: she is saying that she has reason to belief that
this cat is not female. In interpreting these utterances, there is thus no implicit
conditionalization involved. Now the only difference between B’s utterance in this
dialogue and the one in (37) is that the argument of the adverb is not a sentence
anaphor, but a sentence. It is hard to see how this could affect the possibility
for implicit conditionalization. One would expect that it is possible to read B’s
utterance as stating that this cat is necessarily female provided that it is male.
But such a reading seems completely unavailable. Conclusion: the anaphors so
and that in (37) cannot have the consequent as their referent. As they can neither
refer back to the entire sentence uttered by A, this exhausts the options of the
Lewis/Kratzer analysis.
With Belnap’s semantics, on the other hand, our dialogue can easily be dealt
with, because embedding the form that this theory assigns to A’s utterance under
the modal operators in the replies by B and B′ gives us exactly the meanings we
want:
(42) A: If this cat isn’t male, it is female.
this cat isn’t male ⇒ it is female
‘if the conditional has a truth value, i.e if this cat isn’t male, it is
female’
B: Necessarily so.
(all w: w is compatible with the evidence)(this cat isn’t male in w ⇒ it
is female in w)
‘in all worlds compatible with the evidence where the embedded
conditional has a truth-value, i.e. where this cat isn’t male, it is
female’
B′: That’s very unlikely.
(few w: w is compatible with the evidence)(this cat isn’t male in w ⇒
it is female in w
‘in few worlds compatible with the evidence where the embedded
conditional has a truth value, i.e. where this cat isn’t male, it is
female’27
27Simplifying things, I assume here that that’s unlikely can be analyzed analogously to few.
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To sum up, the behavior of conditionals in dialogues suggests that there must
be truly conditional forms to pick up for the anaphors so and that. In Belnap’s
system, such a form is obviously provided. Under the Lewis/Kratzer account,
however, these dialogues remain mysterious.
5.4.2 Compositional conditionals
A second reason for adopting Belnap’s semantics rather than the traditional
Lewis/Kratzer approach is that Belnap’s connective allows for a more straightfor-
ward compositional semantics. Within the Lewis/Kratzer approach to condition-
als surprisingly little is said about the compositional interpretation of condition-
als. To the best of my knowledge, the only exceptions are von Stechow (2004a)
and von Fintel (1994). Von Stechow treats if -clauses as syntactic arguments of
the quantifier, just as common noun phrases form the argument of determiners.
In von Fintel’s approach, on the other hand, if -clauses restrict the domain of the
relevant quantifier through co-indexation, without being a syntactic argument of
the operator. I will discuss both proposals in turn.28
On the Lewis/Kratzer theory, if -clauses do not appear at surface where they
are interpreted. In a way, there is thus a mismatch between syntax and semantics.
The null-hypothesis which accounts for this is that in a conditional like ‘If it is
snowing, it must be cold’ the subordinate clause is base-generated as a sister to
the modal base of the modal, in which position it is also interpreted, while overt
word order is derived by moving the if -clause to a sentence-initial position. This
is the proposal by von Stechow (2004a). Accordingly, the LF for our sentence is
as in (43). As is standard, we assume that the expletive subject is also lowered to
the position where it was base-generated (the VP, given the VP-internal subject
hypothesis).29:
Of course, this is not realistic, as the set of possible worlds is probably not countable, but
nothing hinges on this.
28My presentation is partly based on a recent paper by Ingo Reich (2007), which also compares
these theories.
29This departs from von Stechow, who takes modal bases to directly assign sets of accessible
worlds to their argument, rather than sets of propositions, i.e. the modal base is of type 〈s, 〈st〉〉
rather than 〈s, 〈st, t〉〉. We stick to the latter more Kratzerian formulation, which is also the
one adopted elsewhere in this dissertation.
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(43) I
′
I′ VP
I
must
MB
〈s, 〈st〉〉
MB
〈s, 〈st〉〉
f
CP
〈st〉
if IP
〈st〉
it is snowing
it be cold
Compositional interpretation proceeds as usual, except for the following two new
interpretation rules. First, if is semantically vacuous (say it denotes the identity
function λp.p on propositions), thus the denotation of the entire if -clause is the
proposition that it is snowing. Second, this proposition combines with the modal
base through model base modification:
5.4.1. Definition (Modal base modification)
If ϕ is a tree and {α, β} is the set of its daughters such that α is of type
〈st〉 and β is of type 〈s, 〈st, t〉〉, then JϕKM,h = λw.(JβKM,h(w) ∪ JαKM,h)
(i.e. if β = f and JfKM,h = h(f) = f, JϕKM,h = λw.(f(w) ∪ JαKM,h)).
Informally, quantification is restricted to modal base worlds which make the if -
clause true. The truth conditions of (42) can now be calculated as follows:
(44) Jmust(f(if it is snowing))(it is cold)KM,h(w) = 1 iff
for all v ∈
⋂
(f(w) ∪ Jit is snowingKM,h): it is cold in v
where f = h(f) = what is known
i.e. iff for all worlds that are compatible with what is known and in which
it is snowing: it is cold
A potential problem with von Stechow’s approach is that it suggests that the rela-
tion between if -clauses and the quantifiers whose range they restrict is extremely
tight. For this reason, it is hard to see how it can account for the following
examples, due to Dekker (2001):
(45) a. Every student accepts any position if she qualifies for it.
b. No postdoc disregards a job opportunity if she qualifies for it.
Dekker argues that in these sentences, the if -clause must be taken to restrict two
domains simultaneously (of every and any in (45a), of no and a in (45b)). He
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writes: “This is not impossible, but it certainly transcends the capacities of the
envisaged techniques”. Note that we can even produce sentences in which the
if -clause would have to restrict three domains at the same time:
(46) a. No post-doc should disregard a job opportunity if she qualifies for
it.
b. Every student always reads every paper if it is suggested to him by
Chomsky.
On von Stechow’s approach, for an if -clause to restrict a domain, it must be
base-generated as a sister to the domain argument. It follows that the if -clause
in (46a) must have been base-generated in three different positions. The only way
to deal with this sentence on von Stechow’s implementation of the Lewis/Kratzer
theory is to posit two implicit if -clauses in the sentence, with the same content
as the overt one. Needless to say, this is not very attractive.
Von Fintel’s (1994, chapter 3) approach seems to do better in this respect.
He develops an in situ approach and assumes that the if -clause binds the free
modal base variable and as such constrains the interpretation of that variable.
This move allows the if -clause to be interpreted as part of the modal’s restrictor,
while allowing it to occur at a different location.30 Consider the following LF:
(47) IP
CP
ifi IP
it is snowing
IP
I′ VP
I
must
MB
fi
it be cold
The modal base variable, here with index i, needs to be filled in by the context of
utterance (this determines whether it is epistemic, or deontic, etc.). The if -clause
carries the same index, and therefore restricts its value (but doesn’t supply this
value itself, as is the case in normal binding):
5.4.2. Definition (Interpretation rule for ifi)
JifiK
M,h = λpλq.JqKM,h
′
, where h′ = h[i 7→ h(i) ∪ JpKM,h]
30To be sure, von Fintel’s implementation concerns the Lewis/Kratzer theory for if -clauses
in the scope of adverbial quantifiers like usually, but I think it is safe to assume that the same
theory applies to conditionals under modal operators.
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Essentially, in interpretation, the if -clause is ignored at first, but then, when
the variable is interpreted, it is “remembered”, so that the variable assignment
function takes it into account. Interpretation thus proceeds as follows:
(48) Jifi(it is snowing)(must(fi)(it is cold))K
h(w) = 1, iff
Jmust (f)(it is cold)Kh
′
(w) = 1,
i.e. iff for all v ∈ (h(f) ∪ {that it is snowing})(w): it is cold in v
where h(f) = what is known
Nothing in this theory prevents an if -clause from binding several indices, so
Dekker’s data seem accounted for.
Once we adopt Belnap’s conditional, however, the dislocation problem van-
ishes. If -clauses can, for the most part, simply be interpreted where they occur
at surface. In line with Bhatt & Pancheva’s (2006) conclusions, I assume that
the if -clause of our example sentence modifies the VP. This leads to the following
LF for ‘It must be cold, if it is snowing’ (again, I assume that the subject is
reconstructed at LF) :
(49) IP
I′
I MB
must f
VP
VP CP
it be cold if IP
it is snowing
In line with the previous section, I assume the following lexical entry for if :
5.4.3. Definition (Entry for Belnap’s if)
JifK = λpλq.p⇒ q
Now the truth conditions for (48) can straightforwardly be calculated:
(50) Jmust (f)((it be cold)(if (it is snowing)))KM,h(w) = 1, iff
for all worlds v ∈ f(w): Jit is snowing ⇒ it be coldKM,h,v = 1,
i.e. iff for all worlds v ∈
⋂
f(w) such that Jit is snowingKM,h(v) = 1:
it is cold in v
where f = h(f) = what is known
Crucially, we do not need to assume that the if -clause is part of the modal’s
restrictor, nor that it ‘binds’ the modal base variable in order to arrive at the
184 Chapter 5. Domain restriction by if-clauses
restrictive interpretation. This seems to be a clear advantage both over von
Stechow’s and von Fintel’s approach.
Of course, for sentence-initial (restrictive) if -clauses, as in ‘If it is snowing, it
must be cold’ we still face the problem that the surface order is ‘the wrong order’,
so to speak. To make things work, I assume that sentence-initial if -clauses are
related to sentence-final ones through movement. Then, at LF, the if -clause
must be reconstructed to the position where it was base-generated. Is there any
evidence for this position? Bhatt & Pancheva (2006) argue that reconstruction to
such a position isn’t obligatory, but is definitely possible in some cases. Consider
(51a) and (51b):
(51) a. Johni will be happy if pictures of himselfi are on sale.
b. If pictures of himselfi are on sale, Johni will be happy.
In (51a), John c-commands the pronoun and binding is possible. In (51b), how-
ever, the binder doesn’t c-command the bindee, but a binding relationship is still
possible. Under the assumption that for a binding relationship to be possible,
there must be c-command in at least some level of derivation, these facts suggests
that the if -clause in (51b) is reconstructed at LF to a sentence-final position so
that c-command is ensured. I conclude: my analysis isn’t grossly implausible
from a syntactic point of view. Of course, if -clauses tend to be fronted. But this
is probably related to their discourse status as topics. Although I have argued
above that if -clauses need not be topics, it seems safe to assume that they often
are.
This leaves us with one question. Can Belnap’s theory account for if -clauses
that restrict multiple domains? Consider Dekker’s (52):
(52) Every student accepts any position if she qualifies for it.
Belnap’s semantics offers a very elegant account of sentences like this. Assuming
that any position raises to take scope over the if -clause, (52) is parsed as:
(53) J(every student)(any position(if(she qualifies for it)(she accepts it)))KM,h
(w) = 1, iff (λx.x is a student ⊆ λx.(λy.y is a position ⊆ λy.x
qualifies for y ⇒ x accepts y)
‘For every student x and position y such that the conditional is defined,
i.e. such that x qualifies for y: x accepts y’
Note that on Belnap’s semantics, we need not come up with highly complicated
techniques to deal with this kind of domain restriction. Instead, the desired
readings follow in the simplest way imaginable. This makes the semantics more
attractive than its contenders.
There is much more to be said about the syntax of conditionals. I merely
wanted to demonstrate that Belnap’s conditional allows interpreting if -clauses in
a more straightforward way than seems possible in extant implementations of the
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Lewis/Kratzer conditional. Adopting Belnap’s connective makes compositional
semantics a whole lot easier. It may not be a revolution over the Lewis/Kratzer
approach in this respect, but it does make for a simpler theory.
5.4.3 Domain restriction by coordinated if -clauses
Finally, the last reason for adopting Belnap’s semantics comes from iterated if -
clauses. Note that the following two sentences seem to be equivalent. In fact,
both are trivial (Edgington 1995):
(54) a. If it rains or snows tomorrow, then if it doesn’t rain tomorrow, it
will snow.
b. If it rains or snows tomorrow and it doesn’t rain (tomorrow), it will
snow.
What is so puzzling about these equivalences? This: Gibbard (1981) famously
proved that if indicative conditionals correspond to whatever truth-functional
connective ⇒, it follows from the equivalence of ϕ⇒ (ψ ⇒ χ) and (ϕ ∧ ψ)⇒ χ
that⇒must be material implication. Gibbard’s assumptions are the following (to
be sure, here ⇒ is the connective for indicative conditional, without prejudging
its semantics, while → stands for material implication):
(i) ϕ⇒ (ψ ⇒ χ) ≡ (ϕ ∧ ψ)⇒ χ
(ii) ϕ⇒ ψ |= ϕ→ ψ
(iii) If ϕ |= ψ, then |= ϕ⇒ ψ
It is now easy to prove that ϕ→ ψ |= ϕ⇒ ψ. Take the following sentence:
(55) (ϕ→ ψ)⇒ (ϕ⇒ ψ)
By (i), (55) is equivalent to ((ϕ→ ψ)∧ϕ)⇒ ψ. In turn, this formula is equivalent
to (ϕ ∧ ψ) ⇒ ψ. By (iii), this formula is true in any world. By (ii), (55) entails
(ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ⇒ ψ). As this formula is entailed by a tautology, we may conclude
that its antecedent entails its consequent, i.e.:
(56) ϕ→ ψ |= ϕ⇒ ψ
It thus seems that if we accept that (54a) and (54b) are equivalent, the semantics
we have given above for ⇒ must be wrong (that is, Belnap’s semantics must be
wrong). We can only get the equivalence right by assigning ⇒ the same truth
conditions as material implication. But as we have seen, material implication
doesn’t give us domain restriction if it occurs embedded under a quantifier. Be-
sides, material implication leads to paradoxes. Thus, Gibbard’s proof seems to
show that we can either have a semantics for indicatives which gives us the equiv-
alence of (54a) and (54b), or a non-paradoxical semantics for indicatives, but not
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both. This led Gibbard to propose that conditionals do not express propositions.
Kratzer’s solution
But there are other ways out of the impasse. For instance, the Lewis/Kratzer
analysis can be seen as a solution. Kratzer (1991) argues that Gibbard’s proof
holds only if one takes indicative conditionals to be two-place operators. But as
we have seen, in her framework the logical forms of conditional sentences have a
very different structure. She treats if -clauses as restrictions on the domain of a
quantificational operator.
How can iterated if -clauses be analyzed? Kratzer proposes that such if -
clauses successively restrict the domain of one and the same quantifier, so that
the logical form of both (54a) and (54b) is:
(57) (all w: w is compatible with the evidence and it rains or snows tomorrow in
w and it doesn’t rain tomorrow in w)(it will snow in w)
While this certainly predicts the right meaning for our sentences, it is obvious
that to derive (57) from (54a), we must drastically rearrange various parts of the
sentence. In particular, the presence of then is mysterious. Intuitively, this word
is an anaphoric element which links up to the if -clause. But then it occurs in
the wrong place in (54a). For example, on von Fintel’s (1994) implementation of
the theory, one would want the LF for our sentence to look something like this,
where the restrictor variable f is bound twice, by two if -clauses:
(58) [IP[CPifi it rains or snows tomorrow, ifi it doesn’t rain tomorrow] [IPmust
fi it will snow]]
But where can we fit then in? If then is a resumptive pronoun picking up the
if -clause (i.e. a phonetic realization of f), we would rather expect:
(59) If it rains or snows tomorrow, if it doesn’t rain tomorrow, then it snows.
Schlenker’s solution
Iterated if -clauses are one of the arguments that Schlenker (2004) gives for treat-
ing if -clauses as plural definite descriptions. This analysis goes back to Schein
(2003) who proposed such an analysis to solve a problem by Barker (1997). Barker
is concerned with the E-type approach to anaphora, i.e. the idea that pronouns
go proxy for descriptions. For instance, in (60), the first occurrence of it goes
proxy for ‘the classical theory’, while the second occurrence of it is to be analyzed
as ‘the classical inconsistent theory’:
(60) If a theory is classical, then if it is inconsistent, it is usually trivial.
5.4. Why we want conditional connectives 187
Clearly, the only plausible interpretation for this sentence is the one where the
adverb of quantification is restricted by the coordination of the if -clauses: ‘most
any a classical inconsistent theory is trivial’. But Barker shows that any compo-
sitionally derived interpretation for (60) that assumes that each if -clause comes
with its own quantificational operator to restrict is absurd. These would have to
come down to something like the following: ‘Any situation in which a theory is
classical is such that in any situation where that theory is also inconsistent, it is
usually trivial’. But this suggests that the same theory can sometimes be trivial
and sometimes not. (I will not go over the argument here; see Barker’s paper
for more details). To solve the puzzle, Schein proposes that if -clauses are plural
definite descriptions of events.
Schlenker (2004) takes over this solution, but proposes that if -clauses are
plural definite descriptions of possible worlds. He would assign the following
logical form to (54a):
(61) [ιW: it rains or snows tomorrow (W)][ιW′: W′ ⊆ W and it doesn’t rain
tomorrow (W′)][all w: w ∈ W′] (it will snow (w))
Thus, he takes over Kratzer’s assumption that the sentence contains a covert
quantifier over possible worlds, but the relevant domain is now determined in a
different way. The first if -clause in (54a) denotes all and only those worlds in
which it rains or snows. The second if -clause narrows this further down to just
those worlds in which it rains or snows but doesn’t rain. It is asserted that in
all of the remaining worlds it snows. Crucially, the (covert) modal in (54a) is
interpreted in situ. Hence, this representation is more natural than Kratzer’s
analysis in (57) from a syntactic point of view. However, the analysis makes
different predictions than Kratzer does. For instance, it is now expected that
modals can also collectively quantify over the worlds supplied by the if -clause.
But it isn’t clear that this ever happens.
Belnap’s alternative
On Belnap’s semantics the equivalence between (54a) and (54b) immediately
follows while yielding Kratzer’s predictions. Strictly speaking, the definitions
above seem to disallow the kind of nesting of conditionals that we are interested
in here, but we can easily repair them, following a proposal by Belnap (1973, 50):
5.4.4. Definition (Conditional assertion revised for nesting)
Jϕ⇒ ψKM,h(w) = 1, iff JψKM,h(w) = 1 if JϕKM,h(w) = 1 and JψKM,h(w) =
1/0 ; otherwise
Jϕ⇒ ψKM,h(w) = #
We can now analyze (54a) as follows (we could, if we wanted to, assume a covert
epistemic necessity modal on top of the entire conditional):
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(62) (it rains or snows tomorrow) ⇒ (it doesn’t rain tomorrow ⇒ it will snow)
If (62) has a truth value, i.e. if it rains or snows, and if the embedded conditional
has a truth value, i.e. if it doesn’t rain, it snows. That is, it snows if it rains or
snows but doesn’t rain. So (54a) comes out equivalent to (54b). Note that on this
theory, there is no mismatch between syntax and semantics, as this representation
mirrors the surface form of (54a).
Of course, on this semantics, neither of (54a) and (54b) comes out as trivial,
because they may be undefined (the antecedent may not be true). We can, how-
ever, explain away the intuition that these sentences are tautological, by pointing
out that they are maximally assertable. Recall that a conditional’s assertability
is the probability that it is true given that it has a truth value. Clearly, (62)
is maximally assertable: if it has a truth value, it is most definitely true. We
just thought that the sentence was trivial, because we tend to confuse maximal
assertability with necessary truth.
Summing up, there is another way to avoid the conclusion that if we want
to have the equivalence between (54a) and (54b), material implication is the
only candidate for indicative conditionals. We can assign partial truth conditions
to indicative conditionals. This suggests that Gibbard’s proof only holds in a
classical, two-valued system. Indeed, in a partial system, it is plain that Gibbard’s
principles do not straightforwardly hold. The problem is his third principle,
repeated here:
(iii) If ϕ |= ψ, then |= ϕ⇒ ψ
Given Belnap’s semantics, this is simply not true. If all worlds that make ϕ true
are worlds that make ψ true, it doesn’t follow that all worlds make ϕ⇒ ψ true,
for some worlds are ¬ϕ-worlds and in these worlds, ϕ⇒ ψ has no truth value.
Interim summary
We have given three reasons to think that there are conditional connectives in
the logical forms of natural language indicatives:
• This explains the interpersonal traffic of conditionals in dialogues.
• This gives rise to a simple compositional semantics.
• This accounts for domain restriction by the coordination of two if -clauses
in a syntactically non-offensive manner.
To conclude this chapter, the next section discusses the interaction between nom-
inal quantifiers and if -clauses. It turns out that if -clauses in the scope of such
quantifiers do not always pose restrictions on their domain. As a bonus, we will
discuss some ideas for analyzing this.
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5.5 If -clauses under nominal quantifiers
We saw that the Lewis/Krater analysis views if -clauses as all-purpose restric-
tors. If this is right, it is unexpected that if -clauses are reluctant to restrict
certain determiner-quantifiers, as pointed out by von Fintel & Iatridou (2002).
For instance, the following sentences are odd:
(63) a. At the party, I met some woman if she works for Clinton.
b. They invited at least three students if they oppose the policy.
(63b) can be repaired. However, the sentence then still doesn’t mean that at least
three students who oppose the policy will be invited:
(64) They will invite at least three students if they oppose the policy.
Similar for:
(65) a. Many of the students will succeed if they work hard.
b. 6≈ Many of the students who work hard will succeed.
(66) a. Few of the problems will be solved if we don’t use a computer on
them.
b. 6≈ Few of the problems that we don’t use a computer on will be
solved.
The non-equivalence between the (a)- and the (b)-sentences indicates that the
if -clauses do not restrict the domain of the overt quantifier. Instead, (65a) seems
best analyzed as stating that many of the students have a conditional property:
λx.(x will succeed if x studies hard) (I hope that this is intuitively understandable;
it remains to be seen what if means here of course). In a similar fashion, (66b)
makes a claim about the number of problems that can be solved without the
help of a computer. Relatedly, the if -clause doesn’t make it into the existence
presupposition triggered by the quantifier. Whereas (65b) presupposes that there
are students who work hard, (65a) merely presupposes that there are students.
Someone uttering (65a) is thus not committed to there being any students that
actually work hard. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for (66a) versus (66b).
In contrast, we saw that in (15a) and (15b) the if -clauses do seem to act as
domain restrictors. I repeat these sentences below:
(67) a. Most letters are answered if they are shorter than 5 pages.
b. ≈ most letters that are shorter than 5 pages are answered
(68) a. Few people like New York if they didn’t grow up there.
b. ≈ few people that didn’t grow up in New York like it there
In what follows, I will refer to the if -clauses in these last two sentences as ‘restric-
tive’, and to the other if -clauses above (i.e. those that are not interchangeable
190 Chapter 5. Domain restriction by if-clauses
with relative clauses) as ‘non-restrictive’. The following two questions will be
discussed:
• How should we analyze the meanings of sentences with non-restrictive if -
clauses?
• Why do these sentences lack a reading where the if -clause restricts the overt
quantifier? That is, what’s the difference between (65a) and (67a)?
In 5.5.1, we will look at von Fintel & Iatridou’s (2002) answers to these questions.
However, I will argue that their proposal isn’t satisfactory. Then, in 5.5.2 I will
consider an analysis in terms of scope, but we will see that this analysis isn’t fully
adequate either. In the end, then, we must conclude that there is still a lot that
we don’t know about the domain restriction behavior of if.
5.5.1 Von Fintel & Iatridou’s analysis
To distinguish between sentences like (65a) and (67a), von Fintel & Iatridou
(2002) claim that the Lewis/Kratzer theory should be restricted: if -clauses are
not devices for restricting the domain of any quantificational operator, but they
are devices for restricting the domain of quantifiers that range over possible worlds
(but I will argue that this proposal is unsuccessful).31 Quantifiers that seem to
range over possible worlds and individuals simultaneously are also of the right
kind. Von Fintel & Iatridou point to Goodman’s (1947) familiar distinction be-
tween accidental and lawlike generalizations. Compare:
(69) a. Every coin in my pocket is silver.
b. Every dime is silver.
It is most natural to understand (69a) as reporting an accidental fact, though it
can be read as reporting a policy of mine: for a coin to be in my pocket, it has to
be silver. In contrast, (69b) prefers a lawlike interpretation: only silver objects
can be dimes. The main difference between accidental and lawlike quantified
statements seems to be that the latter range over possible individuals, whereas
accidental generalizations are restricted to actual individuals.
Now, looking back to our paradigmatic examples of restrictive if -clauses, we
observe that (15a) and (15b) are easily read as generalizations about letters or
people in general. This could be taken to indicate that if -clauses indicate that
lawlike readings are intended. I repeat the examples:
(70) a. Most letters are answered if they are shorter than 5 pages.
31Von Fintel & Iatridou’s proposal is not meant to exclude that if -clauses restrict the domain
of adverbial quantifiers like usually. These are assumed to range over situations. Possible worlds
can be seen as maximal situations.
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b. Few people like New York if they didn’t grow up there.
If this is on the right track, then if -clauses should be odd under determiners that
cannot be read as ranging about possible individuals. This is exactly what we
find:
(71) a. Every book that I needed for the seminar happened to be on the
table.
b. #Every book happened to be on the table if I needed it for the seminar.
The if -clause variant is decidedly odd. As von Fintel & Iatridou suggest, this
might be due to the fact that (71b) is explicitly about a happy accident. This
clashes with the lawlike connotation of if.32
In light of these examples, it seems that a more constrained version of the
Lewis/Kratzer theory should be adopted: if -clauses serve as domain restrictors
of modal/generic quantifiers. The question is then what if restricts in (70a) and
(70b). Von Fintel & Iatridou assume that if restricts a covert modal operator,
which universally quantifies over possible worlds.33 In many conditionals, the
modal has an epistemic flavor, but there are exceptions.34 This leads to the
following analysis for (65a):
(72) Many of the students will succeed if they work hard.
(many x: x is a student)((all w: w is accessible and x works hard in w)(x
succeeds in w))
This is true if for many students x it holds that in all of the epistemically accessible
worlds in which x works hard, x succeeds. Quantification thus does not range
over students who work hard, nor does the analysis predict that (72) presupposes
that some students work hard.
To be sure, although we follow von Fintel & Iatridou here who frame their
analysis in the Lewis/Kratzer framework, the main ideas could be formulated in
terms of Belnap’s conditional as well. One could stipulate that ⇒ obligatorily
occurs embedded under a modal operator. Alternatively, one could define nominal
32Bart Geurts (p.c.) observes that the oddness of (71b) seems related to the relative order of
the if -clause and the matrix clause. For example, (i) seems quite good to him:
(i) If I needed it for the seminar, nearly every book happened to be on the table.
Von Fintel (p.c.) doesn’t agree that this is good.
33One could read von Fintel & Iatridou (2002) as a proposal that there are conditional con-
nectives in the logical forms of our sentences, but this is not the claim (von Fintel p.c.). The
analysis is intended to be an extension of the Lewis/Kratzer theory.
34Von Fintel & Iatridou list a number of properties that this modal must additionally satisfy,
but I leave these outside of the discussion. In particular, their modal semantics satisfies Con-
ditional Excluded Middle, which they deem necessary to treat if -clauses that are embedded
under negative quantifiers. In this section, we ignore such examples.
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quantifiers in such a way that they are not restricted to individuals for which their
scope has a truth value.
Epistemic containment
But how does this explain that some if -clauses in the scope of nominal quantifiers
are odd? For instance, we saw that (73) is a weird thing to say:
(73) I met some woman if she works for Clinton.
According to von Fintel & Iatridou this sentence is bad because the if -clause
restricts a covert epistemic modal, which is forced to scope over the quantifier.
As a result, the quantifier doesn’t c-command the pronoun, so it cannot bind it.
Von Fintel & Iatridou (2003) argue that epistemic modals take obligatory
wide scope over nominal quantifiers.35 Evidence comes from the fact that sen-
tence (74) is judged false in the context below. This indicates that (74) can only
mean that the speaker considers it possible that every student has left, i.e. that
the modal takes obligatory wide scope. The other reading ‘for every student x it
is possible that x left’ is unavailable:
5.5.1 Scenario
We are standing in front of a student residence. In some of the rooms the
light is on, in other rooms it is off. Imagine that every room is equipped
with a special device that automatically switches off the light if a student
leaves his/her room. We thus know that some students are home, because
some lights are on.
Now imagine that I say:
(74) Every student may have left.
a. may > every student (false)
b. *every student > may (true)
Von Fintel & Iatridou account for this by stipulating the following constraint on
Quantifier Raising:
5.5.1. Definition (The Epistemic Containment Principle (ECP))
A quantifier-trace chain cannot cross an epistemic modal
*Qi . . . [Epistemic Modal (. . . ti . . . )]
35Both von Fintel & Iatridou (2002) and von Fintel & Iatridou (2003) grew out of the same
longer paper ‘On the interaction of modals, quantifiers, and if -clauses’.
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The ECP forces quantifiers that have raised past an epistemic modal at surface
to reconstruct at LF, i.e. to be interpreted at the position of their trace. The
surface structure of (74) is thus:
(75) Every studenti may [ti have left]
In principle, there are two positions where the subject can be interpreted: at the
head of its chain or at the foot. The ECP excludes the first position. Conse-
quently, epistemic modals always take wide scope over quantifiers.
Now, how does this explain the oddity of (73)? Without the ECP (73) is pre-
dicted to have two LF configurations, depending on whether the modal scope over
the quantifier or not (for recall that if -clauses cannot restrict nominal quantifiers
on von Fintel & Iatridou’s analysis) (the following representation are directly
taken over from von Fintel & Iatridou (2003), I trust that there are intuitively
clear):
(76) a. some > must + if
some [λx. womanx] [λx. must. [λw. if shex worksw for Clinton][λw.
I metw x]
b. must + if > some
must [λw. if shex worksw for Clinton] [λw. [λx. womanx][λx. I metw
x]
The ECP rules out the configuration in (76a). In (76b), however, the quantifier
cannot bind the pronoun, as it doesn’t c-command it. This then, is why the
sentence is odd.36
But there are three problems with this analysis. First, it is not clear that the
ECP correctly captures the interaction between nominal quantifiers and epistemic
modality. There are clear counterexamples. For instance, Tancredi (2007) points
out that each differs from every in that it can take scope over an epistemic modal:
5.5.2 Scenario
It is the beginning of the semester and a teacher is looking over a list of
students enrolled in her class. The teacher doesn’t know who any of the
students in her class are. She sees the name Jones on her list, and thinks:
(77) Each student may be Jones.
36Actually, this is only part of the story. It seems that the ECP doesn’t explain why (i) is
odd, because the covert modal is probably not epistemic:
(i) #Every congressman is a Republican if he is from Florida.
To explain this example, von Fintel & Iatridou appeal to ‘iffiness’: the embedding modal
presupposes that for each x there are worlds in the domain of quantification where x is from
Florida. This seems problematic in (i): we know that not every congressman is from Florida.
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a. may > each (nonsensical)
b. each > may (true)
This sentence is judged true in the given scenario, but the ECP predicts that it
is false.
In some languages other than English, there doesn’t seem to be any problem
at all with scoping over epistemics. For instance, the Dutch counterpart of (77)
is true in the given context:
(78) Iedere
every
student
student
kan
may
Jones
Jones
zijn.
be
‘Every student may be Jones.’
See Huitink (2006, 2008).
On the basis of such counterexamples, we can conclude that it is not clear
that a strong principle like the ECP underlies the interpretation of (74). But
if we don’t really know what is going on in this example, we cannot trust that
the same mechanism is responsible for the oddness of sentences like (73). There
might not be an ECP.
The second problem with the ECP is that it is restricted to quantifiers that
take scope via QR. Arguably, the scoping mechanism for specific indefinites does
not involve quantifier movement.37 It is thus predicted that (73) is not odd if
some woman is a specific indefinite. I repeat the example:
(79) ?I met some woman if she works for Clinton.
It isn’t clear to me that this prediction is borne out. Even if I have a specific
woman in mind, this seems a weird thing to say. This is not because then one
would rather use the or a certain, as ‘I met the/a certain woman if she works
for Clinton’ is still bad. If we change the predicate, the sentence becomes better,
but the result is not equivalent to the relative clause structure: ‘I will invite the
woman if she works for Clinton’ 6≈ ‘I will invite the woman who works for Clinton’.
The final and most important problem I see for the analysis is that it pre-
dicts that if -clauses never restrict the domain of (purely) nominal quantifiers, cf.
Geurts (2005). That is, it is not predicted that (80) is interchangeable with a
relative clause:
(80) Most letters are answered if they are shorter than 5 pages.
≈ Most letters that are shorter than 5 pages are answered.
(80) would be analyzed as follows. The modal’s restrictor is left underspecified
here, but note that it cannot be an epistemic modal, for in that case the analysis
would contradict the ECP:
37For instance, specific indefinites have been analyzed in terms of choice functions (Reinhart
1997) and in terms of presupposition theory (van Geenhoven 1998, Geurts 2008).
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(81) (most x: x is a letter)((all w: w is accessible and x is shorter than 5 pages
in w)(x is answered in w))
But this only presupposes that there are possible letters that are shorter than 5
pages, not that such letters actually exist.
One might think that the existence presupposition can be attributed to an
actuality implication, but it isn’t clear that this would work. As we saw in chapter
1, some modals indeed imply that their complement is actual. It is tempting to
propose that the covert modal in (80) also behaves in this way. But the covert
modal in (82) does not, so there must be some meaning differences between these
modals:38
(82) Many of the students will succeed if they work hard.
6≈ Many of the students who work hard will succeed.
(many x: x is a student)((all w: w is accessible and x works hard in w)(x
succeeds in w))
What could this difference be? My best bet is that sentence (80) expresses a
policy about letter-answering, whereas (82) does not express a policy about stu-
dents succeeding. Arguably, the fact that you have a policy about letters that
are possibly shorter than 5 pages entails that such letters exist. However, after
pondering it for a while, the following is pretty good, and suggests that some of
my students worked hard:
(83) De
the
meeste
most
van
of
mijn
my
studenten
students
zijn
be
geslaagd
passed
voor
for
het
the
tentamen,
test,
als
if
ze
they
maar
particle
hard
hard
gewerkt
worked
hadden.
have+past
‘Most of my students passed the test, if they worked hard’
But this sentence does not express a policy in any way. To deal with this sentence,
it is simplest to assume that here the if -clause does restrict the domain of the
quantifier.
To sum up, if -clauses in the scope of a nominal quantifiers are not always
interpreted as restrictions on the domain of that quantifier. To account for this,
von Fintel & Iatridou claim that if -clauses can only restrict quantifiers that range
over possible worlds. Yet this may be too strong; this implies that if -clauses never
restrict (non-modal) nominal quantifiers. But the facts are that in some cases
they can. In the next section we will examine an alternative analysis.
38As pointed out by Hacquard (2006), in French and Italian, actuality implications arise from
the use of perfective aspect. Therefore, if the difference between (80) and (82) is indeed due to
(80) triggering an actuality implication, it is expected that speakers of French and Italian will
grammatically mark this difference. It is an open empirical question whether this is indeed the
case.
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5.5.2 Scopal ambiguity
In (Huitink 2007a,b) I proposed to analyze sentences in which a non-restrictive if -
clause is embedded under a nominal quantifier in terms of the conditional taking
wide scope. Take the following sentence:
(84) Few of the problems will be solved, if we don’t use a computer on them.
Intuitively, this makes a claim about the number of problems that can be solved
without a computer. This meaning seems to follow if the if -clause scopes over few.
If so, them can of course not be assumed to be bound by few of the problems, but
must rather be taken to refer back to the problems. But for (84) this seems right;
the sentence says that if we do not use a computer on the problems, few of them
will be solved, not that few of them will be solved if we don’t use a computer on
few of the problems. In my favorite analysis of conditionals, i.e. Belnap’s partial
semantics, (84) can be analyzed as follows, i.e. as making a conditional assertion,
while presupposing that there is a set of salient problems:
(85) (conditional) assertion of (84):
we do not use a computer on Y ⇒ (few x: x ∈ Y)(x will be solved)
presupposition of (84):
there is a Y s.t. Y is a set of problems
Thus, if the assertion of (84) has a truth value, i.e. if we do not use a computer
on the problems, few of the problems will be solved. This seems to be a good
approximation of the meaning of (84).39 The wide scope analysis of course raises
the question why the conditional should take wide scope in this case. This seems
related to the use of future tense. Perhaps future will does not like conditionals
in its scope.
Unfortunately, it turns out that the difference between restrictive and non-
restrictive if -clauses cannot be reduced to a scope ambiguity once and for all.
Sentences like (86) are problematic:
(86) Every professor will retire early if he is offered a generous pension.
This is a variation on an example by Higginbotham (2003) who argues that this
is not the same as (87):
39To be sure, the same story can be told given the Lewis/Kratzer theory. We must then
assume that the if -clause restricts a covert modal which takes scope over the nominal quantifier:
(i) assertion:
(all w: w is accessible and we don’t use a computer on Y in w)((few x: x ∈ Y)(x is solved
in w))
presupposition: there is a Y s.t. Y is a set of problems
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(87) Every professor offered a generous pension will retire early.
But it seems clear that the pronoun in (86) is bound by the quantifier. This
means that (86) cannot be analyzed analogously to (84). To be sure, Bosch
(1983, 133-141) argues for (88) that he is not a bound pronoun:
(88) No one will be admitted to the examination, unless he has registered four
weeks in advance.
In Bosch’s analysis, unless receives wide scope, and he is linked up to an inferred
referent: someone who is admitted to the examination. In the end, the truth
conditions he predicts are similar to ‘Anyone admitted to the examination has
registered four weeks in advance’. But this is saying that there is something
extraordinary about he, which is not too attractive. What we would like to have
is an account of the meaning of sentences like (88) that fits the null-hypothesis
about he: that it is bound by no one. Alas!
To sum up, the interpretation of if -clauses under nominal quantifiers is more
restricted than that of if -clauses that occur in the scope of adverbial or modal
quantifiers. We saw that von Fintel & Iatridou propose that this means that
if -clauses always have to restrict an operator of modal or generic flavor. But
this completely excludes the possibility that if -clauses restrict the domain of a
higher nominal. It is not clear that this is correct. We have also considered
a scopal analysis. But this analysis excludes that nominal quantifiers cannot
bind pronouns in non-restrictive if -clauses. Contrary to this prediction, it seems
that they can. The interaction between nominal quantifiers and if -clauses thus
remains puzzling.
5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter I made the following points:
• The following widely held belief is wrong: the only way to account for
the interpretation of if -clauses under quantifiers is by stipulating that if is
semantically vacuous.
• We can also account for the domain restricting function of if by adopting
Belnap’s partial interpretation of if.
• A partial semantics for if is plausible enough from a logical point of view.
• Moreover, once we adopt Belnap’s semantics, we have a straightforward
compositional semantics for conditionals.
• And it gives an elegant account of the behavior of conditionals in dialogue,
and of domain restriction by coordinated if -clauses.
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There is thus good reason to take Belnap’s semantics more seriously. But there
is also a lot of future research to be carried out. The most important question
is: why does the semantics work? I still have the feeling that we semanticized
something essentially pragmatic. Once we know what, perhaps we can do away
with Belnap’s semantics, and replace it with a completely pragmatic theory that
feels less stipulative. At the present moment, however, we do not have such a
system, and Belnap’s semantics seems the best account of if around.
Epilogue
We have seen that, in certain constructions, modal and conditional expressions
seem to fail to contribute their ordinary meaning. They may even appear to go
completely uninterpreted. Throughout this dissertation I have argued in favor of
analyses in which these items are treated as meaningful, even if they appear to
be redundant. This avoids the unfortunate consequences of accounts that treat
these items as semantically empty across the board. On such accounts, it becomes
problematic that modals and conditionals do seem to be meaningful in many other
constructions. This inevitably leads to the postulation of additional machinery
like covert operators just to get the interpretation of originally unproblematic
constructions right.
Let me now recapitulate the conclusions of each of the three main chapters.
First, in chapter 3, we have looked at modal concord, i.e. the phenomenon that
two modal expressions are interpreted as if fused together:
(1) Iedereen
everyone
moet
must
verplicht
obligatorily
Nederlands
Dutch
leren.
learn
‘Everyone has to learn Dutch.’
I have compared three possible analyses for sentences like (1). The first is the
‘logical analysis’, in which the accessibility relation underlying the modal expres-
sions is restricted in such a way that iterated modalities entail single modalities.
However, it speaks against this analysis that iterated modalities do not always
semantically collapse into one. For instance, besides a concord interpretation, (1)
also allows a reading in which each modal is interpreted: ‘it has to be made oblig-
atory for everyone to learn Dutch’. If iterated modalities by way of logic entailed
single modalities, this reading wouldn’t be possible. It could be pleaded that on
the double modal reading of (1), verplicht ‘obligatorily’ and moeten ‘must’ do not
express the same type of deontic modality, but I have argued that it isn’t clear
that this helps the logical analysis.
An alternative possibility is that modal concord is a form of syntactic agree-
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ment (Zeijlstra 2007b). Modal auxiliaries are semantically empty markers that
mark the presence of a possibly covert modal operator. The theory is implemented
by assuming a feature on each item, which is either an interpretable feature [iF] or
an uninterpretable feature [uF]. Uninterpretable features must be checked under
agreement against an interpretable feature of the same type:40
(2) [CPiedereen verplicht[i] moet[i]Nederlands leren]
But this analysis faces essentially the same problem as the logical analysis: the
auxiliary may be interpreted independent of the adverb. This is a problem, be-
cause the agreement theory says that modal auxiliaries are meaningless. The
only way to account for the double modal reading of (1) on the agreement the-
ory is by postulating that there is a covert modal present. However, one cannot
freely postulate covert modals, or else any sentence might make a modal state-
ment. Therefore Zeijlstra proposes an economy condition according to which
covert modals may only be posited in case the sentence would be predicted to be
ungrammatical without it. Yet this doesn’t work for (2): the auxiliary can have
its feature checked by the adverb. In virtue of the economy condition, it isn’t
allowed to appeal to covert material in (2), hence the agreement theory fails.
The last analysis that I discuss and end up defending allows modal adverbs to
type-shift into functions that take a modal as their argument and check whether
it’s meaning is the same as the adverb’s meaning on its non-shifted interpretation
(Geurts & Huitink 2006). This results in the following analysis for (1), where
c©verplicht stands for the type-shifted version of the adverb:
(3) Jmoet c©verplichtK = JverplichtK, iff JverplichtK = JmoetK
The idea is that the adverb restricts the domain of the auxiliary. In principle,
moeten is compatible with a wide range of modal interpretations, but addition of
verplicht suggests that a deontic interpretation is intended. However, as I have
pointed out in 3.1, verplicht can only do this when it is combined with another
necessity modal: verplicht mogen ‘may obligatorily’ has no concord reading. This
is captured by the adverb shifting into a function that ‘tests’ the meaning of its
argument. Unlike its contenders, the type-shifting analysis does account for the
double modal reading of (1): type-shifting is only optional.
One important difference between the agreement theory and the type-shifting
analysis is that the first is actually intended as a general account of concord
phenomena in natural language. In fact, it is an extension of Zeijlstra’s (2004)
analysis for negative concord. The type-shifting analysis was not developed to
have such a broad coverage. However, as argued in chapter 3, it is not excluded
that the theory can be made to work for negative concord as well.
40Recall that the adverb must be assumed to move to a position in which it co-commands
the auxiliary in order to be able to check it’s feature.
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Chapter 4 concerned the semantics of anankastic conditionals:
(4) If you want to go to Harlem, you must take the A train.
Such constructions are problematic for two reasons (i) the expression of intention
in the if -clause (want in (4)) doesn’t seem to make a contribution to the meaning
of the sentence, and (ii) in contexts in which goals other than the one introduced
by the if -clause are relevant, the intuitive truth value of (4) is opposite to what
is predicted by the standard semantics of modality.
To solve the first problem, it has been proposed that the if -clause minus the
expression of intention provides the domain of the modal (Sæbø 2001). Obviously,
this is a non-compositional analysis in which want is zapped. A celevr way to
safe compositionality is the proposal that (4) is ‘elliptical’ for (5) (or contains a
covert to-clause) (von Fintel & Iatridou 2005, von Stechow et al. 2006):
(5) If you want to go to Harlem, you must take the A train (to go there).
The idea is that the to-clause provides the restriction for must. The if -clause
does not contribute to the anankastic meaning of (4) at all. I have argued that
this analysis cannot solve all compositionality issues; one wonders why one would
ever utter (4), given that one could say ‘To go to Harlem, you must take the
A train’. The best bet is that the if -clause in (4) expresses some conditional
speech act that we wouldn’t get with the to-clause variant, but I have shown that
anankastic conditionals are not like other speech acts conditionals that we know
of: they do not match with relevance conditionals nor with factual conditionals.
In the end, von Stechow et al. (2006) propose that anankastic if presupposes that
its complement is true. But, as I have argued, this is way too strong. Conditionals
do not and even cannot presuppose their antecedent (as I also discussed in detail
in chapter 5). Anankastic conditionals are no different in this respect.
Another idea for anankastic conditionals is that, following a proposal by Frank
(1997), they contain a covert modal on top of the explicit modal, and that this
covert modal is restricted by the if -clause:
(6) [nec if you want to go to Harlem] [must (you take the A train)]
Evaluating (6) proceeds as follows: we first let the covert modal take us to worlds
in which you want to go to Harlem, and then we evaluate the proposition that
you must take the A train in those worlds. Since in those worlds you want to go
to Harlem, a teleological modal evaluated relative to such a world will be sensitive
to that goal. Of the existing analyses, this proposal is most attractive. I have
argued that the problems that have been raised for this analysis, i.e. that the
truth conditions it predicts are too strong, and that the putative modal cannot
be made explicit, can be countered.
As said, the second problem with anankastic conditionals is posed by scenario’s
in which multiple goals are relevant. Particularly challenging is the Hoboken
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scenario:
(7) The Hoboken scenario
In the actual world, w@ you want to go to Hoboken, but I don’t know that.
To go to Hoboken, one has to take the PATH train, while to go to Harlem,
one has to take the A train.
It seems that I can felicitously utter (8) in this scenario, and that I can truthfully
do so:
(8) If you want to go to Harlem, you must take the A train.
This is problematic under the following assumptions: (i) the modal quantifies
over worlds in which as much of your goals are realized as possible, and (ii) the
if -clause adds your Harlem-goal to the set of relevant goals.
In order to make sure that the hypothetical goal overrides any conflicting
goals that you might have, von Fintel & Iatridou (2005) propose that the modal
takes an additional argument, which is the ‘designated goal’, which semanti-
cally overrides any other goals. However, the analysis is not completely satisfac-
tory since it essentially treats a goal like a fact. Another proposal is made by
von Stechow et al. (2006), who claim that the modal has counterfactual seman-
tics. But this proposal is not tenable: we would have to make many questionable
assumptions about the similarity relation between worlds just to get the predic-
tions right. In fact, it seems that if anankastic conditionals are counterfactuals,
they can hardly ever be true.
As an alternative, I propose that in anankastic conditionals, the if you want-
phrase is interpreted as an if you only want-phrase, such that (8) is predicted to
mean that you must take the A train to achieve your one and only goal of going
to Harlem. Combined with the nested modality analysis, according to which we
evaluate ‘You must take the A train’ in worlds which satisfy the if -clause, this
predicts that (8) is true. The modal depends on what your goals are in those
worlds, and if all you want is to go to Harlem in those worlds, the modal will thus
be sensitive to the hypothetical goal only.
At the end of chapter 4, I discuss so-called existential anankastics ‘If you want
to go to Harlem, you can take the A train’. As pointed out by Nissenbaum (2005),
standing analyses cannot explain why conditionals like (9) are infelicitous.
(9) To go to Harlem, you can kiss Pedro Martinez.
According to all of the analyses mentioned above, (9) says that there is at least one
world in which you go to Harlem (in some domain, restricted according to your
favorite analysis of anankastics) and in which you kiss Pedro Martinez. There
probably is such a world, so (9) comes out true. But it sounds completely non-
sensical, suggesting that kissing Pedro Martinez is a way to get to Harlem. I have
Epilogue 203
argued that to deal with these sentences, we can either follow Nissenbaum and
assume that the to-clause is a rationale clause, but only for existential anankastics
(for the universal variant this wouldn’t be right), or we can follow von Fintel &
Iatridou’s von Fintel & Iatridou (2005) proposal that there is an extra require-
ment in the semantics of anankastic conditionals that the consequent must be
sufficient for achieving the antecedent goal.
Finally, in chapter 5 I have investigated an alternative for the Lewis/Kratzer
approach to domain restricting if -clauses. Conventionally, the fact that if -clauses
may restrict the domains of various operators is taken to indicate that there
are no real conditionals in natural language. There are just quantifier-if -clause
complexes. It would be hard to see how else a compositional account of restrictive
if -clauses is possible:
(10) a. Harry always succeeds if he works hard.
b. Harry never succeeds if he works hard.
In (10b), it appears that if means and, but this is not the case for (10a), there
it just means if. Apparently, the meaning of if depends on the properties of
the quantifier that embeds it! To avoid this kind of non-compositionality, the
Lewis/Kratzer analysis proposes that if is semantically empty; it’s sole purpose
is to restrict the domain of the quantifier that embeds it.
There is an alternative: adopt Belnap’s (1970, 1973) partial semantics for
conditionals, according to which a conditional only has a classical truth value in
case its antecedent is true, and its truth value in that case is the truth value of
its consequent.
(11) Jϕ⇒ ψKM,h(w) = 1, iff JψKM,h(w) = 1 if JϕKM,h(w) = 1; otherwise
Jϕ⇒ ψKM,h(w) = #
Combined with the assumption that quantifiers only range over cases in which
their scope is defined, this gives domain restriction. For example, the sentences
in (10) now say that in all/no situations in which the embedded conditional is
defined, i.e. in which Harry works hard, he succeeds.
By moving to a partial semantics, it seems that we lose the validity of logical
laws such as Contraposition and Or-to-if-inference. However, I argue that this is
not a problem; the apparent plausibility of such reasoning patterns depends on
the tacit assumption that all statements involved have a (classical) truth value.
That is, though ϕ ⇒ ψ does not classically entail ¬ψ ⇒ ¬ϕ, it does if we add
the premise that ϕ⇒ ψ is either true or false (i.e. it Strawson-entails ¬ψ ⇒ ¬ϕ.
In chapter 5 I argue that Belnap’s semantics is not only a tenable alternative
to the Lewis/Kratzer analysis, but that it might even provide a better account of
the meaning of conditionals. One argument comes from conditionals in dialogues,
and coordinated if -clauses. For instance, in the following dialogue, that seems to
refer back to the entire conditional uttered by A:
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(12) A: If this cat isn’t male, it is female.
B: That’s very unlikely.
But on the Lewis/Kratzer analysis, there is no conditional expressed by A that
can be picked up. Another argument comes from coordinated if -clauses as in
(13):
(13) If it rains or snows tomorrow, then if it doesn’t rain tomorrow, it will
snow.
Here the second occurrence of if seems to mean as much as and. The folkloric
Lewis/Kratzer analysis can account for this, but one wonders how the constituent
structure that the analysis requires can be derived from the surface structure. In
particular, it seems that then occurs in the wrong place in (13). On Belnap’s se-
mantics, on the other hand, the desired reading for (13) follows naturally, without
having to rearrange parts of the sentence.
I had to leave one important question open: what is the Belnap-partiality
supposed to model? It is clear that the undefinedness of a conditional whose an-
tecedent is not true has nothing to do with presupposition. As I have pointed out,
if conditionals presupposed their antecedent, they couldn’t exist. But it is an open
question what kind of other pragmatic phenomenon Belnap has semanticized.
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
Deze dissertatie bespreekt drie fenomenen in de semantiek van modale uitdruk-
kingen en voorwaardelijke zinnen die op gespannen voet staan met het compo-
sitionaliteitsprincipe. Dit principe stelt dat de betekenis van een samengestelde
uitdrukking een functie is van de betekenissen van de haar samenstellende delen
en de wijze van samenstelling. Het lijkt evident dat natuurlijke taal compositio-
neel is. Hoe zou het anders mogelijk zijn dat we zinnen kunnen begrijpen die we
nog nooit eerder gehoord hebben?
Zinnen met meer dan e´e´n modale uitdrukking krijgen echter soms een in-
terpretatie waarbij de modale uitdrukkingen lijken te zijn samengesmolten tot
e´e´n modaliteit. Dit gebeurt met name wanneer een modaal werkwoord wordt
gecombineerd met een modaal adverbium:
(1) a. Iedereen in Nederland moet verplicht Nederlands leren.
b. Frank Rijkaard moet gedwongen weg bij Barcelona.
c. Ik moet nodig plassen.
Zin (1a) zegt bijvoorbeeld dat iedereen Nederlands moet leren, niet dat het moet
dat iedereen Nederlands moet leren. Dit is onverwacht. Aangezien moeten en ver-
plicht op zichzelf volstaan om verplichting uit te drukken, zou (1a) krachtens het
compositionaliteitsprincipe dus een ‘verplichte verplichting’ moeten uitdrukken.
Dit verschijnsel, dat zich ook in andere talen voordoet, noemen we modal concord.
In hoofdstuk 3 onderzoek ik hoe modal concord het beste geanalyseerd kan
worden. Ik bespreek drie mogelijke analyses. De eerste stelt dat de betekenis
van modale uitdrukkingen zo is, dat de verdubbeling van zulke uitdrukkingen
semantisch equivalent is aan een modale uitdrukking in isolatie. Ik beargumenteer
dat dit te sterk is. De tweede optie is dat modal concord te reduceren is tot
een vorm van congruentie, zoals we dat bijvoorbeeld in het Duits zien (Zeijlstra
2007b):
(2) Du kommst
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Het subject is hier tweede persoon enkelvoud, en de markering -st op het werk-
woord moet hiermee congrueren (dus men moet in dit geval kommst zeggen in
plaats van komm of kommen, etc.). Het idee van Zeijlstra is dat modale werk-
woorden te vergelijken zijn met de merkering op het werkwoord in (2): ze voegen
zelf geen betekenis toe aan de zin waarin ze voorkomen, maar zijn er alleen om
te congrueren met het adverbium. De analyse stelt dus dat modale werkwoorden
volstrekt betekenisloos zijn. Ik beargumenteer dat dit implausibel is, omdat ze
in veel andere zinnen wel aan de betekenis lijken bij te dragen:
(3) a. Jan moet de afwas doen.
b. Misschien mag Jan dokter worden.
De analyse die ik uiteindelijk voorstel bouwt voort op Geurts & Huitink (2006).
Het basisidee is dat adverbia als verplicht soms slechts gebruikt worden om een
bepaald aspect van de betekenis van het modale werkwoord waarmee ze gecom-
bineerd zijn extra te benadrukken. Dat wil zeggen, in principe laat moeten ook
andere interpretaties dan verplichting toe, maar als het woord samen met ver-
plicht voorkomt, is er nog maar e´e´n lezing mogelijk. In de uiteindelijke theorie
kunnen woorden als verplicht volgens een zogenaamde type-shift-regel veranderen
in woorden die testen of hun argument wel de juiste betekenis heeft.
Ook de interpretatie van zogenaamde anankastische conditionals lijkt in eerste
instantie niet compositioneel te verlopen. Dergelijke zinnen zeggen wat er gedaan
moet/kan worden om een bepaald doel te bereiken, bijvoorbeeld:
(4) Als je naar de campus wilt, moet je lijn 10 nemen.
Echter, het doel waarvan hier gezegd wordt wat je moet doen om het te bereiken
is op de campus te geraken, niet op de campus te willen geraken. Met andere
woorden: het lijkt erop dat willen geen bijdrage levert aan de betekenis van (4).
Merk op dat de betekenis van (4) geparafraseerd kan worden als: ‘Als je lijn 10
niet neemt, kom je niet op de campus’. In deze parafrase vinden we het woordje
willen niet terug!
Om dit probleem op te lossen, is er wel voorgesteld dat (4) eigenlijk de vol-
gende vorm heeft (von Fintel & Iatridou 2005, von Stechow et al. 2006):
(5) Als je naar de campus wilt, moet je lijn 10 nemen (om daar te komen).
Dat wil zeggen, (4) bevat een om-zin, maar die is niet fonetisch gerealiseerd;
die wordt niet uitgesproken. Vervolgens neemt men dan aan dat de om-zin het
domein van kwantificatie van de modaal bepaalt. Omdat deze om-zin het woordje
willen niet bevat, levert dit geen compositinaliteitsproblemen op. Echter, gegeven
deze analyse is het vreemd dat we u¨berhaupt zinnen als (4) uiten; we kunnen
immers volstaan met ‘Om naar de campus te komen, moet je lijn 10 nemen’. De
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als-zin moet dus iets bijdragen aan (4), maar wat?
Uiteindelijk beargumenteer ik dat het de taak van de als-zin is om ons mee
te nemen naar situaties waarin je naar de campus wilt, en dat de modale zin
‘Je moet lijn 10 nemen’ relatief aan zulke situaties wordt gee¨valueerd. Omdat je
in zulke situaties per definitie naar de campus wilt, bestaat het domein van een
teleologische modaal, dat precies die situaties bevat waarin je je doelen bereikt,
automatisch uit situaties waarin je op de campus geraakt.
Er is nog een probleem met anankastische conditionals. In contexten waarin
je nog andere doelen hebt die in tegenspraak zijn met je hypothetische doel, zijn
anankastische conditionals intu¨ıtief waar, maar standaard analyses voorspellen
dat ze onwaar zijn. Een voorbeeld van zo’n scenario is:
(6) Je wilt naar de campus, maar je wilt ook naar het station. Lijn 10 gaat
naar de campus, en lijn 6 gaat naar het station.
Het lijkt dat (4) nog steeds waar is, ook in deze context. Maar als alle situ-
aties tellen waarin je zoveel mogelijk van je doelen behaalt, is dat niet zo. Dan
tellen werelden waarin je naar het station gaat ook mee. Om dit probleem op
te lossen wordt in de literatuur voorgesteld dat moeten in (4) niet simpelweg
zegt wat je moet doen om je doel te bereiken; volgens von Fintel & Iatridou
(2005) heeft moeten een speciaal argument ‘het enige doel dat telt’, en volgens
von Stechow et al. (2006) kijkt moeten naar situaties die zoveel mogelijk lijken
op het hier en nu. Echter, de eerste analyse is ongemotiveerd, en ik laat zien in
hoofdstuk 4 dat de tweede onwaar is.
In mijn analyse volgt de waarheid van (4) uit het feit dat de als-zin ge¨ınter-
preteerd wordt als ‘als alles wat je wilt is op de campus te geraken’. Dit betekent
dat de als-zin ons meeneemt naar situaties waarin je alleen naar de campus wilt.
In zulke situaties is het waar dat je lijn 10 moet nemen om je doelen te bereiken.
Je hebt immers maar e´e´n doel in die situaties: op de campus te geraken.
Tenslotte, in hoofdstuk 5 bespreek ik de interpretatie van voorwaardelijke
zinnen die ingebed zijn onder een kwantor:
(7) a. Harry drinkt nooit bier als hij uitgaat.
b. Harry drinkt altijd bier als hij uitgaat.
In (7a) lijkt als zoveel te betekenen als en. De zin zegt immers dat er geen situaties
bestaan waarin Harry uitgaat en bier drinkt. In (7b) is dat niet zo, hier lijkt als
gewoon als te betekenen. Dit betekent echter, dat de bijdrage van als afhankelijk
is van het soort kwantor die hem inbed: onder een negative kwantor betekent als
hetzelfde als en, maar onder andere kwantoren betekent het als. Merk op dat
dit in strijd is met het compositionaliteitsprincipe. Volgens dat principe is de
betekenis van een samengestelde zin afhankelijk van de betekenissen van de haar
samenstellende delen, niet andersom!
Om de betekenis van voorwaardelijke zinnen in overeenstemming te brengen
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met het compositionaliteitsprincipe is wel voorgesteld dat als helemaal geen
betekenis heeft (Lewis 1975, Kratzer 1981, 1991). Maar in hoofdstuk 5 bespreek ik
een alternatieve analyse. Die is oorspronkelijk te vinden in een artikel van Belnap
(1970, 1973) en stelt dat voorwaardelijke zinnen alleen waar of onwaar kunnen
zijn als hun antecedens waar is (als aan de voorwaarde voldaan is). Als we dan
aannemen dat kwantoren alleen ge¨ınteresseerd zijn in waarheid en onwaarheid,
volgt de betekenis van de zinnen in (7). De eerste zin zegt dan bijvoorbeeld dat
er geen situatie is waarin ‘Als Harry uitgaat, drinkt hij bier’ een waarheidswaarde
heeft en Harry bier drinkt, oftewel: er is geen situatie waarin Harry uitgaat en
bier drinkt.
Uiteindelijk stel ik dus voor dat voorwaardelijke zinnen soms noch waar noch
onwaar zijn. Dit heeft gevolgen voor de geldigheid van enkele belangrijke rede-
neerpatronen, zoals:
(8) De butler heeft het gedaan, of het was de tuinman.
Dus, als de butler het niet gedaan heeft, dan was het de tuinman.
Dit lijkt een geldige redenering, maar de analyse van voorwaardelijke zinnen die
ik voorstel, voorspelt dat (8) niet geldig is. Ik moet dus uitleggen waarom (8),
ofschoon niet geldig, wel erg aannemelijk lijkt. Mijn uitleg is dat wanneer we een
redenering beoordelen op zijn geldigheid, stilzwijgend aannemen dat de premissen
en conclusie een waarheidswaarde hebben (anders komt de geldigheid niet in
Frage).
Het doel van hoofdstuk 5 is om niet alleen te laten zien dat de analyse van
Belnap houdbaar is, maar dat deze ook te prefereren is boven bestaande analyses.
Een van de argumenten is gebaseerd op dialogen zoals (9):
(9) A: Als deze kat geen mannetje is, dan is het een vrouwtje.
B: Dat is zeer onwaarschijnlijk.
We begrijpen dat B het onwaarschijnlijk acht dat uit het feit dat deze kat geen
mannetje is volgt dat het een vrouwtje is (kennelijk heeft B weinig verstand
van biologie). Analyses die claimen dat als betekenisloos is, kunnen dit niet
verklaren. Maar als we Belnap’s semantiek volgen, is dat geen probleem. Een
ander argument is dat de volgende zinnen hetzelfde lijken te betekenen:
(10) a. Als het morgen regent of sneeuwt, dan sneeuwt het morgen als het
niet regent.
b. Als het morgen regent of sneeuwt maar niet regent morgen, dan
sneeuwt het.
Bestaande analyses kunnen dit alleen verklaren als ze aannemen dat (10a) in een
wezenlijk andere volgorde ge¨ınterpreteerd wordt, dan de volgorde waarin we de
zin uiten. In Belnap’s semantiek, echter, hoeven we dit niet aan te nemen om de
juiste lezing af te leiden.
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Ter afsluiting kunnen we zeggen dat in de bestaande literatuur een compo-
sitionele analyse van bovenstaande drie gevallen meestal ten koste gaat van de
aanname dat de uitdrukkingen in kwestie betekenisvol zijn. Bijvoorbeeld, in de
congruentie analyse van modal concord hebben modale werkwoorden geen beteke-
nis, in ‘elliptische’ analyses van anankastische conditionals, draagt de als je wilt-
frase niet bij aan de betekenis van de zin, en in de conventionele behandeling van
ingebedde voorwaardelijke zinnen wordt het woordje als betekenis ontzegd. Met
deze dissertatie heb ik willen laten zien dat dit weinig attractieve analyses zijn,
en dat het beter kan. Het enige wat we nodig hebben is de juiste analyse van de
betekenis van modale uitdrukkingen en voorwaardelijke zinnen.
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